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Preface to the English Language Edition
It is 2015 and I find myself in a situation similar to the one I found 
myself in at the end of 2008, when I was sending the manuscript 
for this book to the publisher. Was it necessary to make the situ-
ation I was discussing “actual” in order to address readers for 
whom what mattered, what they were in the process of living 
through was, primarily, the financial crash and its consequences? 
Or was it necessary to resist the manner in which a history, which 
is first of all that of a capitalism freed from what had claimed to 
regulate it, imposes its own temporal horizons?
The necessity of resisting hasn’t changed. Governments continue 
to proclaim their good intentions but “realism” has triumphed. 
Every measure that would fetter the free dynamics of the market, 
that is to say, the unalienable right of multinational oil companies 
and financial speculators to transform every situation, whatever 
it may be, into a source of profit, will be condemned as “unre-
alistic.” A carbon market, the source of lucrative operations, 
is perhaps OK, but certainly not the calling into question of 
extraction rights – we must keep the right to extract and there-
fore to burn up all the petrol and gas to which we can have 
access.
Thanks to the increasingly polluting (fracking) or dangerous (deep 
water) operations for the extraction of “non-conventional” energy 
sources, the idea of an energy shortage, forcing a transformation 
of modes of production and consumption, is now behind us. It 
seems that we have largely sufficient means to produce a degree 
of warming that would set off an uncontrollable disruption of 
the climate (runaway climate change). That the earth may then 
become uninhabitable for species which, like our own, depend on 
relative climatic stability goes without saying. That it may even, 
like Venus, become a dead planet is a question to which we will 
never know the answer.
8 What I had not foreseen when I was writing In Catastrophic Times 
is that the great “mobilization of America,” which everyone in 
Europe was expecting, would not take place. How many times did 
we, at that time, hear the comparison with the US entrance into 
the Second World War. Timid old Europe was doing all it could, 
but when the Americans finally understood, when they mobilized, 
then….We could count on the rapid, radical transformation of its 
economy, with the fervent support of an entire population. As 
is known, between 2007 and 2011 the percentage of Americans 
taking climate change seriously collapsed, dropping from 71% 
to 44%. For all those who were expecting the announcement of 
more constraining commitments from Copenhagen, there was a 
rude and painful awakening. Today there is no need to assert, as 
I did at the time of writing In Catastrophic Times, that capitalism—
some representatives of which claimed held the solution (so-
called green capitalism)—is fundamentally irresponsible. In fact, 
unregulated capitalism and its allies have refused the role that 
should have been theirs.1 It was the route of direct confrontation 
that was taken, with the determined negation of global warming. 
“Drill, baby, drill.”
Today, the grand campaign to deny the problem has run out 
of breath a little, but the second phase is being prepared. New 
voices are making themselves heard, asserting that it is impos-
sible to restrict emissions, which in the meantime have exploded. 
The only solution is geo-engineering, which will ensure that it is 
possible to continue to extract and burn, without the temper-
ature rising….
Geo-engineering might only be a dream, or the nightmare of a 
sorcerer’s apprentice. But the radical uncertainty with regard 
to the catastrophes that it is likely to produce, to say nothing of 
its effectiveness, won’t make the capitalist machine hesitate, 
because it is incapable of hesitating: it can’t do anything other 
1 Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2014)
9than define every situation as a source of profit. At the moment 
we are at the stage of fiction, but we know that soon this fiction 
will be proposed, and will try to impose itself, as the only “logical” 
solution, whether we like it or not. Logical because in effect it 
respects the demands of those who reject any calling into ques-
tion of the right to irresponsibility that they have conquered, and 
confirms that the techno-industrial capitalist path is the only one 
that is viable. Moreover, it implies the prospect of a mobilization 
of public finance – but obviously extremely profitably in private 
hands – and here the example of the US war effort becomes rel-
evant. This solution has an additional advantage, which is that if it 
should ever work, the war against global warming will never stop. 
Humanity in its entirety would be taken hostage, constrained 
to serve masters who will present themselves as its saviors, 
as those who are protecting it from an invincible enemy who 
must be kept permanently at a distance. In this way an “infernal 
alternative” will be fabricated at the planetary scale: either it ’s us, 
your saviors, or it ’s the end of the world.2
Today a new word has been created to characterize our situation: 
our epoch would be the epoch of the anthropocene. One need 
not be paranoid in order to ask oneself if the success of this word, 
as much in the media as in the academic world (in a few years the 
number of conferences and publications on the anthropocene 
has exploded), doesn’t signal a transition from the first phase—of 
denial—to the second phase—that of the new grand narrative 
in which Man becomes conscious of the fact that his activities 
transform the earth at the global scale of geology, and that he 
must therefore take responsibility for the future of the planet. 
Of course, many of those who have taken up this word are full of 
2 Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers, Capitalist Sorcery: Breaking the 
Spell, trans. Andrew Goffey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). The generic 
formula for the “infernal alternatives,” woven since the divorce between 
capitalism and the great tale of progress has become perceptible, is “you are 
envisaging resisting this quite unpalatable proposition, but we will show you 
that if you do the consequences will be worse.”  
10 goodwill. But Man here is a troubling abstraction. The moment 
when this Man will be called on to mobilize in order to “save 
the planet,” with all the technoscientific resources that will be 
“unhappily necessary,” is not far off.
In Catastrophic Times is neither a book of prophecy nor a sur-
vival guide. There isn’t the slightest guarantee that we will be 
able to overcome the hold that capitalism has over us (and in this 
instance, what some have proposed calling ”capitalocene,” and 
not anthropocene, will be a geological epoch that is extremely 
short). Nor do we know how, in the best of cases, we might live in 
the ruins that it will leave us: the window of opportunity in which, 
on paper, the measures to take were reasonably clear, is in the 
process of closing. It wasn’t necessary to be a prophet to write, 
as I have done, that we are more badly equipped than ever for 
putting to work the solutions defined as necessary. Those– most 
notably, scientists—who thought that it was enough to sound the 
alarm neglected the fact that political powers had just handed 
the rudder over to capitalism and had solemnly renounced any 
freedom of action.
We do, however, know one thing: even if it is a matter of the death 
of what we have called a civilization, there are many manners of 
dying, some being more ugly than others. I belong to a generation 
that will perhaps be the most hated in human memory, the 
generation that “knew” but did nothing or did too little (changing 
our lightbulbs, sorting our rubbish, riding bicycles…). But it is also 
a generation that will avoid the worst – we will already be dead. I 
would add that this is the generation that, thirty years ago, par-
ticipated in, or impotently witnessed, the failure of the encounter 
between two movements that could, together, perhaps have 
created the political intelligence necessary to the development 
of an efficacious culture of struggle3 – those who denounced the 
ravaging of nature and those who combated the exploitation 
3 This is not knowledge in hindsight. The missed encounter was lived as such. 
Some voices, like that of Félix Guattari, who, in his The Three Ecologies, trans. 
11of humans. In fact, the manner in which large environmental 
movements have adhered to the promises of “green” capitalism 
is enough to retroactively confirm the most somber of suspicions. 
But the retroactive justification should not erase the memory of 
a missed opportunity, of a blind division from which the capitalist 
sirens haven’t failed to profit. Capitalism knows how to profit 
from every opportunity.
What I was afraid of, at the time I wrote In Catastrophic Times, 
was a form of denial on the part of those who saw clearly that 
the threat of climate change could be an argument mobilized 
against unproductive conflict as part of the necessary reconcili-
ation between all those of goodwill. Faced with the danger of 
climate change, a “social peace” could be imposed, and a cul-
pabilizing bureaucratic moralism installed. Hadn’t we already 
started to hear that even the unemployed should learn to reduce 
their carbon footprint? Today, the fable of a supposedly green 
capitalism, bringing new, sustainable employment, the agent of 
peaceful, consensual adaptation of the “systemic” constraints of 
the climate, is not quite dead. But denying the threat of climate 
change is no longer necessary in order to denounce this fable. 
What we are now living is the waking nightmare of a predatory 
capitalism to which States have handed, in all opacity, the control 
of the future, laying the burden of the quasi-moral injunction of 
paying off “their” debts on their own populations and attacking 
each other before the tribunal of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in reaction to the slightest measure aiming to limit the 
predation. In short, it is more and more blatantly obvious that 
the oligarchy of the super-rich has acquired the power to put 
the world in the service of its interests. Many ecological activists 
today have become as radically anticapitalist as the militants of 
the Marxist tradition.
Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (London: Athlone, 2000) called in vain for the 
transversality of struggles. 
12 The old suspicions are tenacious, however, as is the attachment 
to conceptual grand narratives that are perfectly compatible 
with the mirage of the anthropocene (to wit this call to order 
from Alain Badiou, for whom ecology is the new opium of the 
people: “It must be clearly affirmed that humanity is an animal 
species that attempts to overcome its animality, a natural set 
that attempts to denaturalise itself.”4) Whatever the case may 
be, it is a matter today of at least trying not to let old, reheated 
hatreds poison the new generation, the generation of activists 
who, on the ground, are confronting a State rationality that has 
become the servant pure and simple of the imperatives of growth 
and competition, and of all those who – often the same – are 
experimenting with the possibilities of manners of living and 
cooperating that have been destroyed in the name of progress.
This book was addressed and is still addressed to everyone who 
is struggling and experimenting today, to everyone who is a true 
contemporary of what I have dared to call “the intrusion of Gaia,” 
this “nature” that has left behind its traditional role and now has 
the power to question us all. Formulating this question in a mode 
that helps them to resist the poisons we have left for them, the 
grand narratives that have contributed to our blindness, is its 
only ambition.
4 Le Grand Soir, “L’hypothèse communiste,” interview with Alain Badiou by 
Pierre Gaultier, August 2009. http://www.legrandsoir.info/L-hypothese-com-
muniste-interview-d-Alain-Badiou-par-Pierre.html.


Introduction
It is not a question here of demonstrating that the decades to 
come will be crucial, nor of describing what could happen. What 
I am attempting instead is of the order of an “intervention,” 
something that we experience during a debate when a participant 
speaks and presents the situation a little differently, creating 
a short freezing of time. Subsequently, of course, the debate 
starts again as if nothing had happened, but some amongst 
those who were listening will later make it known that they were 
touched. That is what happened during a debate on Belgian 
television about global warming, when I suggested that we were 
“exceptionally ill-equipped to deal with what is in the process of 
happening.” The discovery that such a remark could function as 
an intervention is the point of departure of this essay.
Intervening demands a certain brevity, because it is not a ques-
tion of convincing but rather of passing “to whom it may concern” 
what makes you think, feel, and imagine. But it is also a fairly 
demanding test, a trajectory where it is easy to slip up, and so 
which it is important not to try alone. That is why I must give 
thanks to those who have read this text at one or other stage of 
its elaboration, and whose criticisms, suggestions, and indeed 
(above all, even) misunderstandings have guided me and forced 
me to clarify what I was writing; that is to say, to better under-
stand what this essay demanded.
Thanks first of all to Philippe Pignarre who said “you can” 
to me from the stage of the first draft, to Didier Demorcy 
who ceaselessly awakened me to the demands of what I was 
undertaking, and also to Daniel Tanuro who gave me decisive 
impetus at a moment when I was seeking the right angle from 
which to approach my question. Thanks also to Emilie Hache, 
Olivier Hofman, and Maud Kristen.
Thanks to the members of the Groupe d’études constructivistes, 
and in particular to Didier Debaise, Daniel de Beer, Marion 
16 Jacot-Descombes, David Jamar, Ladislas Kroitor, Jonathan 
Philippe, Maria Puig della Bellacasa, and Benedikte Zitouni. 
Being able to count on the generosity of these researchers, their 
straight talking, and their practicing of an open and demanding 
collective intelligence, is a real privilege.
Thanks finally to Bruno Latour whose demanding objections are 
part of a process that for more than twenty years has testified 
that agreements between sometimes diverging paths are created 
thanks to, and not in spite of, divergence.
[ 1 ]
Between two Histories
We live in strange times, a little as if we were suspended between 
two histories, both of which speak of a world become “global.” 
One of them is familiar to us. It has the rhythm of news from 
the front in the great worldwide competition and has economic 
growth for its arrow of time. It has the clarity of evidence with 
regard to what it requires and promotes, but it is marked by a 
remarkable confusion as to its consequences. The other, by con-
trast, could be called distinct with regard to what is in the process 
of happening, but it is obscure with regard to what it requires, the 
response to give to what is in the process of happening.
Clarity does not signify tranquility. At the moment when I began 
to write this text, the subprime crisis was already shaking the 
banking world and we were learning about the nonnegligible 
role played by financial speculation in the brutal price increases 
of basic foodstuffs. At the moment when I was putting the final 
touches to this text (mid-October 2008), the financial meltdown 
was underway, panic on the stock markets had been unleashed, 
and States, who to that point had been kept out of the court 
of the powerful, were suddenly called on to try to reestablish 
18 order and to save the banks. I do not know what the situation 
will be when this book reaches its readers. What I do know is 
that, amplified by the crisis, more and more numerous voices 
could be heard, explaining with great clarity its mechanisms, the 
fundamental instability of the arrangements of finance, and the 
intrinsic danger of what investors had put their trust in. Sure, the 
explanation comes afterwards and it doesn’t allow for prediction. 
But for the moment, all are unanimous: it will be necessary to 
regulate, to monitor, indeed to outlaw, certain financial products! 
The era of financial capitalism, this predator freed from every 
constraint by the ultraliberalism of the Thatcher-Reagan years, 
would supposedly have come to an end, the banks having to learn 
their “real” business again, that of servicing industrial capitalism. 
Perhaps an era has come to an end, but only as an episode 
belonging as such to what I have called the first clear and con-
fused “history.” I don’t believe that I am kidding myself in thinking 
that if the calm has returned when this book reaches its readers, 
the primordial challenge will be to “relaunch economic growth.” 
Tomorrow, like yesterday, we will be called on to accept the sac-
rifices required by the mobilization of everyone for this growth, 
and to recognize the imperious necessity of reforms “because 
the world has changed.” The message addressed to all will thus 
remain unchanged: “We have no choice, we must grit our teeth, 
accept that times are hard and mobilize for the economic growth 
outside of which there is no conceivable solution. If ‘we’ do not 
do so, others will take advantage of our lack of courage and 
confidence.”
In other words, it may be that the relations between protagonists 
will have been modified, but it will always be the same clear and 
confused history. The order-words are clear, but the points of 
view on the link between these order-words that mobilize and 
the solutions to the problems that are accumulating—growing 
social inequality, pollution, poisoning by pesticides, exhaustion 
of raw materials, ground water depletion, etc.—couldn’t be more 
confused.
19That is why In Catastrophic Times, written for the most part before 
the catastrophic financial collapse, has not had to be rewritten. 
Its point of departure is different. This is because to call into 
question the capacity of what today is called development to 
respond to the problems I have cited is to push at an open door. 
The idea that this type of development, which has growth as its 
motor, could repair what it has itself contributed to creating is not 
dead but has lost all obviousness. The intrinsically unsustainable 
character of this development, which some had announced 
decades ago, has henceforth become common knowledge; this 
in turn has created the distinct sense that another history has 
begun. What we know now is that if we grit our teeth and con-
tinue to have confidence in economic growth, we are going, as 
one says, straight to the wall.
This doesn’t signify in the slightest a rupture between the two 
histories. What they have in common is the necessity of resisting 
what is leading us straight to the wall. In particular, nothing 
of what I will write should make us forget the indispensable 
character of big, popular mobilizations (let us think of the 
WTO protests in Seattle), which are peerless for awakening the 
capacities to resist and to put pressure on those who demand 
our confidence. What makes me write this book doesn’t deny this 
urgency, but responds to the felt necessity of trying to listen to 
that which insists, obscurely. Certainly there are many things to 
demand already from the protagonists who are today defining 
what is possible and what isn’t. Whilst struggling against those 
who are making the evidences of the first history reign, however, 
it is a matter of learning to inhabit what henceforth we know, 
of learning what that which is in the process of happening to us 
obliges us to.
If the, by now common, knowledge that we are heading straight 
to the wall demands to be inhabited, it is perhaps because its 
common character doesn’t translate the success of a general 
”becoming consciously aware.” It therefore doesn’t benefit from 
the words, partial knowledges, imaginative creations, or multiple 
20 convergences that would have had such a success as their fruit, 
which would have empowered the voices of those who had pre-
viously been denounced as bringers of bad news, partisans of 
a ”return to the cave.” As in the financial crash, which gave the 
proof that the financial world was vulnerable in its entirety, it 
is the “facts” that have spoken, not ideas that have triumphed. 
Over the last few years one has had to cede to the evidence: 
what was lived as a rather abstract possibility, the global climatic 
disorder, has well and truly begun. This (appropriately named) 
“inconvenient truth” has henceforth imposed itself. The con-
troversy amongst scientists is over, which doesn’t signify that 
the detractors have disappeared but that one is only interested 
in them as special cases, to be interpreted by their acquaintance 
with the oil lobby or for their psychosocial particularities (in 
France, for example, that of being a member of the Academy 
of Science), which makes them fractious with regard to what 
disturbs.
Henceforth we “know” and certain observable effects are already 
forcing climatologists to correct their models, making the most 
pessimistic of predictions produced by the simulations become 
increasingly probable. In short, in this new era, we are no longer 
only dealing with a nature to be “protected” from the damage 
caused by humans, but also with a nature capable of threatening 
our modes of thinking and of living for good.
This new situation doesn’t signify that the other questions 
(pollution, inequalities, etc.) move to the background. Instead 
they find themselves correlated, in a double mode. On the one 
hand, as I have already underlined, all call into question the per-
spective of growth, identified with progress, which nonetheless 
continues to impose itself as the only conceivable horizon. On 
the other hand, none can be envisaged independently of the 
others any longer, because each now includes global warming as 
one of its components. It is indeed a form of globalization that it 
is a matter of, with the multiple entanglements of the threats to 
come.
21One knows that new messages are already reaching the unfor-
tunate consumer, who was supposed to have confidence in 
economic growth but who is now equally invited to measure 
his or her ecological footprint, that is to say, to recognize the 
irresponsible and selfish character of his or her mode of con-
sumption. One hears it asserted that it will be necessary to 
“change our way of life.” There is an appeal to goodwill at all 
levels but the disarray of politicians is almost palpable. How is 
one to maintain the imperative of “freeing economic growth,” of 
“winning” in the grand economic competition, while the future 
will define this type of growth as irresponsible, even criminal?
Despite this disarray, it is always the very clear logic of what I 
have called the first history that prevails and continues to accu-
mulate victims. The recent victims of the financial crisis, certainly, 
but also, and above all, the “ordinary” victims, sacrificed on the 
altar of growth to the service of which our lives are dedicated. 
Amongst these victims, there are those who are distant but 
there are others who are closer. One thinks of those who have 
drowned in the Mediterranean, who preferred a probable death 
to the life that they would lead in their country, “behind in the 
race for growth,” and of those who, having arrived amongst us 
are pursued as “sans-papiers” (illegal immigrants). But it isn’t only 
a matter of “others.” Mobilization for growth hits “our” workers, 
submitted to intolerable imperatives of productivity, like the 
unemployed, targeted by policies of activation and motivation, 
called on to prove that they are spending their time looking for 
work, even forced to accept any type of “job.” In my country, the 
hunting season against the unemployed has been declared open. 
Public enemy number one is the “cheat,” who has succeeded in 
fabricating a life in the interstices. That this life might be active, 
producing joy, cooperation, or solidarity, matters very little, or 
must even be denounced. The unemployed person who is neither 
ashamed nor desperate must seek to pass unnoticed because 
they set a bad example, that of demobilization and desertion. 
Economic war, this war whose victims have no right to be honored 
22 but are called on to find every means of returning to the front, 
requires all of us.
This quasi-stupefying contrast—between what we know and 
what mobilizes us—had to be recalled so as to dare to put the 
future that is being prepared under the sign of barbarism. Not 
the barbarism which, for the Athenians, characterized peoples 
defined as uncivilized, but that which, produced by the his-
tory of which we have been so proud, was named in 1915 by 
Rosa Luxemburg in a text that she wrote in prison: “Millions 
of proletarians of all tongues fall upon the field of dishonor, of 
fratricide, lacerating themselves while the song of the slave is on 
their lips.”1
Luxemburg, a Marxist, affirmed that our future had as its horizon 
an alternative: “socialism or barbarism.” Nearly a century later, 
we haven’t learned very much regarding socialism. On the other 
hand, we already know the sad refrain that will serve as a song on 
the lips of those who will survive in a world of shame, fratricide, 
and self-mutilation. This will be: “Unhappily, we have to, we have 
no choice.” We have already heard this refrain so many times, 
most notably with regard to the sans-papiers. It signals that what 
had, to that point, been defined as intolerable, quasi-unthinkable, 
is in the process of creeping into habits. And we haven’t seen 
anything yet. It is not for nothing that the catastrophe in New 
Orleans was such a big shock. What is being announced is nothing 
other than the possibility of a New Orleans on a global scale—
wind power and solar panels for the rich, who will perhaps be 
able to continue to use their cars thanks to biofuels, but as for the 
others…
This book is addressed to all of us who are living in suspense. 
Amongst us there are those who know that they ought to “do 
something” but are paralyzed by the disproportionate gap 
1 Rosa Luxemburg, The Junius Pamphlet (Zürich, 1916) https://www.marxists.
org/archive/luxemburg/1915/junius/ch01.htm.
23between what they are capable of and what is needed. Or they 
are tempted to think that it is too late, that there is no longer 
anything to be done, or even prefer to believe that everything 
will end up sorting itself out, even if they can’t imagine how. 
But there are also those who struggle, who never gave in to 
the evidence of the first history, and for whom this history, 
productive of exploitation, of the war of social inequalities that 
grow unceasingly, already defines barbarism. It is above all not 
a matter of making the case to them that the coming barbarism 
is “different,” as if Hurricane Katrina was itself a prefiguring of 
it, and as if their struggles were as a consequence “outmoded.” 
Quite the contrary! If there was barbarism in New Orleans, it 
was indeed in the response that was made to Katrina: the poor 
abandoned whilst the rich found shelter. And this response says 
nothing of the abstraction that some call human selfishness, but 
rather of that against which they are struggling, of that which, 
after having promised us progress, demands that we accept the 
ineluctable character of the sacrifices imposed by global eco-
nomic competition—growth or death.
If I dare to write nevertheless that they too are “in suspense,” it 
is because what Katrina can figure as a precursor of seems to 
me to require a type of engagement that, they had judged, it was 
(strategically) possible to do without. Nothing is more difficult 
than to accept the necessity of complicating a struggle that is 
already so uncertain, grappling with an adversary able to profit 
from any weakness, from any naïve goodwill. I will try to make 
people feel that it would nevertheless be disastrous to refuse 
this necessity. In writing this book I am situating myself amongst 
those who want to be the inheritors of a history of struggles 
undertaken against the perpetual state of war that capitalism 
makes rule. It is the question of how to inherit this history today 
that makes me write.
If we are in suspense, some are already engaged in experiments 
that try to make the possibility of a future that isn’t barbaric, now. 
Those who have chosen to desert, to flee this “dirty” economic 
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seeking, here, means, in the first place, creating, creating a life 
“after economic growth,” a life that explores connections with 
new powers of acting, feeling, imagining, and thinking. Those 
who are doing this have already chosen to modify their manner 
of living–effectively but also politically: they do not live in the 
name of a guilty concern for their “carbon footprint” but exper-
iment with what betraying the role of confident consumer that 
is assigned to us signifies. That is to say, what it signifies to enter 
into a struggle against what fabricates this assignation and to 
learn concretely to reinvent modes of production and of co-
operation that escape from the evidences of economic growth 
and competition. It is to them that this book is dedicated, and 
more precisely to the possible that they are trying to make exist. 
It will not for all that be a matter of making myself into their 
spokesperson, of describing what they are attempting in their 
place. They are perfectly capable of speaking for themselves, 
because far from executing a “return to the cave” as some have 
accused them, they are expert in the use of websites and net-
works. They have no need of me, but they do need others—like 
me—to work, with their own means, at creating the sense of what 
is happening to us.
One should not expect from this book an answer to the question 
“What is to be done?” because this expectation will be deceived. 
My trade is words, and words have a power. They can imprison 
in doctrinal squabbles or aim at the power of order-words—that 
is why I fear the word degrowth with its threatening arithmetic 
rationality—but they can also make one think, produce new con-
nections, shake up habits. That is why I honor the invention of the 
names “Objectors to Growth/Economic Objectors.”3 Words don’t 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (London: Athlone, 1987). The 
reference is to George Jackson.
3 “Objecteurs de croissance” after “objecteurs de conscience”: a more long-
winded translation that would make the point would be to call them “con-
scientious objectors to economic growth.” —Trans.
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gled threats of what I have called the “second history,” on which 
we are embarked despite ourselves, raises. But they can—and 
that is what this book will attempt—contribute to formulating this 
question in a mode that forces us to think about what the pos-
sibility of a future that is not barbaric requires.
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The Epoch Has Changed
In the proper sense this book is what one can call an essay. It is 
well and truly a matter of trying to think, starting from what is 
in the first place an observation: “the epoch has changed”; that 
is to say of giving this observation the power to make us think, 
feel, imagine, and act. But such an attempt is formidable in that 
the same observation can serve as an argument to prevent us 
from thinking, and to anesthetize us. In effect, as the space of 
the effective choices that give a sense to ideas such as politics 
or democracy has shrunk, those who I will from now on call “our 
guardians” have had as their task making the population under-
stand that the world has changed. And thus that “reform” today is 
a pressing obligation. Now, in their case, to reform means to deny 
what had made people hope, struggle, and create. It means “let’s 
stop dreaming, one must face the facts.”
For example, they will say to us let’s stop dreaming that political 
measures can respond to the lightning increase in inequality. 
Faced with pauperization, one will have to content oneself with 
measures that are more of the order of public or even private 
charity. Because it cannot be a question of going back on the 
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of the last thirty years: one cannot interfere with the “laws of the 
market,” nor with the profits of industry. It is thus a matter of 
learning to adapt, with the sad sigh that kills politics as much as 
democracy: “sorry, but we have to.”
“We have to” is the leitmotif that Philippe Pignarre and I, in 
Capitalist Sorcery,1 associated with the hold that capitalism has 
today more than ever, despite the disappearance of any cred-
ible reference to progress. Our primary preoccupation was 
how one is to address capitalism starting from the necessity of 
resisting this hold. Here I am tackling the same problem, from 
a complementary point of view. If it is no longer a matter here 
of echoing the resistance of the antiglobalization – that is to say 
also, anticapitalist – movement, this is evidently not because it 
has lost its importance, but because it too is henceforth con-
fronted with a future whose threats have, in a few years, taken a 
terribly concrete turn. Those who, starry-eyed, put their con-
fidence in the market, in its capacity to triumph over what they 
can no longer deny but that they call “challenges,” have lost all 
credibility, but evidently that is not enough to give the future the 
chance not to be barbaric. And the disturbing truth here – when 
those who are struggling for another world are concerned – is 
that it is now a matter of learning to become capable of making it 
exist. That is what the change of epoch consists of, for us all.
To try to think starting from this “fact,” that is to say, from that 
which has, brutally, become commonly evident, is to avoid taking 
it as an argument (“the epoch has changed, so…”). It is a matter 
of taking it as a question, and a question that is posed, not in 
general, but here and now, at a moment when the grand theme 
of progress has already stopped being convincing. Thus the dem-
onstrations that capitalism gives us an illusion of freedom, that 
the choices that it allows us are only forced choices, have become 
1 Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers, Capitalist Sorcery: Breaking the Spell, 
trans. Andrew Goffey (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011).
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continue to adhere to the fable of the freedom given to each to 
choose his or her life. It is a matter then of thinking at a moment 
when the role – that was previously judged crucial – of illusions 
and false beliefs has lost its importance, without the power of 
the false choices that are offered to us having been undermined – 
quite the contrary.
The epoch has changed: fifty years ago, when the grand per-
spectives on technico-scientific innovation were synonymous 
with progress, it would have been quasi-inconceivable not to turn 
with confidence to the scientists and technologists, not to expect 
from them the solution to problems that concern the devel-
opment they have been so proud to be the motor of. But here too 
– even if it is less evident – confidence has also been profoundly 
shaken. It is not in the least bit ensured that the sciences, such as 
we know them at least, are equipped to respond to the threats of 
the future. Rather, with what is called the “knowledge economy,”2 
it is relatively assured that the answers that the scientists will not 
fail to propose will not allow us to avoid barbarism.
As for States, we know that with a great outburst of enthusiastic 
resignation, they have given up all of the means that would have 
allowed them to grasp their responsibilities and have given the 
globalized free market control of the future of the planet. Even if 
– it is henceforth the order of the day – they claim to have under-
stood the need to regulate it so as to avoid excesses. That is why 
I call them our guardians, those who are responsible for us.3 They 
2 I will come back to this question. I restrict myself here to signaling that what 
here resembles an empty order-word, for use in grand reports bearing on 
the challenges of the epoch (“our economy is now a knowledge economy…”) 
in fact designates a strong reorientation of public research policy, making 
partnerships with industry a crucial condition for the financing of research. 
This amounts to giving industry the power to direct research and to dictate 
the criteria for its success (most notably by acquiring patents).
3 As English doesn’t use the term “responsible” as a noun, “nos responsables” 
here has been rendered as “our guardians.” –Trans.
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much credit to ask them to give an account on this subject. It is 
for us that they are responsible, for our acceptance of the harsh 
reality, for our motivation, for our understanding that it would be 
in vain for us to meddle with the questions that concern us.
If the epoch has changed, one can thus begin by affirming that 
we are as badly prepared as possible to produce the type of 
response that, we feel, the situation requires of us. It is not a 
matter of an observation of impotence, but rather of a point 
of departure. If there is nothing much to expect on the part of 
our guardians, those whose concern and responsibility is that 
we behave in conformity with the virtues of (good) governance, 
perhaps more interesting is what they have the task of preventing 
and that they dread. They dread the moment when the rudder 
will be lost, when people will obstinately pose them questions 
that they cannot answer, when they will feel that the old refrains 
no longer work, that people judge them on their answers, that 
what they thought was stable is slipping away.
Our guardians are predictable enough. If by chance one of them 
read the lines above and noticed the direction in which I am 
heading, he will already have shrugged his shoulders: he knows 
what people are or are not capable of. He knows that the moment 
that I am evoking, when the rudder goes, will produce nothing 
other than an unleashing of selfishness, the triumph of dem-
agoguery. I am nothing but an irresponsible elitist who wants to 
ignore harsh sociological realities.
I don’t know what can be understood by “harsh.” I know that 
amongst experimental scientists – where I learned to think – one 
wouldn’t dare to talk in such terms before the corresponding 
statement “it is thus and not otherwise” had been submitted 
to multiple tests. Where are the tests here? Where are the 
active propositions that render it possible and desirable to do 
differently, that is to say, together for and, above all, with one 
another? Where are the concrete and collectively negotiated 
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learning and successes? Where, in schools, are the modes of 
working together that would create a taste for the demands of 
cooperation and the experience of the strength of a collective 
that works to succeed “all together” against the evaluation that 
separates and judges?
It is necessary to recall all that, that is to say, the manner in 
which we have been formed, activated, captured, emptied out, 
not so as to complain about it, but so as to avoid the impotent 
sigh that would conclude “we can do nothing about it, we are all 
guilty of being passive” – which is also to say “we must await the 
hopefully timely measures which, decided elsewhere, will force us 
to undergo the necessary changes.” The sentiment of impotence 
threatens every one of us but it is maintained by those who 
present themselves in the name of “hard reality” and say to us 
“what would you do in our place?”
To call those who govern us our guardians is to affirm that we are 
not in their place, and that that isn’t by chance. And it is also to 
prevent them, and their allies, from keeping on repeating, with 
the greatest impunity, what I have called the first history, that 
of a generalized competition, of a war of all against all, wherein 
everyone, individual, enterprise, nation, region of the world, has 
to accept the sacrifices necessary to have the right to survive (to 
the detriment of their competitors), and obeys the only system 
“proven to work.” Of all the claims to proof that we have been 
given, that is the most obscene and the most imbecilic. And yet it 
keeps coming back, again and again, like a refrain, and it asks us 
to pretend to believe that things will end up sorting themselves 
out, that, in the place of our guardians, we would do the same 
thing, and that our own task is limited to insulating our houses, 
changing our lightbulbs, etc., but also to continue buying cars 
because growth has to be supported. There isn’t anything to dis-
cuss here, anything to argue about – that would be to lend this 
claim some dignity, and to dignify it would be to nourish it. Better 
instead to renew the virtues of laughter, rudeness, and satire.
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to put oneself in their place, to refuse to argue, to refuse politely 
to discuss the virtues of the market and its very likely limits, is 
to refuse debate, that is to say, rational communication, that is, 
when all is said and done, democracy! Worst, it is to risk panic, 
the mother of irrationality, opening up the possibility of every 
kind of demagoguery. Isn’t their first role, for the difficult times 
ahead, to maintain confidence so as to avoid this panic? It is in 
the name of this sacred task that in the past, officials famously 
stopped the radioactive dust issuing from Chernobyl at the 
French borders. But this kind of heroic gesture has since multi-
plied, to the extent that the unavoidable imperative of having 
to continue as if nothing was wrong has imposed itself, with no 
other option than to call on the population to grit their teeth and 
not lose confidence.
In other words, our guardians are responsible for the man-
agement of what one might call a cold panic, a panic that is 
signaled by the fact that openly contradictory messages are 
accepted: “keep consuming, economic growth depends on it” 
but “think about your carbon footprint”; “you have to realize that 
our lifestyles will have to change” but “don’t forget that we are 
engaged in a competition on which our prosperity depends.” 
And this panic is also shared by our guardians. Somewhere they 
hope that a miracle might save us – which also signifies that only 
a miracle could save us. It might be a miracle that comes from 
technology, which would spare us the looming trial, or the miracle 
of a massive conversion, after some enormous catastrophe. 
Whilst waiting, they give their blessing to exhortations that aim 
to make people feel guilty and propose that everyone thinks 
about doing their own bit, on their own scale – on condition, of 
course, that only a small minority of us give up driving or become 
vegetarian, because otherwise that would be quite a blow to eco-
nomic growth.
I won’t go so far as to feel sorry for those who have taken upon 
themselves the charge of having us behave, but I am convinced 
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sion and not denunciation – as if they were indeed effectively 
“responsible” for the situation – that address could have a certain 
efficacy. In any case that is one of the bets of this essay. And the 
word “essay” finds its full meaning here. It really is a matter of 
essaying, in the pragmatic sense of the term, in the sense that 
the essay defines what would make it a success. As it happens, if, 
by speaking of our guardians I have permitted myself to con-
fuse that which, in a democracy, should be distinguished – public 
officials and politicians – this is not so as to defend a far-reaching 
conceptual thesis on the definition of the relationship between 
the State and democratic politics, but to characterize a situation 
of linguistic confusion that is characteristic of and established 
under the name of governance. The success of this operation of 
characterization will be nothing other than what one of those 
responsible will detest the most – that one refuses to put oneself 
in their position but that one pities them for being there instead.
Make no mistake: when I come to talk about capitalism and the 
State in a few pages’ time, it won’t be a question of definitions 
that would claim to bring to light the real nature of these pro-
tagonists better than previous ones either. I am not amongst 
those who are searching for a position that allows a permanent 
“truth” behind which what is now commonly perceived in the 
mode of a “change of epoch” is to be unveiled. I am trying instead 
to contribute to the question that opens up when such a change 
becomes perceptible: “to what does it oblige us?” In this regard 
I will offer neither a demonstration nor a guarantee, whether 
founded on history or concepts. I will try to think hand to hand 
with the question, without giving to the present, in which the 
pertinence of the responses are at risk, the power to judge 
the past. But also without giving authoritative power to the 
responses provided to other questions in the past.
And so essaying this first proposition – addressing ourselves to 
our guardians in the mode of compassion – doesn’t signify that 
the truth about public powers has at last been unveiled. It is a 
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that this is where we are, without making this into a destiny, as if 
the truth of the past was to lead us here, or a scandal, as if they 
had betrayed their mandate (the idea of such a mandate still 
supposes the evidence of progress), or even an accident on the 
way, as if such a route could be defined without any reference to 
progress.
My approach to the situation that puts “us” into suspense today 
corresponds to the difference between unveiling and character-
izing. To unveil would be to have one’s heart set on passing 
from perplexity to the knowledge that, beyond appearances, 
judges.  On the other hand, to characterize, that is to say, to pose 
the question of “characters,” is to envisage this situation in a 
pragmatic way: at one and the same time to start out from what 
we think can be known but without giving to this knowledge the 
power of a definition. It is what the writer of fiction does when 
she asks herself what her protagonists are likely to do in the 
situation she has created. To characterize is to go back to the past 
starting from the present that poses the question, not so as to 
deduce this present from the past but so as to give the present 
its thickness: so as to question the protagonists of a situation 
from the point of view of what they may become capable of, the 
manner in which they are likely to respond to this situation. The 
“we” that this essay has intervene is the we who pose questions 
of this kind today, who know that the situation is critical but don’t 
know which protagonist’s cause to take up.
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The GMO Event
To address those who can be characterized as our guardians 
today, in the mode of compassion, doesn’t mean any kind of 
sympathy at all, far from it. Rather it is a question of the dis-
tance to take, of the determined refusal to share their mode of 
perception, to allow ourselves to be taken as witnesses for their 
good intentions. There is nothing much to expect from them, in 
the sense that there is no point in going in for the torments of 
disappointment and indignation. But nor is there any point, and 
this is perhaps more difficult, in engaging in head-on opposition, 
armed with the evidence of a situation that is confrontational 
and intelligible only on the basis of this conflict. It ’s not that the 
conflict is pointless or “old hat,” it is its link with the production of 
intelligibility that is in question, which threatens to give answers 
before having learned to formulate questions, of offering 
certainties before having had the experience of perplexity.
I want to give thanks here to something that has allowed me, 
amongst others, to live through a learning experience that was 
crucial for me and without which this essay would not have been 
written. I’m talking here about the “GMO event,” because for me, 
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ance to GMO (genetically modified organisms) marks a before 
and an after. Not the before and after of a victory. That isn’t the 
case: genetically modified and patented organisms have well 
and truly invaded the Americas and Asia and, even if they are 
less frequently associated with their initial claim – responding to 
the challenge of world hunger – with the production of biomass 
fuels they found an amazing alternative promise. What made 
for an event in this epoch that is ours, suspended between 
two histories, what enabled the European movement of resist-
ance to GMO, to make the possibility of acting rather than 
undergoing felt, was the discrepancy that was created between 
the position of those who were in the process of producing more 
and more concrete, more and more significant knowledges, and 
the knowledge of those responsible for public order. It may be 
because of this discrepancy that they were incapable of rec-
onciling opinion with what for them was merely a new agricultural 
mode of production that illustrated how fruitful the relationship 
between science and innovation was.
Even the scientific establishment, in general always ready to 
lay claim to the benefits of an industrial innovation and to shift 
responsibility for their failings onto others, was shaken up. For 
example, February 12, 1997 was a terrible moment for French 
science: the Prime Minister Alain Juppé repudiated the Commis-
sion for Biomolecular Engineering by refusing, against their 
advice, to authorize the launch of three varieties of genetically 
modified corn. The Commission had a clear conscience. With 
regard to colza (rapeseed/canola), it certainly restricted itself at 
first to the “intrinsic” danger of the plant as a product of genetic 
modification, but gradually started to admit that a flow of genes 
that induce resistance to herbicides was going to be brought 
about and could pose a problem. A ban was unimaginable for the 
Commission but it envisaged possibly setting up a biomonitoring 
apparatus (in other words, this signified that commercial devel-
opment would also be an experimental stage, aimed at “better 
37understanding the risk”). But corn didn’t pose such problems 
because it doesn’t have parent plants in Europe! The French 
government had thus done the unforgivable, it had betrayed 
Science, given way to irrational fears, taken a position in an affair 
that wasn’t its concern, but that of experts.
In fact, the politicians had understood that the situation was 
out of their control: the scientists were openly divided, public 
research called seriously into question, militant actions had 
begun and, in the wake of the so-called mad cow crisis, trust 
in scientific expertise was at its lowest ebb. But what the 
politicians hadn’t foreseen is that more than ten years later they 
still wouldn’t have succeeded in “calming this down.” To their 
great dismay, and whilst they are subject to enormous pres-
sure on the part of WTO, the United States, industry and its 
lobbyists, including scientists, European national governments 
and the European Commission (EC) have not so far succeeded in 
normalizing the situation. What should have happened without 
any commotion and without friction would most definitely not.
Worse, and this is where the event is situated for me, the 
arguments that our guardians were counting on provoked not 
only responses but above all new connections, producing a 
genuine dynamic of learning between groups that had hitherto 
been distinct.
It is important to be able to say “I have learned” from others 
and give thanks to them. Thus what originally engaged me 
personally was the ignorant arrogance with which scientists 
announced a response to the question of world hunger that 
was “finally scientific.” I was also convinced, on the basis of the 
nuclear precedent, that only the public calling into question of 
a technology of this kind could produce a knowledge that would 
be somewhat reliable – in any case more reliable than that of 
experts who are most frequently in the service of the “feasibility” 
of an innovation that for them is part of the inevitable (“you can’t 
stop progress!”) As it happens I was really quite naïve, because 
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with was nothing less than reports prepared by the industry 
itself, reports that are usually remarkably slim, thanks, we later 
learned, to sleights of hand testifying to the connivance between 
industrial consortia and the US administration. And I also did not 
know that the majority of requests for additional information 
would come up against “industrial secrecy.”
Another point of naïvety was my not knowing that the over-
whelming majority of the famous experimental fields, the 
destruction of which was denounced as irrational, a refusal that 
science might study the consequences of cultivating GMO crops 
in an open milieu, were not pursuing this goal in the slightest. 
It was a matter of agronomic tests prescribed for the approval 
and thus commercialization of seeds. Another discovery was 
that for the biologists, it was obvious that “GMO insecticides” 
would greatly facilitate the appearance of resistant insects, also 
that Monsanto was organizing a veritable private militia and was 
encouraging informing on anyone who could be suspected of 
farming with seeds that it owned, etc.
But the repercussions of the event exceed the case of GMOs 
alone, leading to the question of what agriculture has become 
in the hands of seed industries, the seed lines that they select 
in relation to costly and polluting fertilizers and pesticides, with 
the resulting double eradication of often more robust traditional 
seeds and small farmers. And leading also to a veritable “object 
lesson” bearing on what is on the horizon today with the 
knowledge economy, to wit the direct piloting of entire sectors 
of publicly funded research by the private sector. Not only is the 
primary interest of genetic modification at the end of the day 
about the appropriation of agriculture through patenting, but it is 
research itself, in biotechnology and elsewhere, which is hence-
forth determined by patents, and not just by the possibility of a 
patent to be had, but by existing patents, which void more and 
more paths of research of any economic interest. Is it any sur-
prise then, that a heavy and ferocious law of silence weighs on 
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the service of everyone,” against what they know to be the case?
If the business of GMO crops was an event it is therefore because 
there was an effective apprenticeship, producing questions 
that made both scientific experts and State officials stutter, that 
sometimes even made politicians think, as if a world of problems 
that they had never posed was becoming visible to them. What is 
proper to every event is that it brings the future that will inherit 
from it into communication with a past narrated differently. At 
the outset, after having announced the amazing novelty of their 
creations, the promoters of GMO crops protested that they were 
in continuity with agricultural practices regarding the matter of 
seed selection. Today it is this very continuity that is the object 
of stories that are new or which have hitherto been considered 
“reactionary,” stories that resonate together and open the event 
up to yet more connections, most notably with those who are 
learning to renew practices of production that modernization had 
condemned (the slow food movement, permaculture, networks 
for the rehabilitation and exchange of traditional seeds, etc.).
Of course, the cry of our guardians has been about “the growth 
of irrationality,” “the fear of change,” “ignorance and super-
stition.” But this cry and the noble task that follows from it, that 
of “reconciling the public with ‘its’ science,” have had little effect. 
Moreover, the question of the “public” has itself been put in crisis. 
What do “the people” think? How do they “perceive” a situation? 
Traditionally, opinion polls responded to this question: one 
addresses a “representative sample of people” and asks them 
point-blank about questions that do not necessarily interest 
them. The business of GMO crops was an occasion when citizen 
juries demonstrated their capacity to ask good questions, which 
made the experts stutter – if and only if the apparatus that brings 
them together effectively allows it. Similarly, some sociologists 
brought participants in one study into public perceptions 
together in such a way that the participants felt respected as 
thinking beings. And the questions and objections that they 
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very worrying for those who are responsible for us. Thus, besides 
the question of knowing who would profit from this innovation 
for which everyone is asked to accept the risks, they posed the 
question of the tracking of the risks, the famous bio-monitoring 
that we have been promised: with what resources? How many 
researchers? Who will pay? Over what period of time? What will 
happen if things go wrong? Etc.
In fact, the apparently perfectly reasonable demands of these 
citizens sketch out a landscape that doesn’t have much to do 
with that claimed by the “innovation economy” on which it seems 
our future depends. For an industrialist they signify having to 
launch an innovation in a milieu that is actively preoccupied 
with consequences, that is entitled to detect them, that can set 
conditions – start small, for example, develop slowly so that one 
can retrace one’s steps – which demands that the promoter of 
the innovation finances the tracking but doesn’t organize it, that 
insists on all consequences being deployed, on no order-word 
or promise being taken at face value. A simple contrast: today 
Monsanto in fact profits directly from the proliferation of “super-
weeds” that have developed resistance to its herbicide, Round 
Up. These superweeds require more than ten or twenty times 
the usual dose of this product, a product that does not have the 
innocuousness originally claimed. Lie first, then say it is too late, 
cover everything with a morality of the inevitable, “you can’t stop 
progress”: that is what the freedom to innovate demands.
Today, citizen conferences have become an officially promoted 
symbol for the participation of the public in innovation, but what 
has been promoted has also been domesticated. Most of these 
conferences are organized in such a manner that the partic-
ipants are guided into giving “constructive” advice, accepting 
the limits of the questions posed, collaborating just like experts 
in the production of the label “acceptable”: a new type of rating 
for innovations. The domestication has been all the easier for 
the fact that apparatuses which induce submission and goodwill 
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put in place than those that induce a capacity to ask worrying 
questions. The fact of knowing that people can become capable 
of asking such questions, however, is part of the GMO event. 
Rather than moaning about this other fact, that it has already 
“recuperated,” it belongs to political struggle to invent the 
manner in which to make what has thus been learned count.
The GMO event has not been brought to an end. It brought to 
active, ongoing existence all those whose activation made this 
event, those who have populated a scene where they weren’t 
expected, where the distribution and the tenor of roles had been 
arranged in a mode that presupposed their absence. Would 
biofuels, presented as a miracle solution as much to global 
warming as to rising fuel prices, have been discredited so quickly 
without them? Pity the poor EC, which had already promoted this 
“solution,” to the great satisfaction of agricultural industrialists!
One must not go so fast, however. Certainly the GMO event 
constitutes an exemplary case for the bringing into politics of 
what was supposed to transcend it: progress resulting from 
the irresistible advances in science and technology. But it only 
partially responds to the question of the future. In effect, and 
contrary to what was the case with GMO, it will not just be a 
question of refusal. The responsibilities with regard to the accu-
mulation of damages and threats are evident. They do not refer 
in the first place to those I called our guardians, but to what has 
defined Earth as a resource to be exploited with impunity. We 
are not in a court of justice, however, where someone whose 
responsibility has been established must also answer for what he 
has done, from whom reparation will be sought. We were able to 
say “no” to GMO crops, but above all we cannot impose on those 
who are responsible for the disasters that are looming the task of 
addressing them. It is up to us to create a manner of responding, 
for ourselves but also for the innumerable living species that 
we are dragging into the catastrophe, and, despite this “us” only 
existing virtually, as summoned by the response to be given.
42 In order to mark the unprecedented character of this situation, 
the way in which it messes up habits and judgments, I have 
decided to name what is coming, which, unlike GMO crops, has 
neither been willed nor prepared by anyone. What we have to 
create a response to is the intrusion of Gaia.
[ 4 ]
The Intrusion of Gaia
It is crucial to emphasize here that naming Gaia and character-
izing the looming disasters as an intrusion arises from a 
pragmatic operation. To name is not to say what is true but to confer 
on what is named the power to make us feel and think in the mode 
that the name calls for. In this instance it is a matter of resisting 
the temptation to reduce what makes for an event, what calls 
us into question, to a simple “problem.” But it is also to make 
the difference between the question that is imposed and the 
response to create exist. Naming Gaia as “the one who intrudes” 
is also to characterize her as blind to the damage she causes, in 
the manner of everything that intrudes. That is why the response 
to create is not a response to Gaia but a response as much to 
what provoked her intrusion as to its consequences.
In this essay then, Gaia is neither Earth “in the concrete” and nor 
is it she who is named and invoked when it is a matter of affirming 
and of making our connection to this Earth felt, of provoking a 
sense of belonging where separation has been predominant, and 
of drawing resources for living, struggling, feeling, and thinking 
44 from this belonging.1 It is a matter here of thinking intrusion, not 
belonging.
But why, one might then object, have recourse to a name that 
can lend itself to misunderstandings? Why not, one friend asked 
me, name what intrudes Ouranos or Chronos, those terrible 
children of the mythological Gaia? The objection must be lis-
tened to: if a name is to bring about and not to define – that is, 
to appropriate – the name can nevertheless not be arbitrary. In 
this instance I know that choosing the name Gaia is a risk, but it 
is a risk that I accept, because it is also a matter for me of making 
all of those who might be scandalized by a blind or indifferent 
Gaia feel and think. I want to maintain the memory that in the 
twentieth century this name was first linked with a proposition of 
scientific origin. That is, it is a matter of making felt the necessity 
of resisting moving on from the temptation of brutally opposing 
the sciences against the reputedly “nonscientific” knowledges, 
the necessity of inventing the ways of their coupling, which will be 
vital if we must learn how to respond to what has already started.
What I am naming Gaia was in effect baptized thus by James 
Lovelock and Lynn Margulis at the start of the 1970s. They drew 
their lessons from research that contributed to bringing to 
light the dense set of relations that scientific disciplines were in 
the habit of dealing with separately – living things, oceans, the 
atmosphere, climate, more or less fertile soils. To give a name 
– Gaia – to this assemblage of relations was to insist on two con-
sequences of what could be learned from this new perspective. 
That on which we depend, and which has so often been defined 
as the “given,” the globally stable context of our histories and our 
calculations, is the product of a history of co-evolution, the first 
artisans and real, continuing authors of which were the innu-
merable populations of microorganisms. And Gaia, the “living 
planet” has to be recognized as a “being,” and not assimilated into 
1 In Capitalist Sorcery Philippe Pignarre and I affirmed the political sense of 
such rituals.
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rat, for example, is a being: it is not just endowed with a his-
tory but with its own regime of activity and sensitivity, resulting 
from the manner in which the processes that constitute it are 
coupled with one another in multiple and entangled manners, 
the variation of one having multiple repercussions that affect the 
others. To question Gaia then is to question something that holds 
together in its own particular manner, and the questions that are 
addressed to any of its constituent processes can bring into play 
a sometimes unexpected response involving them all.
Lovelock perhaps went a step too far in affirming that this 
processual coupling ensured a stability of the type that one 
attributes to a living organism in good health, the repercussions 
between processes thus having as their effect the diminishing of 
the consequences of a variation. Gaia thus seemed to be a good, 
nurturing mother, whose health was to be protected. Today our 
understanding of the manner in which Gaia holds together is 
much less reassuring. The question posed by the growing concen-
tration of so-called greenhouse gases is provoking a cascading 
set of responses that scientists are only just starting to identify.
Gaia then is thus more than ever well named, because if she 
was honored in the past it was as the fearsome one, as she who 
was addressed by peasants, who knew that humans depend on 
something much greater than them, something that tolerates 
them, but with a tolerance that is not to be abused. She was from 
well before the cult of maternal love, which pardons everything. 
A mother perhaps but an irritable one, who should not be 
offended. And she was also from before the Greeks conferred on 
their gods a sense of the just and the unjust, before they attrib-
uted to them a particular interest in our destinies. It was a matter 
instead of paying attention, of not offending them, not abusing 
their tolerance.
Imprudently, a margin of tolerance has been well and truly 
exceeded: that is what the models are saying more and more 
46 precisely, that is what the satellites are observing, and that is 
what the Inuit people know. And the response that Gaia risks 
giving might well be without any measure in relation to what 
we have done, a bit like a shrugging of the shoulder provoked 
when one is briefly touched by a midge. Gaia is ticklish and that 
is why she must be named as a being. We are no longer dealing 
(only) with a wild and threatening nature, nor with a fragile 
nature to be protected, nor a nature to be mercilessly exploited. 
The case is new. Gaia, she who intrudes, asks nothing of us, not 
even a response to the question she imposes. Offended,2 Gaia 
is indifferent to the question “who is responsible?” and doesn’t 
act as a righter of wrongs – it seems clear that the regions of the 
earth that will be affected first will be the poorest on the planet, 
to say nothing of all those living beings that have nothing to do 
with the affair. This doesn’t signify, especially not, the justification 
of any kind of indifference whatsoever on our part with regard to 
the threats that hang over the living beings that inhabit the earth 
with us. It simply isn’t Gaia’s affair.
That Gaia asks nothing of us translates the specificity of what 
is in the process of coming, what our thinking must succeed in 
bringing itself to do: it is a matter of thinking successfully, the 
event of a unilateral intrusion, which imposes a question without 
being interested in the response. Because Gaia herself is not 
threatened, unlike the considerable number of living species who 
will be swept away with unprecedented speed by the change in 
their milieu that is on the horizon. Her innumerable co-authors, 
2 Offended but not vindictive, because evoking a vindictive Gaia is not just 
to attribute to her a memory but also an interpretation of what happens 
in terms of intentionality and responsibility. For the same reason, to speak 
of the “revenge” of Gaia, as James Lovelock does today, is to mobilize a 
type of psychology that doesn’t seem relevant: one takes revenge against 
someone, whereas the question of offense is one of a matter of post-factum 
observation. For example, one says “it seems that this gesture offended 
her, I wonder why?” Correlatively one doesn’t struggle against Gaia. Even 
speaking of combating global warming is inappropriate. If it is a matter of 
struggling, it is against what provoked Gaia, not against her response.
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her regime of existence, that of a living planet. And it is precisely 
because she is not threatened that she makes the epic versions 
of human history, in which Man, standing up on his hind legs and 
learning to decipher the laws of nature, understands that he is 
the master of his own fate, free of any transcendence, look rather 
old. Gaia is the name of an unprecedented or forgotten form of 
transcendence: a transcendence deprived of the noble qualities 
that would allow it to be invoked as an arbiter, guarantor, or 
resource; a ticklish assemblage of forces that are indifferent to 
our reasons and our projects.
The intrusion of this type of transcendence, which I am calling 
Gaia, makes a major unknown, which is here to stay, exist at the 
heart of our lives. This is perhaps what is most difficult to concep-
tualize: no future can be foreseen in which she will give back to 
us the liberty of ignoring her. It is not a matter of a “bad moment 
that will pass,” followed by any kind of happy ending – in the 
shoddy sense of a “problem solved.” We are no longer author-
ized to forget her. We will have to go on answering for what we 
are undertaking in the face of an implacable being who is deaf to 
our justifications. A being who has no spokesperson, or rather, 
whose spokespersons are exposed to fearsome temptations. We 
know the old ditty, which generally comes from well-fed experts, 
accustomed to flying, to the effect that “the problem is, there are 
too many of us,” numbers whose “disappearance” would permit 
significant energy savings. But if we listen to Lovelock, who has 
become the prophet of disaster, it would be necessary to reduce 
the human population to about 500 million people in order to 
pacify Gaia and live reasonably well in harmony with her. The so-
called rational calculations, which result in the conclusion that the 
only solution is to eradicate the vast majority of humans between 
now and the end of the century, scarcely dissimulate the delusion 
of a murderous and obscene abstraction. Gaia does not demand 
such eradication. She doesn’t demand anything.
48 To name Gaia  – that is to say, to associate an assemblage of 
material processes that demand neither to be protected nor to be 
loved, and which cannot be moved by the public manifestation of 
our remorse, with the intrusion of a form of transcendence into 
our history – ought not especially to shock most scientists. They 
themselves are in the habit of giving names to what they rec-
ognize has the power to make them think and imagine – and this 
is the very sense of the transcendence that I associate with Gaia. 
Those who have set up camp in the position of the guardians of 
reason and progress will certainly scream about irrationality. 
They will denounce a panicky regression that would make us 
forget the “heritage of the Enlightenment,” the grand narrative 
of human emancipation shaking off the yoke of transcendences. 
Their role has already been assigned. After having contributed 
to skepticism with regard to climate change (think of Claude 
Allègre3), they will devote all their energy to reminding an always 
credulous public opinion that it must not be diverted, that it must 
believe in the destiny of Man and in his capacity to triumph in 
the face of every challenge. Concretely, this signifies the duty to 
believe in science, the brains of humanity, and in technology, in 
the service of progress. Provoking their yelling is something that 
neither amuses nor scares me.
The operation of naming is therefore not in the least bit anti-
scientific. On the other hand, it may make scientists think, and 
prevent them from appropriating the question imposed by the 
intrusion of Gaia.  Climate scientists, glaciologists, chemists, and 
others have done their work and they have also succeeded in 
making the alarm bells ring despite all the attempts to stifle them, 
imposing an “inconvenient truth” despite all the accusations 
that have been leveled against them, of having mixed up science 
and politics, or of being jealous of the successes of their col-
leagues, whose work has succeeded in changing the world where 
3 French politician and scientist, minister of education under Lionel Jospin, 
and visible climate change skeptic. –Trans.
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“proven” something that is only hypothetical. They have been 
able to resist because they knew that time counted, and that it 
wasn’t them, but that to which they were addressing themselves 
that in fact mixed up scientific and political questions, or, more 
precisely, aimed at substituting itself for politics and imposing its 
imperatives on the entire planet. To name Gaia is finally to help 
scientists resist a new threat, one which this time would fabricate 
the worst of confusions between science and politics: that one 
ask them how to respond, that one trust in them to define what it 
is appropriate to do.
Moreover, that is what is in the process of happening, but with 
other types of “scientists.” Nowadays it is economists who have 
become active, and in a way which guarantees that like many 
unwanted effects, the climate question will be envisaged from 
the point of view of strategies that are plausible, that is to say, 
are likely to make it a new source of profit. Even if this means 
being resigned – in the name of economic laws (which are harsh, 
they will affirm, but which are laws, after all) – to a planetary 
New Orleans. Even if it means that zones on the planet that are 
defined as profitable must, at all scales – from the neighborhood 
to the continent – protect themselves by every means necessary 
from the mass of those who will doubtless be opposed to the 
famous “we cannot take care of all the woes of the world.” In 
short, even if the succession of “sorry, but we musts” establishes, 
completely, and openly deployed, the barbarism that is already in 
the process of penetrating our world.
Economists and other candidates for the production of global 
responses based on “science” only exist for me as a power to 
harm. Their authority only exists to the extent that the world, our 
world, remains what it is – that is to say, destined for barbarism. 
Their laws suppose, above all, that we stay in our places, keep 
the roles assigned to us, that we have the blind self-interest and 
congenital incapacity to think and cooperate that makes an all 
azimuths economic war the only conceivable horizon. It would 
50 be completely pointless to name Gaia if it was just a matter of 
combating them. But it is a matter of combating what gives them 
their authority. Of that against which the cry “another world is 
possible!” was raised.
This cry really hasn’t lost any of its topicality. Because that 
against which it was raised – capitalism, the capitalism of Marx, 
of course, not of American economists – is already busying itself 
concocting its own responses to the question imposed on us, 
responses that lead straight to barbarism. This is to say that the 
struggle assumes an unprecedented urgency but that those who 
are engaged in this struggle must also face a test that they didn’t 
really need, which, in the name of that urgency they might be 
tempted to abstract out. To name Gaia is to name the necessity 
of resisting this temptation, the necessity of starting out from the 
acceptance of this testing challenge: we do not have any choice, 
because she will not wait.
Do not ask me to sketch what other world may be able to come to 
terms, or compose, with Gaia. The response doesn’t belong to us, 
that is to those who have both provoked her intrusion and now 
decipher it through data, models, and simulations. Naming Gaia 
is naming a question, but emphatically not defining the terms of 
the answer, as such a definition would give us, us again, always 
us, the first and last word. Learning to compose will need many 
names, not a global one, the voices of many peoples, knowledges, 
and earthly practices. It belongs to a process of multifold 
creation, the terrible difficulty of which it would be foolish and 
dangerous to underestimate but which it would be suicidal to think 
of as impossible. There will be no response other than the barbaric 
if we do not learn to couple together multiple, divergent strug-
gles and engagements in this process of creation, as hesitant and 
stammering as it may be.
[ 5 ]
Capitalism
I have spoken of those who are responsible for us, those who 
have assumed the role of our guardians and present themselves 
as such, even whilst they are in a state of frozen panic. On the 
other hand, what Marx called capitalism doesn’t experience 
a panic of this kind, even whilst the type of development it is 
responsible for is called into question by the intrusion of Gaia. 
And it experiences neither panic nor even hesitation because, 
quite simply, it is not equipped for that. That in any case is why one 
can inscribe oneself in Marx’s heritage without for all that being 
“Marxist.” Those who say to us “Marx is history,” with an obscene, 
satisfied little smile, generally avoid saying to us why capitalism 
such as Marx named it is no longer a problem. They only imply 
that it is invincible. Today those who talk about the vanity of 
struggling against capitalism are de facto saying “barbarism is 
our destiny.”
If we need, now more than ever, perhaps, the manner in which 
Marx outlined capitalism – even if it means “characterizing” it 
where he proposed to define it – this is first of all so as not to 
entertain the hope that, necessity being the law, “they” will end 
52 up doubting, understanding that it is the future which is at stake 
here, that of their children as well as ours. That is to say also so 
as not to waste our time becoming indignant, denouncing, finally 
only to draw the darkest of conclusions about the flaws of the 
species, which in the end would only be getting what it deserves. 
What Marx named capitalism doesn’t speak to us about humans, 
it doesn’t translate their greed, their self-interest, or their 
inability to pose questions about the future.
Of course – and this is the very sense of Marx’s character-
ization of capitalism – businessmen, as individuals, are like 
everyone else. It is not impossible that in the 1980s, some 
may have believed in the “citizen enterprise,” to which it was 
a matter of reconciling the French people. Are they the same 
bosses or different ones who now remind us that at a time of 
outsourcing and mergers the only business of the enterprise is 
to make money? The question is insignificant: the conjuncture 
has changed. Similarly today certain amongst them are perhaps 
terribly disturbed, whilst others place their trust in the market, 
whose capacity for adaptation and innovation should respond to 
the problem posed by the intrusion of Gaia. When it is a matter 
of capitalism, individual psychology is completely irrelevant. 
Capitalism must be understood instead as a mode of functioning, 
a machine, which fabricates its own necessity, its own actors, in 
every conjuncture, and destroys those who haven’t been able to 
saddle up for the new opportunities.
In their own way this is what is recognized by the servile or 
divinatory economists who talk about the laws of the market that 
impose themselves whatever our projects and futile hopes might 
be. Capitalism does, in effect, have something transcendent 
about it, but not in the sense of the laws of nature. Nor in the 
sense that I have associated with Gaia either, which is most 
certainly implacable, but in a mode that I would call properly 
materialist, translating the untameable character of assem-
blages that couple together those material processes on whose 
stability what has been called development thought it could 
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radically irresponsible, incapable of answering for anything. And it 
has nothing to do with the materialism that people of faith often 
associate with it. In contrast to Gaia, one ought to associate it 
instead with a power of a (maleficent) “spiritual” type,1 a power 
that captures, segments and redefines always more and more 
dimensions of what makes up our reality, our lives, our practices, 
in its service.
That I have been led to characterize both the assemblage of 
coupled material processes that I named Gaia and the regime of 
economic functioning that Marx named capitalism by a mode of 
transcendence highlights the particularity of our epoch, that is to 
say, the global character of the questions to which they oblige us 
in both cases. The contemporaneity of these two modes of tran-
scendence is evidently no accident: the brutality of the intrusion 
of Gaia corresponds to the brutality of what has provoked her, 
that of a development that is blind to its consequences, or which, 
more precisely, only takes its consequences into account from the 
point of view of the new sources of profit they can bring about. 
But the questions of contemporaneity they pose don’t imply any 
confusion within the responses. Struggling against Gaia makes no 
sense – it is a matter of learning to compose with her. Composing 
with capitalism makes no sense – it is a matter of struggling 
against its stranglehold.
You will have understood that to trust in capitalism as it presents 
itself today, as the “best friend of the earth,” as “green,” con-
cerned about protection and sustainability, would be to commit 
the same kind of error as the frog in the fable, who agrees to 
carry a scorpion on his back across the river. If the scorpion 
stung him, wouldn’t they both drown? And yet the scorpion stings 
him, right in the middle of the river. With his last breath the frog 
murmured “why?” to which the scorpion, just before sinking, 
1 What Philippe Pignarre and I have associated with the power of the sorcerer 
to cast spells.
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nature of capitalism to exploit opportunities: it cannot help doing 
it.
The logic of capitalist functioning cannot do anything other 
than identify the intrusion of Gaia with the appearance of a 
new field of opportunity. Questioning the (bronze-cast) laws of 
free exchange is something, then, that it cannot envisage. On 
the other hand, carbon quotas are welcome, permitting as they 
already do highly fruitful financial operations. Correlatively, the 
GMO event clearly translates what must, from the point of view 
of this logic, be avoided, what those who are responsible for us 
have taken it upon themselves to avoid, and which will have to be 
so all the more when the effects of Gaia’s intrusion become cata-
strophic: the production of collective capacities to meddle with 
questions that concern the common future. Discussing details 
of a solution may be tolerated, but meddling with the manner in 
which questions are formulated will not.
Governance is well named. It describes well the destruction of 
what is implied by a collective responsibility with regard to the 
future, that is to say, politics. With governance, it is no longer a 
matter of politics but of management, and, in the first place, the 
management of a population that must not meddle with what 
concerns it. In the case of GMO crops, our guardians failed in the 
task they were allotted, from the point of view of the distribution 
of what capitalism makes the State do and what the State leaves 
capitalism free to do. They could not get people to accept that 
GMO crops constituted, if not a benefit for humanity, at least a 
fact that it was impossible to resist. They were not able to leave 
capitalism free to do what it had the opportunity to do thanks to 
GMOs – complete the redefinition of agriculture by submitting 
it to patent law. Or not without snags, friction or noise, at least. 
Capitalism doesn’t like noise.
But we must not go too quickly and constitute the refusal of 
GMOs as a model for the unexpected resistance with which the 
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course, GMOs are now almost everywhere – the success is the 
“almost” – but above all because this refusal benefited from the 
effect of surprise. GMOs were supposed to happen without too 
much friction, in the name of the progress that the holy alliance 
between scientific research and human progress brings. Indus-
trial consortia and their scientific allies noted, to their great 
consternation, that it no longer worked as a charm, that the 
reference to progress had lost (part of) its power. But one can 
think that the lesson has been learned and that in future, the 
progress argument – which turned out to be unable to create 
a consensus – will be replaced by the kind of well-concocted 
montages of what Philippe Pignarre and I, in Capitalist Sorcery, 
called “infernal alternatives.”
Everyone is now familiar with what these alternatives produce: 
“you refuse to accept a reduction in living standards and are 
calling for a raise? Then business will locate elsewhere….”; “you 
refuse to accept unbearable levels of work? Then there are plenty 
of others who will happily take your place….” Every situation 
in which infernal alternatives are imposed is the “the fruit of 
patient processes of fabrication at a very small scale, of careful 
experiment, because it is always a question of capturing without 
creating too much alarm, or by creating false alarms.”2 What 
presents itself as a logical consequence (then…) has been fab-
ricated by multiple processes of so-called rational reorganization 
that in the first place aimed at sapping or capturing the capacities 
for thinking and resisting of those who were apt to do so. That 
is why infernal alternatives first concerned the world of labor – 
questions of retirement, flexibility, salaries, the organization of 
work, etc. Today, the rhetoric announcing that it is impossible 
or suicidal to refuse what one doesn’t want has become auto-
nomous. Thus, we are told that to struggle against the exorbitant 
price of patented medicine, even if only for the poor, is to 
2 Pignarre and Stengers, Capitalist Sorcery, 28.
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The rhetoric, as repeated at the level of the State, is now sufficient 
to freeze a situation.
It is such a rhetoric that was used in face of the unexpected 
refusal of GMOs. Alternatives with an infernal mission were 
quickly cobbled together – for example “if you refuse GMOs, 
there will be a brain drain,” or “you will slow us down in the 
great economic race,” or “you won’t get the second-generation 
GMOs, which will be really beneficial.” But it was too late and not 
at all convincing, because the proposition “GMO” didn’t crown 
a montage that would authorize the infernal argument “if you 
refuse GMOs, the result will be worse.” We can, however, foresee 
the proliferation of more convincing alternatives. Biofuels 
prefigure this type of alternative – either a major energy crisis or 
the forfeiting of a considerable share of productive land. Food 
riots risk complicating the argument, but the capitalist scorpion 
can’t help it, opportunities must be taken advantage of – in this 
instance, speculating on – and thus accelerating – the price rise of 
staple foodstuffs.
Numerous alternatives of the “it is either that, or you will con-
tribute to the climate catastrophe” must therefore be expected. 
Whilst the intrusion of Gaia won’t make capitalism think or 
hesitate, because capitalism doesn’t think or hesitate, such 
predictable alternatives can make those who have been able 
to resist being bewitched by capitalism hesitate. They have 
every reason to dread that in the face of climate threat a mobi-
lization that will claim to transcend conflicts will be proposed. I 
anticipate and equally dread such appeals to sacred unity and the 
accusations of betrayal that automatically accompany them. But 
what I also dread is that this might incite those who resist only to 
pay lip service to the idea that global warming is effectively a new 
problem, following it immediately with the demonstration that 
this problem, like all the others, should be blamed on capitalism, 
and then by the conclusion that we must therefore maintain our 
heading, without allowing ourselves to be troubled by a truth 
57that must not upset the prospects for the struggle. Those who, 
like me, take note that it is a matter of learning from now on what 
a response to the intrusion of Gaia that is not barbaric requires, 
and insist on the necessity of new practices of struggle, are con-
sidered naïve.
Such practices (it must be repeated again and again) should not 
be thought of as the successor of social struggles but in terms of 
their coupling. But the challenge of such a coupling is in effect for-
midable because it undoubtedly means complicating the logic of 
strategic priorities that has till now predominated. What has to be 
given up, at the moment of greatest need, really is what has most 
often served as the rudder for struggle – the difference to be 
made between what this struggle demands and what will become 
possible afterwards, if capitalism is finally defeated. Naming 
Gaia, she who intrudes, signifies that there is no afterwards. It 
is a matter of learning to respond now, and notably of creating 
cooperative practices and relays with those whom Gaia’s 
intrusion has already made think, imagine, and act. With the 
conscientious objectors to economic growth, for example, and 
the inventors of “slow” movements, who refuse what capitalism 
presents as rationalization and who seek to reclaim what it has 
destroyed. Alliances will be required, and certainly demanding 
ones, but the demand should not be that of judges who verify 
that what they are dealing with really is entitled to claim that it 
constitutes a force of opposition to capitalism, indeed, which 
even consults the codex in which Marx has already listed untrust-
worthy allies. Because these new actors will not, almost by def-
inition, have the required legitimacy.
That this is a matter for confusion I can easily understand. But 
what I dread is that this confusion might be translated into a 
defensive reaction, into an “I am aware but all the same” that 
paralyzes and anesthetizes. And I dread just as much that the 
possible alliance with these new actors be based on tolerance, 
on the indulgence that adults who “know” reserve for naïve 
children – adults who will continue to think between themselves 
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of taking note of the fact that Gaia’s intrusion questions the 
theories that armed this “adult” knowledge, which was supposed 
to provide a compass for struggles, to allow the direction to be 
maintained despite all the false pretenders, illusions, and chimera 
that the Great Illusionist systematically produces. To throw away 
such a compass at the moment when it is a matter of confronting 
a capitalism that is more powerful than ever might appear to be 
the height of irresponsibility. Naming Gaia is accepting to think 
with this fact: there is no choice.
This “there is no choice” is one that materialists ought to be 
able to accept. But here it is a matter of not just “accepting 
because there are no means of doing otherwise.” It is a matter 
of being obliged to think by what happens. And perhaps the 
test will demand the abandoning, without any nostalgia, of 
the heritage of a nineteenth century dazzled by the progress 
of science and technology, cutting the link then established 
between emancipation and what I would call an “epic” version 
of materialism, a version that tends to substitute the tale of a 
conquest of nature by human labor for the fable of Man “created 
to have dominion over the earth.” It is a seductive conceptual 
trick but one that bets on an earth available for this dominion 
or conquest. Naming Gaia is therefore to abandon the link 
between emancipation and epic conquest, indeed even between 
emancipation and most of the significations that, since the 
nineteenth century, have been attached to what was baptized 
“progress.” Struggle there must be, but it doesn’t have, can no 
longer have, the advent of a humanity finally liberated from all 
transcendence as its aim. We will always have to reckon with Gaia, 
to learn, like peoples of old, not to offend her.
People will perhaps say that my sketch is a simplification or a 
caricature. Certainly, and it is not a matter here of knowing what 
is in Marx’s texts and what isn’t. If I caricature, it is in order to 
characterize the test, the difficulty for us of thinking that the 
challenge of Gaia’s intrusion cannot be reduced to a “bad moment 
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for it. Indifferent to human reason, blind to the greatness of 
what we call emancipation, this intrusion puts all those whom it 
challenges on an equal footing because no knowledge can claim 
any privilege with regards to the response to bring to it. Not that 
what we know is henceforth null and void. Definitely not. It is the 
consequences of what we know that stammer, that is to say, the 
set of “and so…” that adults and judges fabricate.
Accepting the challenge doesn’t signify, for me, calling into 
question the notion of emancipation itself, the idea that there 
are childish dependences that we must learn to rid ourselves 
of. But the point of view changes a little. If there is a childish 
dependence, it is above all ours, our dependence on the con-
fidence that we placed in the epic fable of Progress, in its multiple 
and apparently discordant versions, all of which nevertheless 
converge in blind judgments about other peoples (to be liberated, 
modernized, educated, etc.). If there must be emancipation, it 
will have to be carried out against what has allowed us to believe 
we can define a heading that would provide a direction for the 
progress of the entirety of humanity, that is to say, against the 
hold of the clandestine form of transcendence that has seized 
us. There are many names for this transcendence, but I will 
characterize it here by the strange right that has prevailed in its 
name, a right that would have frightened all the peoples who 
knew how to honor divinities such as Gaia, because it is a matter 
of the right not to pay attention.
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Not Paying Attention!
The need to pay attention is, apparently, common knowledge. We 
know how to pay attention to all sorts of things, and even those 
who are attached most ferociously to the virtues of Western 
rationality will not refuse this knowledge to peoples whom they 
disqualify as superstitious. Furthermore, even animals on the 
lookout testify to this capacity….
And yet we can also say that once it is a matter of what one calls 
“development” or “growth,” the injunction is above all to not pay 
attention. Growth is a matter of what presides over everything 
else, including – we are ordered to think – the possibility of com-
pensating for all the damage that is its price. In other words, 
whilst we have more and more means for foreseeing and 
measuring this damage, the same blindness that we attribute to 
civilizations in the past (who destroyed the environment on which 
they depended) is demanded of us. They may not have under-
stood what they were doing, and they did it only locally. We know 
that we are destroying to the point of scarcity resources con-
stituted over the course of millions of years of terrestrial history 
(much longer for aquifers).
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attention, but the art of paying attention. If there is an art, and 
not just a capacity, this is because it is a matter of learning and 
cultivating, that is to say, making ourselves pay attention.1 Making 
in the sense that attention here is not related to that which is 
defined as a priori worthy of attention, but as something that 
creates an obligation to imagine, to check, to envisage, con-
sequences that bring into play connections between what we 
are in the habit of keeping separate. In short, making ourselves 
pay attention in the sense that attention requires knowing how 
to resist the temptation to separate what must be taken into 
account and what may be neglected. 
The art of paying attention is far from having been rehabilitated 
by the precautionary principle, although the protests of indus-
trialists and their scientific allies give us a foretaste of what that 
rehabilitation would signify. When one hears the protestations 
that continue today against this unfortunate principle, one can 
only be seized by a certain fright, as much because of the con-
tempt they express in relation to a population defined as being 
scared of everything and nothing, calling for zero risk, as because 
of the feeling of legitimacy of those protesting, those brains of 
humanity who are charged with the task of guiding the human 
flock towards progress. Because this principle is apparently 
perfectly reasonable: it is restricted to affirming that in order 
to take into account a serious and/or irreversible risk to health 
or the environment, it is not necessary that that this risk be 
scientifically proven. In other words, what has provoked so much 
protest is limited to stating that even if the risk is not proven, one 
is supposed to pay attention.
1 It is not easy to directly translate the sense of these passages here and 
capture their broader resonances. What I have translated as “making 
ourselves pay attention” is, in the original French, “faire attention” – where 
“faire” means “to make” or “to do.” “Faites attention” also means something 
like “look out” or “be careful.” –Trans.
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for the public powers in Europe to finally be constrained to 
acknowledge that a precautionary principle is well founded. That 
some renowned scientists have been able to cry out “betrayal” 
despite such catastrophes casts a very strange and raw light on 
the situation that it is the ambition of this principle to reform: a 
paradoxical situation, as the necessity of paying attention where 
there are doubts, what one would require of a “good father,” what 
one teaches children, is defined here as the enemy of Progress.
Yet what made those scientists cry out was rather timid, because 
the precautionary principle respects the precoded stage on which 
it intervenes, a stage on which the task of judging the value of an 
industrial innovation is entrusted solely to its encounter with the 
market, and in which public powers only have the right to place 
certain conditions on this encounter. The principle is limited to 
extending this right a little, but doesn’t modify the logic of the 
scenario at all. Evaluation continues to belong to the market 
and therefore only involves the criteria that the market accepts. 
As for the conditions in which the principle is applied, they are 
extremely restrictive. Not only must risks bear on health or the 
environment, and therefore not concern, for example, the social 
catastrophes that an innovation can provoke, but the principle 
indicates that the measures that respond to the taking into 
account of the risk must be “proportionate.” One might think that 
proportionality would bear on any evaluation of the benefits of a 
techno-industrial innovation for the general interest, since that 
is what is in play with the risk. But no, what proportionality puts 
on stage is concern for the damages that the measures will entail 
for those who benefit from the sacred right of the entrepreneur, 
the sacred right of bringing things to market, of making them 
circulate.
So, can Monsanto’s right as an entrepreneur be questioned, on 
the pretext that GMOs clearly risk accelerating the proliferation 
of insects that are resistant to the pesticide loaded into plants? 
Certainly not. One is limited to enacting rules that aim to reduce 
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the agriculturalists concerned will obey these rules, which will 
permanently complicate their lives and reduce the profits they 
were banking on. Since prohibiting Monsanto’s GMOs would be a 
“disproportionate” measure, no other choice can be envisaged. As 
for the socio-economic consequences of GMOs – there is no place 
for them. Ruining Indian peasant smallholders is not a serious or 
irreversible risk, even if they commit suicide. It ’s the price, harsh 
but necessary, of the modernization of agriculture.
It will be said that it is entrepreneurial freedom that is at stake. 
And every entrepreneur will repeat the refrain: risk is the price 
of progress (today: of competitiveness). But here is where we 
must slow down and pay attention. To agree to identify Monsanto 
with the entrepreneur whose heroic stance it claims, that of 
one who accepts the possibility of failure with a valiant heart, 
that of the Promethean man who is incessantly exploring what 
could become possible, is to allow oneself to be trapped by one 
of those dramatic stagings that are the trademark of master 
thinkers relating the intrusion of Gaia to the audacity of Man, 
who has dared to challenge the order of things. From which the 
consequences cascade, pushing us up against the wall: have con-
fidence in the genius of humanity, or curse it and repent. Well, 
well! But hasn’t capitalism been forgotten?
The heroic pose struck by Monsanto and others like it is mis-
placed. Because when it is a matter of their own investments, it is 
security that they demand: only the market, a veritable judgment 
of God, can be called on to put them at risk, not the question 
of consequences. That this judgment of God is itself rigged 
goes without saying. On the other hand, that these so-called 
entrepreneurs, who assume the passion for what may be pos-
sible, can demand that the question of possible consequences 
not constitute an argument entitled to put them at risk is what 
matters to me here.
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this story about creative and audacious entrepreneurs, which 
they claim to be a part of, commanding us to choose between 
the adventure of humanity and fearful renunciation, I will 
call them Entrepreneurs, the capital letter signifying – as will 
be the case later, with Science – that it is a matter of a façade 
that dissimulates a change of nature. We will not say that the 
Entrepreneur has a (Promethean) confidence in progress, 
which “can mend whatever damage it may have occasioned,” 
a confidence that compels us all to face the grandeur of Man’s 
vocation and his future (written in the stars?) What the double 
scandal of the GMO event and the precautionary principle for our 
Entrepreneurs and their allies teaches us, is that it is not a matter 
of confidence. It really is a matter of a demand. Correlatively, 
relearning the art of paying attention has nothing to do with a 
sort of moral imperative, a call for respect or for a prudence that 
we might have lost. It is not a matter of “us,” but of business, which 
the Entrepreneur requires us not to meddle with.
When Marx characterized capitalism, the big question was “who 
produces wealth?” hence the preponderance of the figure of 
the Exploiter, this bloodsucker who parasitizes the living power 
of human labor. Evidently this question has lost nothing of 
its currency, but another figure might be added, without any 
rivalry, to this first, corresponding to the injunction not to pay 
attention, including even when barbarism threatens. This figure 
is the Entrepreneur, he for whom everything is an opportunity, 
or rather, he who demands the freedom to be able to transform 
everything into an opportunity – for new profits, including what 
calls the common future into question. “This could be dangerous” 
is something that an individual chief executive officer (CEO) 
might understand, but not the operative logic of capitalism, 
which will eventually condemn whoever recoils in the face of an 
entrepreneurial possibility.
With the figure of the Entrepreneur come two others, because 
the Entrepreneur demands, and his demand must be heard 
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could perhaps associate the moment when one can really talk 
about capitalism with the moment when an Entrepreneur can 
count on a State that recognizes the legitimacy of his demand, 
that of a “riskless” definition of the risk of innovation. When an 
industrialist says, with the tears of the sacred in his voice, “the 
market will judge,” he is celebrating the conquest of this power. 
He doesn’t have to answer for the consequences (which are 
possibly highly undesirable) of what is put on the market, except 
if these contravene a regulation explicitly formulated by the 
State, a scientifically motivated regulation that responds to the 
imperative of proportionality. As for Science, which has been 
accorded a general authority for all terrains about the definition 
of the risks that must be taken into account, it has little to do 
with the sciences. One will not be astonished that the experts 
who play this game know that their opinions will not be plausible 
unless they are as balanced as possible, that is to say, give all 
due weight to the legitimacy of the innovator who has “made the 
investment.”
What is this Science, which intervenes here as the third thief, 
an arbiter tolerated by the Entrepreneur with regard to his 
right to innovate, that is to say too, with regard to the right that 
he recognizes (albeit constrained and forced) the State has to 
prohibit or regulate? If I have given it a capital letter, it is to dis-
tinguish it from scientific practices. And that not so as to exempt 
practitioners of any responsibility, to oppose experts (in the 
service of power) with (disinterested) researchers, but because 
with the coupling together of Entrepreneur, State, and Science, 
we are very close to the gilded legend that prevails whenever it 
is a question of the “irresistible rise to power of the West.” This 
legend, in effect, stages the decisive alliance between scientific 
rationality, the mother of progress of all knowledge, the State, 
finally free of the archaic sources of legitimacy that prevented this 
rationality from developing, and the industrial growth that trans-
lates what Marxists have called the development of the forces 
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is from the grip of this legend that it is a matter of escaping, of 
course. And if the art of paying attention must be reclaimed, what 
matters is to begin by paying attention to the manner in which we 
are capable of escaping it.
Here again it will not be a matter of defining the truth of the State 
or of Science, of rewriting the “real story” behind the legend, but 
of activating questions that arise first of all from the moment in 
which we are living, from what it forces us to think and also from 
what it asks us to be wary of. What it is a matter of being wary of 
are the simplifications that would still ratify a story of progress, 
including the one that enables us to see the truth of what we 
are facing. Whether this truth makes capitalism the only real 
protagonist, the relative autonomy of the authors being largely 
illusory, or makes the three protagonists the three heads of the 
same monster, which it behooves the interpreter to name, what 
is missing is the question, which has become crucial today, of 
knowing what might or might not be a resource for the task of 
learning once again the art of paying attention.

[ 7 ]
A Story of 
Three Thieves
I have written a great deal about the sciences, and notably 
against their identification with an undertaking that would be 
neutral, objective, and finally rational. It was a matter not of 
attacking scientific practices but of defending them against 
an image of authority that is foreign to what makes for their 
fecundity and relative reliability.1 I will restrict myself here to 
emphasizing that whenever it is a question of scientific research, 
the definition of what “must” be taken into account never 
imposes itself in a general manner, but translates the event of an 
achievement that opens up a new field of questions and pos-
sibilities to those that it concerns. Science, with a capital ‘S,’ is a 
stranger to this type of event, and it participates directly in the 
prohibition that bears on paying attention.
“It ’s unproven, it ’s unproven!” How many times have experts 
made this obscene refrain ring out? A refrain whose authority, 
1 See on this subject Isabelle Stengers, The Invention of Modern Science, trans. 
Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2000) and La 
Vierge et le neutrino (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 2006).
70 it really must be emphasized, is not called into question by 
the precautionary principle, because this talks of what is “not 
yet” proven. With Science, it is no longer a question of proof 
as an achievement, as something of an event. Proof is what 
one is entitled to demand, where a question, an objection, a 
worrying proposition, surfaces. The primary role of the refrain 
“it ’s unproven” is to shut up, to separate out what is reputedly 
objective or rational from that which will be rejected as sub-
jective, or illusory, or as the manifestation of irrational attach-
ment to ways of life that unfortunately progress condemns. This 
role, accepted by many scientists, dishonors those who endorse 
it much more intimately even than their participation in the 
development of weapons. Because it transforms the event that 
genuine proof constitutes, the rare achievement the possibility 
of which puts researchers into tension, forcing them to think, to 
object, to create, into an all-terrain imperative.
But this dishonor goes back a long way. I have tried to 
characterize the practical novelty effectively associated with 
the experimental proof with the realization that certain facts – 
those that will be called experimental – may be recognized as 
having the power to testify to the manner in which they must be 
interpreted. That is the achievement, passionately staged and 
verified in laboratories, which makes experimental scientists, 
those who understand what it means to dance in the laboratory 
when it works, think, imagine, bustle about, or object. But 
Galileo, who discovered that such an achievement was pos-
sible, hastened to generalize it, that is to say, to transform the 
event (to succeed in producing a type of fact that “proves”) into 
the reward of an at last rational method (to yield to the facts). 
Thus he was able to oppose the new scientific reason, which 
only accepts the authority of facts, to all those who took sides 
on undecidable questions, who gave power to their convictions 
or prejudices. This staging was without a doubt one of the most 
successful propaganda operations in human history, as it has been 
repeated and ratified even by the philosophers who Galileo 
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on repeating the terse judgment of Gaston Bachelard: “Opinion 
is, in principle, always wrong. Opinion thinks badly; it doesn’t 
think: it translates needs into knowledge.”2 That this judgment 
was emitted in a book entitled The Formation of the Scientific Mind 
assumes a profound logic. What is called the scientific mind only 
has a meaning in opposition to what would be nonscientific. Even 
if some think themselves clever in reversing the sense of the 
opposition, by attributing to people a subjective or emotional 
richness the absence of which would be characteristic of the cold, 
calculating, rational, scientific mind, as long as such an operation 
prevails, Science is recognized as having the power to extend its 
objective approach to everything that matters.
Not all scientists have adhered to the staging of “Science versus 
Opinion,” which gives Science the role of defining the “real” ques-
tions, those that can be settled objectively, and of relating all the 
rest to subjectivity and its irrational attachments. But amongst 
those who know that this is only a matter of propaganda, some 
think that it was unfortunately necessary, otherwise the true 
value of the important work of scientists would not have been 
recognized. Moreover, this may be what Galileo thought. The 
contempt for people that the opposition between Science and 
Opinion propagates then takes softer forms – “they” cannot 
understand what we do, thus we have to offer them what will 
inspire in them the respect we are due – but the contempt is 
there nonetheless, simply in the fact that the price that has been 
paid, and continues to be paid, in order that the value of science 
being recognized might appear acceptable: it is acceptable to 
state neither the whole truth nor nothing but the truth, because 
people neither ask for nor merit it. People would lose confidence 
if one allowed them to know the extent to which a scientist is 
poorly prepared by his discipline for intervening in questions of a 
2 Gaston Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, trans. Mary 
MacAllester Jones (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2001).
72 collective interest, and would throw themselves into the arms of 
charlatans, creationists, astrologers, and who knows what else.3 
A strange tolerance in relation to their colleagues, who endorse 
the role conferred on Science, characterizes most scientists, 
including those who know that the scientific mind or method that 
these colleagues are so proud of are the products of propaganda. 
A form of law of silence imposes itself from the moment that the 
colleagues in question seem to them to remain of good faith, 
even if this faith is blind.
I will come back to the knowledge economy, which is in the 
process of enslaving scientific practices but that will upset 
neither the scientific propaganda nor the authority of all-terrain 
“objective” proofs in the slightest. But from now on I want to 
underline the link between the sad passivity of the scientists who 
submit to this new management of public research, their inability 
to make politics out of what is happening to them, and this 
reference to Science, which, after having been so advantageous, 
is now strangling them. All they can do is whine about “the rising 
tide of irrationality” or that “they know not what they are doing”, 
“killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.” But this same pas-
sivity characterizes the so-called academic world in its entirety: it 
is in the process of being redefined by the very thing it allowed to 
be defined as “objectivity” when it was a matter of judging others 
– and I am including in this world those who protested against the 
“reign of objectivity.” Whether it is a matter of the famous uni-
versity rankings or the criteria of evaluation to which researchers 
and research centers are now subjected, they are produced 
by experts, who are also colleagues. And the facts that these 
experts record, which they identify as signs of excellence, may 
well be understood as blind, irrelevant or unjust – but they are no 
different to the ones that academics already accepted that other 
3 Hence perhaps the excitement of many scientists faced with the creationist 
onslaught against Darwinian evolution: you see, here is the monster, and 
it is attacking us. So we are still a bulwark against obscurantism, like in the 
time of Galileo!
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denounce the imperative of objectivity. The lack of resistance of 
academics against what is fabricating a new, operative definition 
of research cannot be dissociated from the way they accepted 
elsewhere generalized objectivity at its face value.
It is not a matter of academics complaining here, but of observing 
that the process of destroying the resources that might nourish 
an art of paying attention continues unabated under the cover 
of modernization, a process whose categorical imperative is 
the mobilization of all, with the door being shown to those who 
had till now benefited from relatively well-protected niches. 
Capitalism perhaps didn’t demand quite so much, and it is here 
that the other protagonist, the State, shows itself. The resentful 
passivity of researchers comes in part from their feeling betrayed 
by this State, which they thought was in the service of the (well 
understood) general interest.
Not to complain, then, but not to say “it ’s only just” either. The 
intrusion of Gaia is opposed to this morality, which is in direct 
contact with the grand epic tale about the advent of Man: those 
who are unworthy, those who have been vulnerable to the 
temptations of the enemy, will only get what they deserve. I will 
repeat incessantly: we need researchers able to participate in 
the creation of the responses on which the possibility of a future 
that is not barbaric depends. It is an aspect of the GMO event that 
some started to manifest themselves; others will, undoubtedly. 
The way they are received matters.
Certainly I will not say that on the other hand we have no need of 
the State. I will rather say that faced with the intrusion of Gaia the 
State must not be trusted. It is a matter of abandoning the dream 
of a State that protects the interests of all, a bulwark against 
the excesses of capitalism, which is then only to be denounced 
for having failed in its mission. The question, then, is not one of 
knowing who (unduly) dominates the State and diverts it from 
the role it should play, which is the case when one talks about 
74 technocracy – whether “technology” here refers to engineering, 
to management, to science, or to law. Corruption obviously 
matters as well as conflicts of interest. But it seems more inter-
esting to me – today especially, when the State’s business is 
above all that of mobilizing for the economic war, without any 
credible reference to progress – to characterize what it is that 
the State does to the different technical practices that claim to 
serve the so-called general interest, what it does to those who 
busy themselves in its service. We know that their activity is most 
often characterized by the production of rules and norms (of 
quality, security, etc.) that are blind to locales and knowledges 
denigrated as traditional, and by the correlative elimination of 
what does not conform, is not standardized, what is recalcitrant 
in the face of objective evaluation. But to attribute all that 
to technical rationality is to go too quickly. As practitioners, 
technicians could be capable of many other things than sub-
jecting everything that moves to categories that are indifferent to 
their consequences. The practices of a scientist, a technician, an 
engineer or a lawyer imply a particular art of attention, they allow 
(even demand, when they aren’t enslaved) that they occasionally 
hesitate and learn. On the other hand, serving the State demands 
that there be no hesitation, it defines all hesitation as a threat to 
public order, as threatening demobilization.
But it is not for all that a matter of denouncing the State as an 
accomplice to, even as a direct emanation of, capitalism. However 
justified, denunciation fabricates a division between those who 
know and those who are duped by appearances. Worse, the 
knowledge that it produces has no other effect than to attribute 
even more power to capitalism. One could say, on the other hand, 
that between the modern State and its reasons, and capitalism, 
there is a chicken and egg logic. This entails not confusing the 
chicken and the egg – there is no symmetry between them – 
but affirms the impossibility of understanding the one without 
reference to the other, and vice versa, even if there is neither 
voluntary complicity, nor corruption, nor, moreover, friendship. 
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other moans “we still need to impose some regulation.” If it is a 
chicken and egg situation, it is because there is interreferencing 
of distinct logics of functioning, that of a machine said to be blind 
and heavy-handed, which defines what is entitled to be perceived 
and regulated, and that of an opportunist on the lookout, able to 
profit from everything that is not defined as perceptible.
Here again, I do not intend to define the logic of the State, 
but to try to characterize it, and this on the basis of what has 
happened. For nearly thirty years, our history has been that of 
the destruction of what was conquered through political and 
social struggle. Flexibility! Reducing red tape and state-imposed 
costs on employers! Everyone knows the quasi-consensual power 
that these demands by the bosses have succeeded in acquiring, 
the manner in which they have become order-words ensuring the 
weak adherence of the majority. But what has been so badly and 
so little defended was not what was conquered, but the trans-
position into the categories proper to State management of what had 
been conquered. I propose the term “whoever” to characterize 
this transposition. What has been conquered for all has been 
redefined by categories that are addressed to whoever, categories 
that produced amnesia and which are then vulnerable to the 
infernal alternatives concocted by capitalism.
Defeat, rather than victory (in this instance, the defeat of those 
who placed their trust in the State), allows these logics of 
functioning to be detected. In the era of social conquest, it was 
possible to attribute a progressive dynamic to the State, but 
when it turned and ran, it didn’t betray anything. Its logic hasn’t 
changed. Public order demands rules, and these rules demand 
a “logic of whoever,” whoever designating all those to whom a 
rule or norm is to be applied whatever the consequences of this 
application might be. If there is an interreference between State 
and capitalist logics of functioning, between those who think 
themselves responsible for public order and those who clamor 
for a right to irresponsibility, the condition of free enterprise, it 
76 would pass via the hostility towards the art of paying attention 
to consequences that is common to them both, but for distinct 
reasons.
Of course, exceptions abound for every rule, and these 
exceptions are motivated by consequences to avoid. But they 
are always translated in terms of subcategories, or sub-subcat-
egories, each time grouping together a class of “whosoevers,” 
a class defined by the homogeneity of those that it includes 
from the point of view of the rule. And woe betide anyone who 
doesn’t have the power to make their claim to be an exception 
heard. Woe betide, for example, the small farmers crushed by 
the administrative paperwork and regulations imposed in the 
name of consumer safety, if they haven’t been able to make the 
case that only the large industrial farms can afford this cost. Woe 
betide too those who have been able to make themselves heard 
and have seen what they struggled for redefined in the terms of 
the State, and transformed into regulated functioning, blind to its 
consequences.
It goes without saying that big businesses, with their armies 
of lawyers and lobbyists, avoid the category of whoevers. 
Sometimes it happens that they do what “whoever” cannot do: 
obtain the adoption of rules that suit them, as was the case for 
Monsanto with the US administration with regard to the safety 
of GMOs, or get the State to act in their service directly, as is the 
case with the unilateral retaliation taken by the United States 
against countries judged lax with regard to respecting intellec-
tual property rights. But more routinely, they are perfectly happy 
playing the game of whoever, that is to say, of benefiting from the 
legal fiction that makes them “moral persons,” even being able to 
claim human rights. Except that they not only have the rights but 
also all the means they need to find the dodges that allow them to 
twist a rule or to make it work to their benefit.
Let it not be asked why the world of free enterprise continues 
to be opposed to the authoritarian, planner State. This is the 
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Enterprise that can, consequently, be called “capitalist”) reach 
an understanding to empty out the scene, to silence, or to ignore 
the voices of those who object, who demand that attention be 
paid to consequences that are unforeseen or haven’t been taken 
into account or are intolerable. In short, of those who claim the 
capacity to intervene, to complicate matters, to meddle with 
that which – from the point of view as much of the State as of the 
Entrepreneur – doesn’t concern, them. Especially not them.
If the question that matters today is that of a collective reap-
propriation of the capacity for and art of paying attention, the 
State, such as I have just characterized it, will not help. For the 
State, the springing up of groups meddling with what concerns 
them, who propose, who object, who demand to become actively 
involved in the formulation of questions, and learn how to 
become so, is in the first place always a “trouble to public order,” 
which it is a matter of trying to ignore, and if that isn’t possible, 
something about which amnesia will have to be produced. Public 
order, with its claims to being synonymous with the protection of 
a general interest that it is a matter of explaining to a population 
that is always suspected of wanting to give primacy to its selfish 
interests, reestablishes itself incessantly. We are swamped with 
consensual narratives, in which what has succeeded in counting is 
presented as normal, in which struggle is passed over in silence, 
in which those who have had to accept become those who “have 
(by themselves) recognized the necessity of….”
That is why attention must be paid to the contemporary 
appearance of “other narratives” that perhaps announce new 
modes of resistance, which refuse the forgetting of the capacity 
to think and act together that public order demands. I will devote 
myself here to narratives that make reference to “enclosures,” 
that is to say, to the history of the expropriation of “commons.”
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Enclosures
“Enclosures” makes reference to a decisive moment in the social 
and economic history of England: the final eradication in the 
eighteenth century of customary rights that bore on the use of 
communal land, the “commons.” These lands were “enclosed,” 
that is to say, appropriated in an exclusive manner by their 
legal owners, and with tragic consequences, because use of 
the commons was essential to the life of peasant communities. 
A frightening number of people were stripped of all means of 
subsistence. “The Tragedy of the Commons” is, moreover, the 
title of a widely read essay published in 1968, but its author, 
Garrett Hardin, misappropriates the association between the 
destruction of the commons and tragedy. The tragedy is in fact 
supposed to be the overexploitation (postulated by Hardin) of 
the communal lands themselves, linked to the fact that each user 
pursued his self-interest without taking into account the fact that 
the outcome of this self-interest would be the impoverishment 
of everyone. This fable evidently met with great success, as it not 
only allowed the enclosures to be legitimated as “unfortunately 
necessary” but with them the ensemble of privatizations of what 
80 had been of the order of collective management: the interest of 
private property owners is also selfish but it pushes them to turn 
a profit on their capital, to improve their returns, and to increase 
productivity.
Another classic narrative – that of Marx – associates the 
expropriation of the commons with what he calls the “primitive 
accumulation of capital.” The great mass of the poor, now 
stripped of any attachment, will be mercilessly exploited by the 
nascent industries, because there is no need to take into account 
the “reproduction of labor power”: the poor can collapse on the 
job as there will always be others. In this sense, the enclosures 
prepare the capitalist appropriation of the labor of those 
who, deprived of their means of life, will be reduced to being 
nothing but their labor power. Marx, however, did not celebrate 
this expropriation in the manner in which he celebrates the 
destruction of the guilds and of the ensemble of what attaches 
humans to traditions and ways of life: like the elimination of 
an old order, an elimination that the future socialism will be 
indebted to capitalism for. Perhaps it is because of the pitiless 
brutality of the operation, or because what was destroyed was 
a form of primitive communism bringing resources and means 
into common use, but the fact remains that he saw in it a “theft” 
or the destruction of the “right of the poor” to ensure their 
subsistence.
If, today, the reference to enclosures matters, it is because the 
contemporary mode of extension of capitalism has given it all its 
actuality. The privatization of resources that are simply essential 
to survival, such as water, is the order of the day, as well as that of 
those institutions which, in our countries, had been considered as 
ensuring a human right, like education. Not that the management 
of water has not been a source of profit, and that capitalism 
hasn’t largely profited from the production of well-trained and 
disciplined workers. What has changed is that henceforth it is a 
matter of direct appropriation, under the sign of privatization of 
what were public services.
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is very directly activated by this knowledge economy to which 
I have already alluded, because what the latter promotes is 
nothing other than the disappearance of the line separating 
public and private research and the direct appropriation of 
what had, until now, benefited from a (relative) autonomy. The 
production of knowledge today is considered a stake that is too 
important to allow this minimal autonomy to researchers, who 
are now subjected to the imperative of establishing partnerships 
with industry, to defining acquiring a patent as the desirable 
success par excellence, and the creation of spin-offs as the 
glorious dream. All that with public money, which gets sucked up 
into multiple spin-offs that fail, whilst those that succeed will be 
purchased, without too much risk, together with their patents, by 
one or another consortium.
In short, the distribution between what the State lets capitalism 
do and what capitalism gets the State to do has changed. The 
State lets capitalism appropriate what was defined as forming 
part of the public domain, and capitalism gets the State to 
endorse the sacred task of having to hunt down those who 
infringe the now sacrosanct IP. Rights to such IP extend over 
practically everything, from the living thing to knowledge pre-
viously defined as freely accessible to all its users. Rights to which 
the WTO intends to subject the entire planet, in the name of the 
defense of innovation.
The contemporary reference to enclosures, to the appropriation 
of what was a common good, however, was not invented by union 
movements defending public services, or by researchers set to be 
run directly by their old industrial allies, with the blessing of the 
State. It was computer programmers, whose work was directly 
targeted by the patenting of their algorithms, that is to say, their 
very languages, who named what was threatening them thus, 
and created a response, the now celebrated GNU general public 
license. This was the point of departure for a movement for the 
collective creation of free software, which anyone can download 
82 and contribute to the proliferation of as competence and time 
allows. Let’s not fool ourselves: it is not a matter of the angelic 
reign of disinterested cooperation. Other ways of making money 
were organized. But it is a matter of the invention of a mode of 
resistance to enclosure: everyone who has recourse to programs 
with a GNU license, or who modifies them, falls under the con-
straint of the exclusive non-appropriation of what they create.1
The resistance of programmers fits into the general category of 
struggle against exploitation with difficulty, because it is a matter 
of resisting the capitalism of the knowledge economy, and those 
who serve it rarely define themselves as exploited. Of course it is 
always possible to keep holding on to the theoretical compass, to 
maintain the heading that identifies capitalism and exploitation 
by speaking of a form of “false consciousness” – they do not know 
that they are exploited, but we do. Sticking to the heading here, 
however, amounts to denying the originality and relative efficacy 
of what programmers who resist have succeeded in doing. If they 
had joined the struggle of the exploited masses, IP rights would 
reign undivided today over the domain of software.
How is this type of resistance, which has transformed the 
reference to the commons as a stake in a struggle, to be 
recounted? I will distinguish two types of narrative here, in 
a manner that is a little caricatured, certainly, but it is the 
divergence that it is a matter of making sensible here, not the 
positions themselves.
1 That I am referring to the free software movement here doesn’t signify that 
they are “good,” whereas the software “pirates” and “crackers” of protected 
software who distribute pirate copies that avoid protection are without 
interest. One might say that at the level of effects – their power to harm 
the property rights and ensure the free access to programs – the pirates 
are more effective. But there is no need to choose here – many in any case 
belong to both milieus. Nor is there any need to oppose them, like one might 
oppose reformism and radicalism. Both movements are interesting, neither 
is exemplary (if many creators of free software get on well with profit, 
gratuitous piracy, like every war machine, communicates with a problem of 
capture: many such pirates are taken on as experts and become hunters).
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theater, which preserves the epic genre (characterizing it in this 
manner is a way of announcing that for me it is a matter of dis-
tancing myself from it).2 Capitalism today supposedly has to be 
qualified as “cognitive” – it aims less at the exploitation of labor 
power than at the appropriation of what must be recognized as 
the common good of humanity – knowledge. And not no matter 
what knowledge – it is the workers of the immaterial, those 
who manipulate abstract knowledges in cooperation with one 
another, who have become the real source for the production of 
wealth. From now on, this “proletariat of the immaterial,” as Toni 
Negri says, is what capitalism is going to depend on but is what 
it will (perhaps) not be able to enslave. Because the specificity of 
immaterial knowledges, ideas, algorithms, codes, etc., is that their 
use value is immediately social, as is language, already, which 
only exists by and for sharing and exchange. The new enclosures 
would thus translate this new epoch, in which for capitalism it is 
a matter of preventing a social dynamic on which it now depends 
and that escapes it. And reciprocally the mobile and autonomous 
immaterial proletariat could well succeed at doing what the old 
peasant communities, attached as they were to their communal 
fields and their concrete knowledges, could not. The revolt of 
the programmers, the manner in which they have succeeded in 
constructing cooperative networks, which affirm the immediately 
social value of the immaterial – because every user is now, thanks 
to them, free to betray Bill Gates and to download the programs 
he or she needs – would thus be an exemplary annunciation.
It is thus still a matter of an epic for humanity, a humanity to 
which capitalism has, in spite of itself, revealed its true vocation. 
2 The proposition from which I am distancing myself here is that of Toni Negri 
and Michael Hardt, staging what they called the “multitude.” This multitude, 
which is fundamentally anonymous, nomadic, and expert, becomes the new 
antagonistic force capable of threatening capitalism. The latter, become 
cognitive, has a vital need of the multitude, which is, on the other hand, 
capable of escaping its grasp, because it is not identified with industrial 
modes of production.
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allows the communication of everyone with everyone else, a 
knowledge which, produced by each benefits everyone, would 
make exist, here and now, what is common to humans, a common 
that is fundamentally anonymous, without quality or property. 
Without wanting to, capitalism would thus contribute to the 
possibility of a humanity reconciled with itself, a mobile creative 
multitude, emancipated from the attachments that brought 
groups into conflict. And as there can only be one revolutionary 
epic, the working class is chased from the role that Marx had 
conferred on it, indeed, is even defined in terms that retro-
spectively disqualify it from playing that role. It was supposed 
to have nothing to lose but its chains, but those who have lost 
their chains already exist – or have already acquired a concep-
tual existence, at least. And the old working class itself, whose 
work was material, is now characterized as being too attached to 
the tools of production to be able to satisfy the concept, to be a 
bearer of the “common” of humans.
From the conceptual point of view, the fact that in the name of 
competition workers are exploited today with a rare intensity, 
without even talking about the sweatshops reserved for poor 
countries, or about the appearance in our countries of poor 
workers who aren’t capable of making ends meet on their 
salaries, doesn’t count for much. But above all, as in every 
theater of concepts, we are functioning here in the long, even the 
indefinite, term. Mathematicians might talk about a theorem of 
existence: what is conceptualized demonstrates the existence of 
a positive answer to the question “is there a candidate worthy of 
the role?” but doesn’t indicate the manner in which the candidate 
will become capable of fulfilling this role. It is precisely this kind 
of research, for a conceptual guarantee, that Gaia interrupts, and 
does so in the most materialist mode there can be. The response 
to her intrusion will not admit, cannot admit, any guarantee, 
because Gaia is deaf to our ideas.
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have been able to resist, these enclosures that were to sup-
press their own manner of working and cooperating. Might 
they not remind us of another dimension of capitalism, not 
one that is concurrent with exploitation but required by it and, 
as such, propagated wherever new resources to be exploited 
can be envisaged? According to the second narrative that I am 
proposing, what was destroyed with the commons was not 
just the means of living for poor peasants, but also a concrete 
collective intelligence, attached to this common on which they all 
depended. From this point of view, it is this kind of destruction 
that programmers have been able to resist. They would no longer 
be the figure of annunciation, represented by the immaterial 
nomadic proletariat, incarnating the common social character 
of immaterial production. The “common” that they were able to 
defend was theirs, it was what made them think, imagine, and 
cooperate. That this common may have been immaterial doesn’t 
make much difference. It is always a matter of a concrete, situ-
ated, collective intelligence, in a clinch with constraints that are 
as critical as material constraints. It is the collective brought 
together by the challenge of these constraints, rather different 
from the indefinite ensemble of those who, like me, use or down-
load what has been produced, that have been able to defend 
against what had endeavored to divide them. In other words, 
the programmers resisted what was endeavoring to separate 
them from what was common to them, not the appropriation of 
the common good of humanity. It was as “commoners” that they 
defined what made them programmers, not as nomads of the 
immaterial.
The divergence between the two narratives thus bears on the 
question of community. From the point of view of the first, there 
isn’t any great difference between the creators and the end 
users of software, like me – we all have in common this abstract 
language of a new type, belonging to no one, free of the attach-
ments that divide, that oppose, that make for contradictions. 
86 From the point of view of the second, cognitive capitalism doesn’t 
appropriate the inappropriable, but destroys (continues to 
destroy) what is required by the very existence of a community. 
The “common” here cannot be reduced to a good or a resource 
and it doesn’t in the least have the traits of a sort of human 
universal, the (conceptual) guarantor of something beyond 
oppositions. It is what unites “commoners,” I utilize software 
as an end user, but those who resisted enclosure by IP rights 
did not defend the free use of a resource but the very practices 
that made them a community, that caused them to think, 
imagine, and create in a mode in which what one does matters 
to the others, and is a resource for the others. And it is as such, 
because the knowledge economy was attacking what made them 
a community, and not as the precursors of a multitude freed 
of its attachments, that they laid claim to the precedent of the 
enclosures.
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Common Causes
To use the word ”commoner” to talk about programmers who 
have been able to resist is thus to situate them in the lineage of 
peasants who, in the past, struggled against the confiscation of 
their commons in a mode that no longer defines these peasants 
as poor but as communities. And it is also to associate this resist-
ance with the recent political creation called “user movements.” 
This is what takers of illegal drugs called themselves, in a 
movement in which they created an expert knowledge with 
regard to this practice, and called for this expertise to be rec-
ognized as such by the “experts.” There has been something 
similar for patient associations faced with doctors and 
pharmaceutical enterprises. But the term has also been used 
to talk about those who unite around a “common,” a river or a 
forest, with the ambition of thwarting the sinister diagnosis of 
the “tragedy of the commons” and of succeeding in learning from 
one another not to define it as a means for their own ends but as 
that around which users must learn to articulate themselves. In 
each of these cases, and there are many others, the success of 
the movement derives from those who were initially defined as 
88 utilizing something, seizing hold of questions that they weren’t 
supposed to meddle with, and conferring on the “common,” 
which was often defined in terms of rival utilizations, the power to 
gather them, to cause them to think, that is to say, to resist this 
definition, and produce propositions that it would otherwise have 
rendered unthinkable. In brief to learn again the art of paying 
attention.
One must not go too quickly, however, because the rap-
prochement of programmers and commoners quickly encounters 
difficulties that it would be dangerous to ignore. Whether they 
have resisted or not, programmers know that, like scientists 
or lawyers, they are bearers of a recognized knowledge, which 
makes them what I call practitioners. On the other hand, in 
the same movement, unrepentant drug users and members 
of associations such as Act Up, for example, have created a 
collective “profane” knowledge and struggled for the recognition 
of this knowledge by practitioners and acknowledged experts. 
That they may be able to succeed in transforming the latter, 
forcing them to pay attention to the dimensions of a situation 
that haven’t been taken into account, certainly matters, but isn’t 
confusing these two types of protagonists under the same term 
to introduce an ambiguity regarding its signification?
I haven’t stopped emphasizing that the question I am posing is 
not “what is to be done in the face of the intrusion of Gaia?” – a 
question whose answer belongs to the multifold process of its 
creation – but “what does trying to respond to the intrusion of 
Gaia in a mode that isn’t barbaric call for?” Such a response will 
need the contributions of scientists, technicians, and lawyers, but 
not those of people who work under the yoke of the knowledge 
economy, nor those of people who define themselves, one 
way or another, by a contempt for “people.” That is why I con-
sider that the type of ambiguity I have just arrived at, or more 
precisely, that the resistance of programmers as much as the 
creation of user movements, have allowed me to arrive at, is 
precious. The fact that I am tentatively using the same term 
89“commoners” for practitioners who defend what causes them 
think and imagine, and for the heterogeneous group of those 
who learn to be caused to think by what they refuse to be the end 
users of, creates an ambiguity that doesn’t have to be removed 
but much rather made explicit. To remove it would be to look for 
a ready-made solution, and there is no such solution when the 
question is “making common.” This question must rather be a 
dimension of situations that, around a common concern, gathers 
representatives of user movements, practitioners, and experts, 
a dimension that belongs to the situation and cannot be thought 
independent of it.
I am alluding here to a difficulty that is well-known in user 
movements that have gained the right to intervene in technical 
discussions from which they were excluded. This moment of 
relative success, the moment that one moves from a position of 
contestation to a position of having a stake, is also the moment of 
greatest danger. In order to learn how to address themselves to 
practitioners and experts, those who participate in such discus-
sions must learn how to get to know them, to get the measure of 
their knowledge, and this necessity is often the source of great 
tension. The users’ engagement around a common cause is put 
to the test by a divergence that can be actualized in personal con-
flict. Suspicions bearing on the ambitions of some – “you talk like 
them, you’ve become one of them” – will be met with reproach 
regarding others’ lack of investment – “is it my fault if I’m the only 
one to make any effort? You only had to….” Making the ambiguity 
explicit is not to resolve the difficulty. There is no general solution 
here, the only generality is the necessity of foreseeing that there will 
be tension, that is to say, in particular, of nourishing the common 
engagement with knowledges, narratives and experiences which, 
when the time comes, will allow the trap not to be fallen into.
We will not, however, oppose practitioners, who would be people 
with a genuine craft, and users, who would be amateurs who wish 
to assert their objections and suggestions but would be divided 
when it is a question of participating fully in the construction 
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equally posed on the practitioners’ side. They too can be divided, 
depending on whether they behave as professionals or are 
actually able to understand their specialized knowledge as con-
tributing to a common concern, not defining it. In the first case, 
users will be dealing with interlocutors who will certainly agree to 
envisage the manner in which objections and suggestions can be 
understood, but who will already know how to pose the problem 
– users will therefore be heard as intervening at the level of the 
solution, not in the formulation of the problem, and those who 
enter into this game really will be in danger of being separated 
from the others, caught in insurmountable conflicts of loyalty. In 
the second case, it is not impossible that they might, with and in 
the same way as practitioners, contribute to the construction of 
the problem, the concerning situation now being defined in terms 
of the heterogeneous knowledges, requirements, and manners of 
paying attention that its unfolding demands.
The intervention of users thus activates a contrast that 
matters when it is a question of the contribution of those I call 
practitioners to the response when facing the intrusion of Gaia. 
And this contrast henceforth constitutes a political stake in the 
same way as does the distinction between users who partic-
ipate in a movement and end users who defend their interest. 
Whether it is a matter of the end users or of those one calls true 
professionals, we are dealing with those whom Entrepreneurs 
and those who are responsible for public order can count on 
not to hesitate. But the question of practitioners has an extra 
dimension. One can become part of a user movement but one 
must be trained in a practice. This doesn’t signify any kind of 
hierarchy but translates a belonging, the fact that the knowledge 
of a practitioner, her capacity to participate in the construction 
of a problem, refers to the community to which she belongs. The 
extra, political dimension is that a future in which the very notion 
of a practice would be destroyed, in which the sciences would 
no longer produce anything other than professionals, incapable as 
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easily imagined.
When, some years ago, I decided to question the sciences on 
the basis of the persona of the practitioner,1 this was, in the first 
place, so as to resist the direct link so often established between 
Science and a neutral, universal rationality, but also so as to 
announce the inevitable conflict that would arise once demys-
tifying critical studies began to show that scientists do not obey 
these famous standards of rationality. Demystification always 
risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater, here denying 
that some sciences (not all) actually bring new reliable knowledge 
about the world, and populate reality with new beings and 
agencies. To speak about scientific practices was meant both to 
characterize their own specific force, irreducible to general social 
relations, and to unlink this force from any claim to a rationality 
that would be lacking amongst nonscientists. That is why I have 
tried to characterize scientific practitioners (in contrast to those 
who serve Science) as gathered together by a “common,” that is to 
say, by a cause: they are engaged by a type of achievement proper 
to each field the eventuality of which obliges those who belong to 
this field, forces them to think, to act, to invent, to object, that is to 
say, to work together, depending on one another.
Today, it has to be noted that scientists have not, in the manner 
of programmers, invented a manner of resisting the enclosures 
that are their lot too in the knowledge economy. That this is paid 
for by a loss of reliability can already be sensed, with the multiple 
cases of conflicts of interest – when one discovers that a scientist 
who presents himself as an expert on a question benefits from 
subsidies from an industry interested in this question. But even 
when there is no direct conflict, the situation of dependency is 
enough to destroy reliability because it dissolves the obligation 
1 Practices and practitioners are introduced in my Cosmopolitics vol. 1 and 2 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010–11) and envisaged from 
the point of view of an ecology of practices in La Vierge et le neutrino.
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different means. Soon the baby will be thrown out with the bath-
water and demystification will be redundant. We will be dealing 
with “true professionals,” who do not hesitate and who do not 
fear the objections of their colleagues. Because when everyone is 
dependent, when everyone is linked by partnerships to industry, 
no one will want to “spit in the soup,” to carry out research that 
might weaken the legitimacy of their, and everybody else’s, 
participation in the industrial redefinition of the world. There is 
no need for trickery, it is enough to avoid working on questions 
that are challenging and to focus on those for which grants and 
public support are abundant. Even if, as is the case with nano-
technology, it means shifting from a knowledge economy to an 
economy of promises. In this instance scientists promise the 
moon on a stick, a new industrial revolution, a new age of Man, 
no longer taming matter but atoms, assembled at whim one at a 
time. They do not fear objections on the part of their colleagues 
any longer, and industry and public powers join the somewhat 
obscene merry-go-round, where no one knows who believes, 
who is dupe, or who manipulates who any longer….
What is in the process of happening with the knowledge economy 
demonstrates well the associating that I am attempting to make 
between enclosures and the destruction of practices generically 
taken as production of collective intelligence. What will be 
destroyed is not just the communities of practitioners, united by 
a cause that leads them to think, imagine, and object. In effect, 
what distinguishes practitioners from professionals is also the 
capacity to perceive the difference between situations and ques-
tion the definition of what matters to them as a community, what 
causes them to gather, and to others for which their knowledge 
or expertise can be useful, even necessary, but will never allow 
them to define the “right manner of formulating the problem.” 
Certainly, and it ’s the least one can say, such a capacity hasn’t 
really been cultivated by scientific communities and the modes of 
training they developed. But with the triumph of professionals, 
93this capacity will be eradicated. Another potential resource will 
have been destroyed, which matters in a crucial manner if it is a 
question of the gathering together of heterogeneous knowledges, 
requirements, and concerns around a situation that none can 
appropriate.
From the point of view that she poses the question of our 
capacity to create responses that aren’t barbaric, the intrusion 
of Gaia gives a formidable significance to the destruction of 
common causes that I have associated with the enclosures of 
yesterday and today. And she gives a crucial sense to the double 
distinction that I have proposed between users, or commoners, 
and end users, between practitioners and professionals. We 
urgently need to learn how to resist the nasty little song that 
sweetly whispers “that’s what people are like (selfish, subjected 
to their habits of thought, etc.)”, this little song whose theme is 
what intellectuals call voluntary servitude – which is always that 
of others, of course. No, the transformation of users into (selfish) 
consumers, or practitioners into (submissive) professionals 
doesn’t testify to people always being inclined to follow the 
easiest path. It testifies to the destruction of that which gathers 
together and causes people to think. But to adopt this point of 
view is equally to take note that the response to intrusion will not 
be one that a humanity which is finally reconciled, reunited under 
the sign of a general goodwill, would become able to give, but 
depends on the repopulating of a world devastated today by the 
confiscation or the destruction of collective, and always situated, 
capacities to think, imagine, and create.
From this point of view, what the GMO event was able to yield 
matters: to make our guardians stammer, to make the evidence 
on which they count to lead their flock towards a future that 
they themselves are incapable of conceiving lose its hold. The 
question of knowing how they might do otherwise, without anes-
thetizing order-words, is a different story, which is not ours. What 
we now know is that our hypothetical future, the stories through 
which a response to Gaia could be created, doesn’t pass via the 
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a refusal of a moral type, refusing to take power so as to keep 
one’s own hands clean. The question is rather technical: “taking 
power” presupposes that a government has power, that it can 
betray the role that capitalism makes it play. How to reclaim power 
is doubtless a better question, but the response then passes via 
a dynamic of engagements that produce possibilities, a dynamic 
that breaks the feeling of collective impotence without toppling 
over into the formidable “together anything becomes possible!”
Breaking the feeling of impotence in effect has nothing to do 
with what is, rather, the correlate of impotence, the feeling of 
omnipotence, the cult of hidden powers that ask only to be 
liberated, the abstract dream of the day when, at last, “the 
people will be in the street.” If it isn’t only a question of the reap-
propriating of the wealth produced through work, the people 
who may well invade the street should come there with concrete 
experience of what is demanded by reclaiming what has been 
destroyed, reappropriating the capacity to fabricate one’s own 
questions, and not responding to the trick questions that are 
imposed on us. One never fabricates in general and one is never 
capable in general.
The people in the street is an image that I do not want to give 
up, however, because it is an image of emancipation that can be 
delinked from the grand, epic prospect. After all, before our cities 
were reconfigured according to the imperatives of frictionless 
circulation, purified of threats to the public order that crowds 
and mixing together can always constitute, the people were in 
the street… But to prevent this image from becoming a poison, 
an abstract dream, perhaps it is worth transforming the image of 
what a street is. For the grand boulevards that lead to the places 
of power, a labyrinth of interconnected streets could be sub-
stituted, that is to say, a multiplicity of gatherings around what 
forces thinking and imagining together, around common causes, 
none of which has the power to determine the others, but each 
one of which requires that the others also receive the power of 
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Because if a cause is isolated, it always risks being dismembered 
according to the terms of different preexisting interests. And it 
also risks provoking a closing up of the collective, the collective 
then defining its milieu in terms of its own requirements, not 
as that with which links must be created. Which is what has 
happened to scientific communities. In short, a cause that 
receives the power to gather together is, par excellence, that 
which demands not to be defined as good, or innocent, or 
legitimate, but to be treated with the lucidity that all creation 
demands.
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It Could Be 
Dangerous!
Some eyebrows might well be raised at the prospect that I have 
just opened up. After all, my example bearing on the sciences 
cuts both ways. Well before entering the stage of the knowledge 
economy, did not scientists conclude privileged alliances with 
industry, the State, and the army? And have they not contributed, 
since the nineteenth century at least, to the type of development 
that has for us merited the intrusion of Gaia? Have they not 
played on their authority so that the undesirable or threatening 
consequences of this development would not be taken into 
account, in the name of future progress that would repair the 
damage, or even more simply, as the price of progress? In other 
words, do they not offer the example of what happens when one 
obeys not the common interest, but one’s own interests, whether 
or not they are those of a practice?
Certainly one retort could be that scientists have, as far as what 
didn’t concern their own practices goes, shared the great trust 
of the majority (a majority amongst those who felt themselves 
qualified to speak in the name of humanity…) as to the irresist-
ible drive of Promethean Man, he who breaks limits and ignores 
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example of scientists, it is the manner in which I proposed 
to associate commons with a capacity for resistance, for the 
reclaiming of capacities to think and act together, which raises 
eyebrows. Doesn’t the vulnerability of scientists to the grand 
narrative that they were the heroes of, which made of them the 
collective brains of humanity, demonstrate that I am placing my 
trust in the collective intelligence that would characterize those 
I am calling practitioners or users really too easily? Certainly we 
live in a veritable cemetery for destroyed practices and collective 
knowledges, but is it for all that necessary to entertain an idyllic 
vision of these commoners united by and around a common? 
Is it not necessary to fear corporatist reflexes? In short, have I 
not fallen for a typical illusion, one incessantly denounced by 
Marxists, namely the trust in a spontaneous capacity for resist-
ance that needs neither theory nor compass, and in which it 
would be necessary to trust?
The objection matters, and it is now necessary for me to 
underline that the characterization that I am trying to link to 
the theme of the enclosures – that of a capitalism that isn’t 
just an affair of exploitation but which requires, and doesn’t 
stop propagating, an operation of destruction – does not signify 
that those whom I have called practitioners or those who call 
themselves users, offer as such any guarantee whatsoever of 
reliability.
In fact, those who object will be able to line up the most dis-
astrous of examples. They could evoke the trap laid for workers 
when they have been associated with quality circles from long 
ago (already), in which it was a matter of thinking together about 
how everyone could contribute to the common cause that the 
good of the enterprise constituted. They will also be able to 
evoke the reasons why the unions who represent public service 
workers scorn any alliance with users, knowing that the latter 
can very easily propose reforms that would upset relations of 
force established with difficulty, to the detriment of workers. In 
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become the best allies of the pharmaceutical industry, calling for 
a distance from the norm (hyperactivity, for example), for which 
this industry has precisely provided medication, to be recognized 
as a real illness. But above all one can see looming the general 
question of the unraveling of politics to the benefit of govern-
ance by stakeholders, those who have an interest (a share) in 
a situation. Despite my fine assurances, can one not hear the 
murmuring of the great refrain of stakeholders: “let the others 
collapse, let all the rules that aim to avoid deepening inequality 
disappear, we demand to be able to play all the winning cards we 
possess in ‘free and undistorted’ competition,” the credo of the 
European Union (EU).
In short, to evoke the commoners, practitioners or users, those 
whom a common cause unites, those who have to give to what 
they all depend on the power to cause them to think together, 
albeit in different modes, is not, in effect, without danger. And the 
first danger is to evoke them as the source of unprecedented 
alternatives, enabling resistance to the capitalist takeover of the 
future. One could even see here a new version of the fascistic 
opposition between the “real country,” perfectly able to take its 
future in hand, and the clique of those who confiscate its power 
to act and determine itself. Any naïvety in the matter could be 
disastrous.
Nevertheless, one must equally resist the “and so…” that follows 
all too rapidly the disqualification of those who announce the 
good news, the discovery of the human capacity to self-organize, 
the hidden resource that will resolve everything. Because this 
“and so” brings discredit to the experimental efforts that always 
laboriously, sometimes messily, seek effectively to produce this 
collective intelligence. Both those who announce the good news, 
as well as the skeptics and the anxious, who make an argument 
from the dangerous drifting to which such efforts are vulnerable, 
contribute to their weakening, like an unhealthy environment that 
infects those who try to live in it.
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need – have a crucial need of – is a particular version of the art 
of paying attention. It is a matter of the art of what the Greeks 
called the “pharmakon,” which can be translated as “drug.” 
What characterizes the pharmakon is at the same time both its 
efficacy and its absence of identity. Depending on dose and use, 
it can be both a poison and a remedy. The type of attention that 
their milieu can lend to user movements is a pharmakon. It is 
capable of both nourishing and  poisoning them. And the same 
“pharmacological” uncertainty prevails with regards to what 
these movements themselves can produce. That they might be 
dangerous thus goes without saying – every pharmakon can 
be dangerous. What it is a matter of putting into suspension, 
through referring to the instability of the pharmakon – remedy or 
poison – is the way this danger functions as an objection.
When one of our guardians cries – and this is the cry by means 
of which we recognize that he effectively thinks of himself as 
responsible for us – “but that could be dangerous!” he inherits 
with this “but” a history in which the instability of the pharmakon 
has been used again and again to condemn it. A history in which 
what has been privileged again and again is what presents, or 
seems to present, the guarantees of a stable identity, which 
allows the question of the appropriate attention, the learning 
of doses and the manner of preparation, to be done away with. 
A history in which the question of efficacy has been incessantly 
enslaved, reduced to that of the causes supposed to explain their 
effects.
The hatred of the pharmakon goes back a long way. If one wishes, 
one can trace it all the way back to Plato, who defined philosophy 
by the requirement of such stability against its sophist rivals, 
who were capable of the better and the worse. Or Christian 
monotheism, inventing an intrinsically good God. Or the question 
of the power of judgment, which needs to be able to abstract out 
from circumstances. Or even the passion for recognizing genuine 
claims from amongst imposters, a passion that nourishes a 
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with multiple versions of the same obsession, that of doing away 
with the pharmakon and retaining only that which offers the 
guarantee of escaping from its detestable ambiguity. But it may 
well be that privileging what would offer such a guarantee, as it 
lures us into not paying attention, provoking the imprudence of 
an unthinking use, stabilizes the efficacy as a poison of what is 
defined as a remedy.
Let us come back, from this point of view, to the contrast 
between the response that programmers were able to give to the 
operation of enclosure that threatened them, and the passive 
resentment of most of those scientists who have not already 
embraced the imperative of the knowledge economy. It is a con-
trast that is all the more intriguing because it was the cooperative 
character of scientific research that served as a reference for 
the programmers. Why have programmers not only succeeded 
in defending their capacity to cooperate, but also to think and 
to invent links with end users who, like me, now count on the 
possibility of the free download of software that meets their 
needs? Why have scientists preferred to link themselves with 
States and entrepreneurs, and why have they defined the rest in 
terms of a lack (a lack of knowledge, a lack of rationality) or of a 
fear (of change, of challenging the unknown), in such a way that 
at the moment their allies started to enslave them, they found 
themselves incapable of imagining a possibility of resistance?
To think in pharmacological terms here is to pose the question, 
not of the identity of the sciences, but of the differences in milieu 
of these two practices, milieus that are not only external but 
that include the manner in which practitioners evaluate their 
relations with them. From this point of view, the event that the 
“birth of modern science” constituted is significant. Today one 
still finds authors, who are nevertheless interesting, who keep 
on repeating the stupid error that the explosive development 
of Europe, in contrast, most notably, with China, was due to 
the discovery of the power of scientific rationality, enabling 
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propaganda operation initiated by Galileo, and which still infects 
the imagination of scientists as much as nonscientists, may well 
derive from the propaganda in question having almost no need 
of propagandists. The practical novelty effectively associated 
with experimental proof may well have found a milieu already 
prepared to echo it in this way. As rare and restricted in scope 
as the experimental facts, able to testify to the manner in which 
they must be interpreted, are, this capacity may well have 
reactivated the old hatred of the pharmakon, of unstable opinion, 
of undecidable interpretations. A relationship with the world that 
was at last rational had been created!
What the propaganda fed upon then would be less the novelty 
of the experimental success and more the satisfaction of a much 
older requirement, the requirement that a truth imposes itself, 
that is to say, is able to manifest its difference from its rivals. Con-
sequently it is no surprise that the “it has not been proven” came 
to be associated so easily with “it is thus not worth counting,” 
indeed with the suspicion of irrationality coming to weigh upon 
those who took an interest in what has not been proven.
By contrast, one could say that from the outset the practice of 
programmers was placed under the sign of knowing that what 
they produced could be a remedy or a poison – notably, under 
the sign of a possible future in which Big Brother reigned. And 
the correlate of this contrast is the singularity of the history 
of practical innovations within information technology. It is a 
matter of a rare case in which the technical, cultural, social, and 
political stakes are intimately linked. A case that is all the more 
remarkable for the anchoring of this history in a military devel-
opment. It is not, in effect, a matter of forgetting that information 
technology is entwined with war, or that today, more than ever, 
it is an instrument of control, repression, and exploitation. But 
that that is not all it is is something that is perhaps owed to this 
particularity of the practitioners, who never thought that their 
technique was innocent, who never made the choice of its good 
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argument ritually used by scientists: is it the fault of the inventor 
of the axe if it has been used for killing?
The pharmacological approach doesn’t permit the question of 
whose fault it is to be the crucial one, the distribution of guilt and 
innocence to be an aim in itself – programmers who have been 
able to resist are not better than scientists who haven’t. But it 
proposes “thinking by the middle/milieu.” And the case of the 
scientists shows that a milieu obsessed by a stable distinction 
being established between remedy and poison is a milieu that 
empoisons, which even destroys. How many efforts have been 
disqualified because they couldn’t offer guarantees that no 
one should be capable of offering?! How many false, illusory 
guarantees have been offered and accepted at face value?! How 
many brutal judgments have been passed with regard to that 
which, being fragile and precarious, asked to be nourished and 
protected?!
In any case, the time of guarantees is over – that is the first 
meaning to confer on the intrusion of Gaia. This does not signify 
that anything goes, a resigned sigh or the horrified cry that 
express again and again the search for a value endowed with the 
power to denounce its rivals, who would be nothing but frauds. 
It does signify that what is valuable must in the first place be 
defined as vulnerable. By definition the dynamics of the creation 
of knowledges, of struggles, and of experiments that will respond 
to the intrusion – each insufficient by itself but important through 
its possible connections and repercussions – will be vulnerable.
A response cannot be reduced to the simple expression of 
a conviction. It is fabricated. It succeeds or fails. No manner 
of responding has to proclaim a legitimacy that transcends 
circumstance, that demands recognition on the part of all, that 
dreams or requires that all accept it as determining. But nor can 
any be condemned because it might be vulnerable to drifting 
dangerously. What the art of the pharmakon proposes to those 
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to recognize that the objection engages them, makes them an 
integral part of the process of fabrication. If they want to ignore 
that they are an integral part, they will still be so, but as judges 
who will contribute to a hostile or ironic milieu. On the other 
hand, they can also be so as allies, with questions like “how can 
we contribute to avoiding this danger?,” “how are we to cooperate 
against what will be employed to confirm our diagnosis?” and 
“how can we participate in the creation of a milieu that will help 
what is venturing to exist?”
There is but one certainty: that the process of creation of pos-
sibility must be very careful of the utopian mode, which appeals 
to the surpassing of conflicts and proposes a remedy the inter-
est of which must be respected by everyone. And there is but 
one generality that holds: that every creation must incorporate 
the knowledge that it is not venturing into a friendly world but into 
an unhealthy milieu, that it will have to deal with protagonists – 
the State, capitalism, professionals, etc. – who will profit from 
any weakness and who will activate all the processes likely to 
empoison (“recuperate”) it. For example, by recognizing users in 
a mode that transforms them into stakeholders, by setting up 
situations that divide those who seek to cooperate, by demanding 
inappropriate guarantees, or by fabricating infernal alternatives 
that dismember that which was seeking to create its own 
position.
As I have already emphasized, the intrusion of Gaia upsets the 
order of temporalities. The pharmacological art is required 
because the time of struggle cannot postpone the time of 
creation. It cannot delay until “after,” when there is no longer 
any danger, the time when humans will be able to unfold their 
creative capacities – life, thought, joy – and conjugate their efforts 
for the benefits of all. But it is also required because those who 
are seeking to create cannot do so innocently, by accusing those 
who struggle of wanting to take power whereas they would have 
known the need to turn their back on such an ambition. The 
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without confusion, through relaying, prolonging and reciprocal 
apprenticeship to the art of paying attention, on pain of mutual 
poisoning and of leaving the field free for the coming barbarism.
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A Threat of 
Regression?
Conjugating struggle and creation without confusion sounds 
very good. Too good perhaps. Writing this essay, my aim is not 
to offer propositions that demand adherence, but to seek to put 
into words, and perhaps into thought, the manner in which what 
I have named “the intrusion of Gaia” puts our propositions to 
the test. It is thus a matter of stimulating something completely 
different to adherence – it is necessary instead that it grates, 
that it resists, that it protests. That in any case is why there is 
something deliberately provocative in my choosing to name Gaia, 
to designate her as an unprecedented, or forgotten, form of 
transcendence. It is a matter of a provocation that doesn’t seek 
to scandalize, hence my precautions and explanations, but which 
nevertheless means to stimulate a minimum of perplexity or dis-
comfort. Thus some may ask why – if what I have called Gaia asks 
nothing of us, if it is not a matter of a cult or of conversion – give 
it this name? Why employ the term ”transcendence”?
What finds its expression in this perplexity or discomfort can 
be called a fear of regression, and this fear is long-standing, 
even amongst those who no longer believe in progress: there 
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is here that one must pay attention. Is the fear to which the 
refusal to renounce responds the fear of being oneself tempted 
to renounce? Or is it the fear that others may be drawn into 
renouncing? That’s an entirely different matter.
The distinction that I have just brought about implies a properly 
pharmacological test. To fear on behalf of others is to maintain 
the position of the “brains” of humanity, thinking for and in the 
name of those who are supposedly vulnerable to temptations 
from which they must be protected. I will come back later to this 
fear, which I consider to be a poison that it is a matter of learning 
to recognize and  resist. But I want first to address myself to the 
fear of regression in a mode that is appropriate to the painful 
perplexity of those who would wonder if, despite my assurances, 
I am not in the process of inciting a betrayal of that for which 
fidelity must be maintained.
It is impossible for me to speak for others about what they want 
to be faithful to. I will therefore speak for myself, refusing to turn 
my back on that important moment in European history that is 
called the Enlightenment, that moment when a taste for thinking 
and for the imagination as exercises in insubordination became 
widespread, in which a link of a new type between life and 
possibilities was forged. I do not wish to renounce that Enlight-
enment, and I want nothing to do with those who deny its hap-
pening, in the name of its limits and ambiguities.
I take myself as a daughter of the Enlightenment, then. But it 
belongs to those who identify themselves as inheriting such 
an event to ask the question of how to inherit it, that is to say 
too, how to avoid being its rentier, the representative of an 
established privilege that it could never be a matter of going 
back on, except by regression. Or else how to inherit the insolent 
laughter, the audacity of a Diderot, against the scientific mind 
that also claims to be an inheritor of the Enlightenment, but in 
the name of which the insolent are silenced. And above all, how is 
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since the Enlightenment, has been honored as the remedy par 
excellence for the erring of humanity, the critical thinking.
Let me be clearly understood: the question is not in the 
slightest one of contesting the utility, and even the necessity, 
of what is always an ingredient of thinking anyway, but rather 
the identification of critique as a remedy, that is to say also its 
transformation into an end in itself – an end in itself that would 
singularize we inheritors of the Enlightenment, amongst all 
other peoples. It is this transformation that generated the great 
epic genre in which Man becomes adult, takes his own destiny 
in hand and shakes off the yoke of illusory transcendences. The 
adventure of the Enlightenment then became a mission: at one 
and the same time a merciless combating of the monsters that 
incite us to regression, and a mandate to have to bring light to 
anywhere obscurity is said to reign.
Here I want to try to make those who feel themselves to be 
engaged in this combat hesitate. I will first emphasize that such 
combat is not associated with too many risks in our countries, 
where we call ourselves modern and where it is now extremely 
rare for the critical hero to provoke a ferocious raising of 
the defenses on the part of those whose illusions he aims to 
destroy. Today the exercise of critique has become a pastime for 
academics, who are not widely known for their courage, and a 
well-worn path for beginners whose doctoral dissertations kick 
over the statues of the beliefs supposed to dominate us again 
and again, to indifference and general tiredness. In some cases 
those who should be called the rentiers of the Enlightenment 
strike a heroic pose because they have provoked anger or hate. 
Our right to blasphemy is in danger, we hear. The question is 
not one of defending hateful reactions, but of underlining the 
indignity of this supposedly privileged right: to blaspheme has 
never meant insulting the belief of others who are distant, but 
those who are near, sometimes even our own beliefs. That 
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denunciation by one’s own kin.
It would be easy to say that this risk of rejection is one that I run 
on the part of those who would accuse me of favoring regres-
sion, or of demobilization in a world in which the enemies of the 
Enlightenment are waking up again. But this kind of retort is inap-
propriate, to the extent that I am addressing those who I imagine 
hesitating, asking themselves if giving up the power of critique, 
its capacity to destroy illusions, is not about giving up the only 
defense that we have in a world in which illusionists proliferate.
On the other hand it is possible to share with those who hesitate 
the question that this epoch poses, in which it is the very pos-
sibility of progress that is being shelved in the store of lost 
illusions. Will not the barbarism that could well define the future 
be that which designates as illusions the finally dispersed causes 
that made live, hope and struggle those we want to inherit from? 
Is that not what we are already having much more than a fore-
taste of today, when the hold of capitalism, nonetheless rid of its 
pretences at bringing progress, is stronger than ever? In Capitalist 
Sorcery we wrote that “if capitalism were to be put in danger 
by denunciation, it would have collapsed long ago.”1 To which I 
would add today that barbarism doesn’t fear critique. Rather, it 
nourishes itself on the destruction of that which appears retro-
actively as a dream, utopia, or illusion, as that of which reality 
imposes the renunciation. It triumphs when the memory of what 
has been destroyed is lost or makes people cackle or sigh.
The argument, however, would be insufficient if it was to be 
understood in the mode of tolerance, the necessity of suspending 
the critical weapon in order to allow all sorts of archaic or New 
Age beliefs to nourish a resistance to this reality. That is why it is 
necessary to go a bit further, and call into question the image of 
illusion that the heritage of the Enlightenment has been referred 
1 Pignarre and Stengers, Capitalist Sorcery, 11.
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truth. What that truth is depends on the spokesperson, but the 
point of convergence is the imperious necessity of dissipating 
the fog, of unveiling, demystifying, and not being duped. Now 
what is striking, in our modern countries at least, is the lack of 
resistance, the quasi resignation of those who, when they are not 
taking the path of rebel dissidence, are supposed to incarnate 
what separates us from the truth. As if they themselves knew 
the quasi-ineluctable character of their defeat. The only cry that 
is sometimes raised is a pitiful “but it ’s happening too quickly, 
we are not ready!” as was the case in Belgium with the adoption 
of children by homosexual couples. Protesting “that cannot be 
done, that will never be done” for its part provokes a slightly 
voyeuristic tendency, and the ultimate dishonor is attained when 
traditionalists are reduced to appealing to arguments of the “psy” 
type to defend their convictions.
Here it is a matter of thinking on the basis of the fact that far 
from being a heroic combat, critique seems henceforth to have 
something redundant about it, as if it merely ratified something 
that has already happened, which has already been carried out, 
as if it duplicated a prior operation of destruction. Perhaps that 
is why nothing, or nothing much, grows again where illusion has 
been destroyed – as if those who pride themselves on having 
triumphed over it were limited to digging up weeds that are dying 
or already dead, killed by a ground that is poisoned.
Thus when the never-ending refrain “you believe that this ‘really 
exists’, in the sense that it would have the right to impose itself 
on us, but in fact it is nothing more than a ‘social’ construction” 
resounds, no sense of suddenly liberated possibilities makes 
itself felt. Everything seems to have been said but nothing is 
produced. The desperately general adjective “social” most often 
equates with “arbitrary,” with what could just have easily been 
different. Certainly that also signifies that it is now available for 
change – but what change? And above all, since the nineteenth 
century, in whose interest is it that nothing resist change? What 
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result of a generalized operation of rendering equivalent? That is 
to say also the destruction of what mattered in a mode that was 
irreducible to a generality, of what claimed not an exceptional 
status but the taking into consideration of its own manner of 
diverging from the general rule.2 And is not what is called society 
then that which is defenseless in relation to the operations 
of redefinition through the categories of the State and the 
production of infernal alternatives by capitalism?
I am not denying that the adjective social may have had an 
eminently positive and constructive sense when the labor 
movement gave birth to it, in the epoch in which it learned 
actively, knowingly, to meddle with what was supposed not to 
concern it, to create relations of cooperation, solidarity, and 
mutuality, to explore what a “popular” and not a “public” (State) 
education could mean. But the fact that today critique can end 
up in the sadness of “it ’s just a social construction” marks the end 
of this intensely constructivist moment. The adjective social was 
emptied out when public order came to rhyme with social peace 
and the State took in hand and submitted what had been created 
to its categories. And it is not the supposedly immediately social 
immaterial labor that will give a positive meaning back to this 
adjective, which is now honored precisely because it is abstracted 
from everything that attaches humans, everything that produces 
relations that aren’t interchangeable.
Perhaps one might say that critique, which certainly was a 
remedy, has become a poison, because it has not known how to 
defend the truth proper to what is constructed, to what succeeds 
in holding together and making hold together, what is fabricated 
2 “To diverge” must be understood here in the sense that, as in La Vierge et le 
neutrino, I associate it with an ecology of practices taken not as contra-
dictory or incommensurable but as heterogeneous: the manner in which a 
practice, a way of life, or a being diverges designates what matters to them, 
and this not in a subjective but a constitutive sense. If they cannot make 
what matters to them matter they will be mutilated or destroyed.
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ricated it think, act, and feel.3 And perhaps it didn’t know how to 
because of its historical anchoring in Science, in the reference 
to scientific progress substituting a corrosive truth for human 
beliefs, expelling from the world that which humans, having 
finally arrived in the age of Reason, no longer had anything 
to do with. When it celebrates as the progress of reason the 
destruction of what people are attached to, without accepting 
that what they are attached to might be what causes people to 
think, doesn’t critique follow the path of Science, discovering a 
social explanation behind appearances? Even if it meant, in recent 
decades, itself turning against sciences themselves and dis-
covering that they also could be assimilated to a form of illusion, 
a social construction like the others.
And certainly there was grist to the critical mill, because 
scientists have never said nothing but the truth, the whole truth, 
about what made them practitioners: that was the condition 
under which their successes could be presented as moral, as 
representative of the general progress of reason, and also under 
which the all-terrain judgments that are demanded of Science 
could be accepted, separating what must be taken into account 
from what is merely subjective. If at the end of the twentieth 
century what has been called the “science wars” was able to stage 
the denunciation, by furious scientists, of the critical reading of 
the sciences, this was because they were already experts in the 
matter. They knew that critique dismissed their knowledge as 
that which they incessantly dismissed as “not scientific,” that is, 
a mere social construct. This war probably belongs to the past, 
however. With the knowledge economy, critique will be able to 
3 This is what Bruno Latour, also struggling against social (de)constructivism, 
has called “factishes,” thus responding to the antifetishism that again and 
again denounces those who attribute an existence to what is only a con-
struction. See On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods trans. Catherine Porter 
and Heather MacLean (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2010) and chap. 4 
and 9 of Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies, trans. Cath-
erine Porter (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999)
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sional researchers, used to the injunction that they must interest 
industry, the very idea of an achievement imposing criteria of 
reliability that are more demanding than those of their industrial 
partners, and of gaining patents, will doubtless appear to be a 
romantic illusion belonging to the past.
Today the hero of the critical epic has become postmodern. 
Unlinked from the reference to Science and concluding with 
the terrible relativism of everything, he resides in a sad hall 
of mirrors. Emancipation seems to be summed up by the 
interminable task – which is, apparently, all the more sacred 
for being interminable – of breaking every reflection, always 
with the same refrain “it is constructed.” That is, unless a new 
sacred cow is postulated – human rights, democracy – the empty 
abstraction of which defies critique. How does one critique a 
postulate? Critique is now in a situation of levitation, something 
that is, moreover, celebrated by some as the ultimate lucidity, 
finally assuming the abyssal drama of the human condition. I 
implore those who may be seduced by the hymn to the death 
of thinking to consider that there is perhaps a certain obscenity 
to today’s somewhat “chic” radicalism – like a demonstration by 
the absurd that far from liberating new questions and new pos-
sibilities, critique is pursuing the shadow of what had mattered, 
had caused people to live and think, and is honoring what can no 
longer cause anyone at all to live or think.
If the question now is that of the causes able to make us think, 
invent, and act, to allow us to repopulate our devastated 
history, it is necessary to know a priori that they will all be 
vulnerable to critical attack, to that which we have carried out 
like mad chemists systematically submitting everything that 
they encounter to the acid bath and triumphantly concluding “it 
doesn’t resist!” They will, on the other hand, need the critical, 
discerning attention that the art of the pharmakon proposes, 
but then it isn’t a question of illusions to defeat, but much 
rather one of knowing that what can be a remedy is all the more 
115likely to become a poison if it is used imprudently and without 
experience. And that is a kind of attention that has nothing epic 
about it, which may have belonged to every epoch and to every 
tradition.
I recall that I have been addressing myself to those for whom 
what I proposed might be felt to be a terrible renunciation, the 
betrayal of what has been most precious to us. But this disarray 
may be doubled by a cry “that would be to open the door to 
every kind of monster!” and then the scenario changes, because 
what is in question with this cry is “the others,” those who will be 
vulnerable to the most monstrous of temptations. Here again, it 
will be a matter of naming, so as to force thinking. In our so-called 
modern world, when the hero in the epic genre makes himself 
into the sworn enemy of the illusions that fetter the process of 
emancipating humanity, it can have as its consequence the power 
given to what I will name stupidity.4
4 Bêtise is translated here as stupidity; however it is worth noting that this is 
not unproblematic – stupidity invokes stupor, sleep, while “la bêtise,” as will 
be seen here, has nothing passive about it. –Trans.
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Stupidity
Just as Gaia cannot be reduced to an object of knowledge, what I 
will name stupidity cannot be reduced to a type of psychological 
weakness. It will not be said that “people are stupid” as if it was 
a matter of some personal defect. Stupidity is something about 
which it will be said instead that it seizes hold of certain people. 
And in particular it seizes hold of those who feel themselves in 
a position of responsibility and who then become what I call our 
guardians.
It is not that those who are responsible for us, those who 
are found everywhere, at all levels, are stupid, in the sense 
that it would be sufficient to get rid of them, to take power, 
to put smart people in their place. And it is not that everyone 
who is responsible is afflicted with stupidity. The technician 
responsible for the operation of a network of computers isn’t 
especially, as such. As the saying has it, it is a bad workman who 
blames his tools, and responsibility, here, implies an attention 
towards the possible, the capacity to imagine the unforeseen, 
a learned wariness not towards the situation but towards one’s 
own routines. On the other hand, it is us that those who are 
118 responsible for us distrust. While wariness implies a precise situ-
ation, procedures to use, and commitments to formalize, those 
who are responsible for us are defining us as never to be trusted. 
They are like shepherds who must answer for their foolish flock to 
whoever entrusted them to look after it.
One might think that by assimilating our guardians, those who I 
am calling responsible for us, to shepherds who must answer for 
their flock, I am associating the question of stupidity with what is 
called “pastoral power,” which implies a leader who has received 
a mandate to assure the safety of those he must guide. Stupidity, 
however, is rather what remains of this power when there is no 
longer any mandate, or whenever only an impoverished version 
of it subsists, staging a recalcitrant humanity, one that is always 
ready to allow itself to be seduced, to follow the first charlatan 
to come along, to allow itself to be had by the first demagogue. 
Those who are responsible for us are not pastors because they 
are not guiding us towards anything at all; they are in the grip of 
stupidity because they judge the world in terms of dangerous 
temptations and seductions that it is a matter of protecting us 
from.
Today, faced with the intrusion of Gaia, which they can no longer 
entirely ignore, those who are responsible for us are in suspense, 
as we are. The “I am aware but all the same…” stance that takes 
the place of thinking for them is nearly audible, but, in a certain 
manner we are all in that position. On the other hand, what is 
not of the order of a common reaction in the face of what is 
difficult to conceive, of an impotent complaint in the face of what 
exceeds us, is the reaction – almost a cry – that is typical in the 
face of certain propositions: “but such a proposition would open 
the floodgates to…” To hear this cry is to hear what makes the 
difference between the compassion that is possible for whoever 
is in a position of responsibility and feels out of their depth, and 
the distance to be taken with regard to those who I am character-
izing as responsible for us. Because this cry is the cry of stupidity.
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that invokes the open floodgates, discussion is pointless, because 
one is dealing not with someone whose reasons would have to 
be understood, but a being who has been captured, in the grip of 
something in relation to which any reason will come afterwards, 
and most often in the mode of the “you should remember that…” 
Whoever says “you should remember that” is not dumb – those 
who are seized by stupidity never are. He doesn’t plaintively 
demand to be understood but rather is frightening. Because what 
makes him react – although perhaps he would like the world to be 
different, that people be not “like that” – is of the order of a force 
that one collides with, and, what is more, a force that one feels 
feeds on all the efforts at persuasion, all the arguments to which 
one might be tempted to have recourse.1 Stupidity does not here 
refer to stupor, to paralysis, or to impotence. Stupidity is active, 
it feeds on its effects, on the manner in which it dismembers a 
concrete situation, in which it destroys the capacity for thinking 
and imagining of those who envisaged ways of doing things 
differently, leaving them stunned, a stupid and nasty argument 
may well leave you stunned with the mute perplexity of a “he may 
be right but all the same,” or enraged, which confirms it in turn: 
you see, with these kinds of people, there’s always violence.
1 Naming stupidity is to repeat in a different way the operation that Philippe 
Pignarre and I attempted in Capitalist Sorcery when we named “petites 
mains” (“minions”), those who are not simply part of the “system” as one 
says, but who watch over it, who incessantly adjust its articulations, block up 
its leaks, and extend its hold. In that case too it was a matter of diagnosing 
a capture and a hold, one which, when the minion says “sorry, but we have 
to…” makes them say so not as something they suffer but as a commitment 
that sets them up against those who insinuate that there might be a way 
of doing or thinking differently. Naming is a risk and one doesn’t do just as 
one pleases with words. The name petites mains was probably associated 
with too sympathetic an image, as people behind the scenes, who provide 
invaluable assistance, and the name minions connotes something a little too 
obsequious, too personal a relation to a powerful person, to permit their 
use to be changed. We have had to recognize that.
120 It seems to me that it is necessary today to dare to name the 
stupidity that seizes hold of those whom capitalism has made 
endorse the responsibility for maintaining public order. And 
that even though – and our guardians “are well aware of it, but 
all the same” – it is systematically and in all irresponsibility 
activating new sources of disorder. It is not a matter of accusing, 
as is the case when complicity or corruption is denounced. Such 
accusations in effect create the idea that if one rid oneself of 
these sell-outs, everything would be OK – an idea that always 
favors those who present themselves as saviors, the voice of the 
people, of the nation… or of the race. And they only reinforce the 
sense our guardians entertain of the necessity of their mission – 
their conviction that those who accuse them “don’t understand.” 
Those who have been captured by stupidity deserve neither 
accusation nor indignation. In fact they deserve nothing because 
it is that which they are in the grip of that matters. And what 
grips them can be sensed at every level of responsibility, and it 
connects them all, including those who are strangers to the direct 
interests of contemporary capitalism, including those who have 
been captured by the pedagogic refrain “what would you do in 
our place?” and feel themselves responsible for us by proxy.
Gilles Deleuze, from whom I have borrowed this name 
stupidity, made of it a new problem, one that imposed itself 
on those who questioned the erring of human thought in the 
nineteenth century. In his Alphabet, when he tackles “H as in 
History of philosophy” Deleuze carries out a kind of wild gallop. 
The philosophers of the seventeenth century were, he says, 
preoccupied with error – how is one to avoid error? But in the 
eighteenth century, a different problem emerges, that of illusion, 
of the vulnerability of the mind to the illusions to which it 
adheres, which it even produces. Then in the nineteenth century, 
it is stupidity that haunts some, like Nietzsche, Flaubert, or 
Baudelaire, which fascinates and horrifies them.
That the question of stupidity arises in the nineteenth century 
doesn’t in the least bit signify the discovery of something that 
121previously had been ignored or misrecognized. Stupidity is 
new, like the coupling of modern States and capitalism is new. 
It doesn’t affect capitalism, because capitalism doesn’t fear 
the opening of the floodgates to anything whatsoever. What it 
doesn’t want, what would be a fettering of the laws of the market, 
is what would prevent it from being in command when it is a 
matter of defining the manner in which problems have to be 
posed. But stupidity does, on the other hand, affect those who 
view themselves as the inheritors-rentiers of the Enlightenment, 
those who continue the noble combat against illusions but who 
– and this makes for a difference that matters – have abandoned 
its sense of adventure for that of a mission that made them ped-
agogues. They are those who have to protect others, those who 
know, whilst others believe.
It is a matter here of “thinking by the middle/milieu” in Del-
euze’s expression, that is to say, without descending to roots 
nor ascending to the final sense, but grappling with a milieu 
that is henceforth saturated with multiple versions of the “they 
believe, we know” that fabricate those who are responsible for 
us, those who know that behind the floodgates that must not be 
opened a formidable mass of beliefs are jockeying for position, 
always ready to invade the stage.2 In one way or another, the 
Entrepreneur’s demand – that the State ensures the security of 
his investments – is an ingredient in the matter. But who is the 
chicken and who is the egg? Couldn’t one just as easily say that 
the State has lent a favorable ear to the Entrepreneur, because 
what this latter was proposing corresponded to its own sense 
of its responsibilities, to ensure the orderliness of progress by 
closing the floodgate to irrational turbulence? In any case, we are 
grappling with two protagonists who have been coproduced by 
2 It is rather remarkable that the cry about the open floodgate is only emitted 
very rarely when it is a matter of a socio-technical innovation – then one 
speaks about something satisfying the “needs” of a population, if only to 
observe later that the supply made a powerful contribution to actualizing 
the need.
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onists and their respective roles conceptually, “thinking by the 
middle” here could well signify producing knowledges that con-
spire to fabricate a different experience of this middle/milieu, to 
recount our histories differently, and notably to learn to discern the 
manner in which stupidity has poisoned them.
Although it is only an example, it is thus that we have become 
used to seeing scientists hold that one of their most important 
and most legitimate missions, in the name of reason, is to hunt 
down those who they denounce as charlatans, impostors, 
carrying away a credulous public, a public that is vulnerable to 
every kind of seduction, susceptible to every kind of irrationality. 
Recounting the manner in which this role has been taken on, in 
which it produced the evidence for a scientific reason struggling 
against opinion, is also to recount the manner in which stupidity 
has captured the scientific adventure, has contributed to putting 
the power of proof in the service of public order. This is what I 
realized when studying the approach initiated by the scientists 
who in 1784, that is to say, just before the French Revolution, par-
ticipated in a commission of enquiry nominated by King Louis XVI 
to investigate the magnetic practices of the Viennese physician, 
Anton Mesmer.3
Around Mesmer’s “baquet” (vessel), loaded, according to him, 
with a curative magnetic fluid, women swooned and the crowd 
became impassioned, a crowd that was a danger to public order, 
because it brought magnetism into resonance with affirmation 
of the equality of humans, all brought into relation by the fluid. 
The Queen, Marie Antoinette, it was said, was as sensitive to the 
fluid as the lowliest of her chambermaids. And for the first time, 
scientists, amongst whom were the masters of experimentation, 
3 Léon Chertok and Isabelle Stengers, A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason: 
Hypnosis as a Scientific Problem from Lavoisier to Lacan, trans. Martha Noel 
Evans (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
123Lavoisier and Franklin, will take on the role of those who “feel 
themselves responsible” and apply themselves to finding the 
means to destroy the claims of this charlatan. To do this, they will 
invent a new type of proof: it will not be a matter of successfully 
giving a reliable interpretation, one that resists objections, to 
the crises, and the cures that Mesmer attributed to the fluid, but 
of devoting themselves solely to the question “does Mesmer’s 
fluid really exist?” For them this signifies: does it have any effects 
independently of the imagination, in this instance, independently 
of the knowledge that one has of being magnetized? In other 
words, the commissioners were there in order to disqualify, and 
that is what they would do thanks to a series of stagings at the 
center of which was the power to dupe. Subjects are duped with 
the complicity of a magnetizer, and the conclusion follows: the 
imagination can produce the effects that are attributed to the 
fluid, whereas without the imagination, the fluid has no effect. 
Mesmer is thus nothing but a charlatan.
Of course the effects felt by those who were duped, who thought 
that they were being magnetized, didn’t have all that much to 
do with the curative effects that could be observed around the 
baquet. One ought really to write that the imagination must be 
able to explain such effects, something that has nothing to do 
with experimental proof. What is more, the members of the 
committee didn’t define the power of the imagination, nor did 
they envisage the hypothesis that in order to be effective, the 
fluid demands the imagination. These objections, and many 
others, were made at the time, but in vain, because it wasn’t 
Mesmer’s therapeutic practices that were at stake: what the 
commission had selected was his claims to give the fluid the 
power to explain the cures that he obtained. It was these claims 
that allowed his practice to be submitted to a test imposed in a 
unilateral manner, a test that resembles experimentation but 
doesn’t seek experimental achievement, just the power to judge. 
The approach inaugurated by the commissioners, which has illus-
trated the critical spirit proper to Science ever since, is made to 
124 kill things off, to mark a stopping point in a history that is judged 
to be irrational. And it repeats itself every time that, faced with 
what he judges apt to raise an unwelcome interest, a scientist 
concludes “it must be possible to explain that by…” Explaining is 
no longer a rare achievement but a judgment that manifests the 
power of reason to dissipate illusion.
Accepting power’s offer, placing their science in the service of 
public order, the commissioners were aware that an abyss sep-
arated the event of experimental proof, when a phenomenon 
has become able to explain itself, from the “it must be possible 
to explain that by…,” which, as it happens, always explains by a 
general cause, emptying what it explains of any interest. They 
knew this but to acknowledge it would have been to open the 
floodgates to the crowd that stuck blindly to the authority of 
Mesmer the illusionist. Let us not be mistaken though: what the 
commissioners produced really is of the order of an invention, 
but having agreed to count themselves amongst our guardians 
what they invented was the power to dismember a concrete 
question – what occurs around Mesmer’s baquet – in the name 
of Science, that is to say, to redefine this question in terms of 
categories that authorize them to conclude: “Move on, there’s 
nothing to be seen here.”
One can see why it is so important to emphasize that the hold of 
stupidity doesn’t make those who are vulnerable to it “stupid” 
because they feel themselves responsible. Those who are made 
stupid, or dumb, are rather those who are seen as threatening 
the public order. When one says of a remark that it is “stupid 
and nasty” one is characterizing something that is remarkably 
effective, but of a destructive efficacy, producing a paralysis 
in the thought of whoever it targets. To render the power of 
stupidity perceptible is thus not just about making perceptible 
the manner in which it anesthetizes those who it seizes hold of, 
prohibiting them from wondering, hesitating about the way a 
situation demands to be approached, felt, and thought. It is also 
about rendering perceptible the manner in which it commands 
125them to invent the means to subject such situations to unilateral 
requirements that have the nasty power to dismember them. 
Because what matters for them is not the situation itself but what 
is rumbling behind the floodgates, the formidable and formless 
mass of illusions that only ask to profit from this situation in 
order to rush on stage.
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Learning
The commissioners could have replied: “But what would you 
have done in our position?” To which just one response stands 
out: “We aren’t in your position.” Not a very polite answer, but 
a salubrious one. To refuse to put oneself in their position is, in 
effect, to refuse the anonymity that those who feel themselves 
responsible claim. It is this kind of response that is appropriate 
when, for example, it appears that the refusal of GMOs puts 
our guardians in a difficult situation in relation to the rules of 
the WTO: “if you have given up on the possibility of prohibiting 
the cultivation of GMOs in European countries, if you now have 
to be accountable to your masters in the WTO, you have done 
so without any mandate” – just as it is without any mandate 
today that those who are responsible for us attempt to impose 
a freedom of “exchange” on African countries and a submission 
to IP rights that would be totally ruinous for these countries. 
And it is without any mandate that they have defined the limits 
of political action by reference to their necessary subjection to 
what they call the laws of the market. Concretely, this signifies 
that what capitalism is now able to make them do includes the 
128 task of ensuring our subjection. How are we to put ourselves in 
their position if amongst the illusions jostling for position behind 
the floodgates that must be kept shut is now to be found the idea 
that trying to think the collective future is a legitimate right?
Naming stupidity in order to make it perceptible, in order to make 
it felt that agreeing to imagine oneself in “the position of…” is 
to expose oneself to its grasp, is all the more important today 
given that it is a matter of resisting appeals to unity in the face of 
the challenge of global warming. Naming stupidity is not a good 
thing in itself, however. The art of the pharmakon is required. 
As a remedy, the operation can certainly be demoralizing for 
our guardians, those who, in order to feel good, need us to put 
ourselves in their position, that is to say, allow ourselves to be 
infected by the stupidity that has captured them.  But every remedy 
is susceptible to becoming a poison. If the refusal of GMOs was 
an event, it was not just because the disarray of our guardians 
had become perceptible, but also because on this occasion, 
minor knowledges were able to make themselves heard and con-
spired to fabricate a very different problematic landscape. The 
floodgates were effectively opened but onto the multiplicity of 
questions that the order-words “agriculture must be modernized” 
had silenced. Beyond the generalities correlating the empire of 
GMOs, which is nothing other than that of industrial agriculture, 
with a series of quasi-programmed catastrophes, there is no 
generality that would define a different agriculture, one that is 
able to compose itself with Gaia, but also to stop poisoning the 
concrete Earth and its inhabitants, and this whilst feeding ever 
growing numbers of humans. Not that this is impossible but 
the possibilities have to be formulated on a case by case, region 
by region basis, and above all in a mode that confers a crucial 
place to the knowledges of interested people. The poison here 
would to underestimate this challenge, the need to learn what it 
requires, here too on a case by case basis, without postulating a 
generalized goodwill. Multiple connections are to be created and 
maintained, never to be considered acquired once and for all.
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theme of stupidity, the situation is the same. In the minority in 
the commission, the naturalist Jussieu had called for a renewal 
and careful study of what he called the traditional “treatment 
by touch,” to which he thought Mesmer’s magnetism belonged 
despite its revolutionary claims. Heeding Jussieu’s appeal, 
studying the traditional therapeutic practices of healers from the 
countryside, rather than subjecting them to the criteria of judges 
who were indifferent, even hostile, who in any case had decided 
to make the right of scrutiny and control of Science prevail, might 
have meant to learn (how) to work with healers. That is to say, with 
practitioners without formal qualifications who, unlike Mesmer, 
would not have presented themselves as discoverers, but much 
more often as the custodians of a transmitted knowledge or gift. 
And to do that, it would have been necessary not to make the 
grand break between “those who believe” and “those who know” 
prevail, and to recognize the healers as those whom it was a 
matter of learning from and with. Legend has it that Galileo had 
the courage to murmur “and yet it moves” when he was con-
demned to recant. But those who condemned him were not his 
scientific colleagues. To affirm apropos of practitioners with trou-
bling references “and yet they heal” in the face of scandalized col-
leagues demands much greater courage, the type of courage that 
researchers not only do not cultivate but that they are actively 
encouraged to refrain from (“that would open the floodgates 
to…”)
Thus there really is something that is pressing against the 
floodgates, which it is the task of our guardians to keep shut, 
a whole mass of learning to do, which is sometimes shocking, 
always difficult, because it cannot be reduced to the generalities 
of good sense. It is this mass I am thinking of when I refer to the 
manner in which Gilles Deleuze characterized the difference 
between left and right – a difference in nature, he emphasized, 
not of conviction. This difference of nature refers to the relation-
ship with the State power, and it is why the parties said to be on 
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people to think, that is to say also to imagine, to feel, to formulate 
their own questions and their own demands, to determine the 
unknowns of their own situation.1
The institutions of the State can only disappoint such a need. I 
will limit myself here to an example from education, when it is 
dominated by the State imperative of “control and verification,” 
ensuring that whoever has passed a stage is capable of providing 
comparable answers to the same questions, of responding to the 
same demands. What such verifications produce is well known. 
Far from being a simple element of the educational apparatus, 
they constitute its heart and soul: verification captures what 
comes before it and defines the transmission of knowledge (an 
unjustly criticized expression) as a passage from a supposed 
ignorance to a knowledge that is defined by its conditions of 
verifiability.2 This makes school, officially placed under the sign of 
equality, a systematic producer of inequalities, inequalities that 
are, in addition, ratified by those interested in maintaining them. 
One need only think of the sad demand for the equality of oppor-
tunity. What does such a demand signify, if not the abstraction of 
a “whoever” who aims to get themselves recognized as belonging 
to the set of all those who find themselves offered the same 
opportunities as all the others, a little like a lottery ticket that has 
the same chances of winning as all the others? Except that the 
demand can have as its correlate a returning of the responsibility 
for one’s fate back to whoever didn’t seize the opportunities they 
were offered.
Today, the difference in nature between learning to pose one’s 
own questions and submitting to questions that come from 
elsewhere is taking on a formidably concrete signification: 
the possibility of a response to Gaia that is not barbaric could 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 127.
2 Julie Roux, Inévitablement (après l’école) (Paris: La fabrique éditions, 2007).
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responses to questions that are ready made because addressed 
to “whoever.” They will always be local responses, not in the 
sense that local means “small” but in the sense that it is opposed 
to “general” or “consensual.” As for the “people,” whose thinking 
is needed in a vital manner, they are never the others, those 
unreliable, vulnerable to irrationality others about whom our 
guardians talk without ever including themselves amongst 
them. Learning to think, to pose one’s own questions, to situate 
oneself by escaping from the evidence of the whoevers, is never 
permanently acquired, defining an elite against the suggestible 
flock. The only thing that can be acquired is, rather, the taste and 
the trust for it. And those who acquire it today know they were 
lucky and can often recount the encounter or the event to which 
they owe this experience, the possibility of which school and the 
media had left them unaware of: not “I think” but “something 
makes me think.”
Learning to recognize and to name stupidity, then, matters, 
but it is not an end in itself. Rather it is a matter of a condition 
for something else, an active diagnosis bearing on our milieus, 
milieus that don’t make the learning of this experience that 
Deleuze calls thinking impossible but exceptional (for the elite, 
not for “people”). It is an eminently political diagnosis, because 
it is in these milieus that one also deals with those who are 
engaged in experimenting with what “thinking” means to live or 
survive, thinking in the sense that matters politically, that is to say, 
in the collective sense, with one another, through one another, 
around a situation that has become a “common cause” that 
makes people think. It is a matter of diagnosing the unhealthy 
character of the milieus in which such experiments will always 
risk being dismembered, subjected to control and scrutiny, and 
to regulations that are blind to their consequences, summonsed 
to provide accounts that are not theirs, destroyed. But also, 
should this happen, unduly glorified as “the” solution by those 
who will hasten to condemn them if they do not live up to the 
132 promises they have been made to bear. In the world that is 
ours, one must, of course, be mistrustful of one’s enemies, 
but also of one’s (critical) friends, who are always ready to be 
“disappointed.” And yet it is also a matter of trusting that if 
the occasion is appropriately constructed, people can become 
capable of acquiring or reclaiming the taste for thinking. That is 
to say, of discovering that what disgusted them or what they had 
no taste for, felt incapable of doing, wasn’t thinking at all (which 
is indissociable from a concrete, practical experience) but the 
indeed rather loathsome exercising of a theoretical abstraction 
which demands that what one knows and lives be dismissed as 
anecdote.
But this is a utopia, it will be objected! To accept this objection is 
to condemn us to barbarism. And it is barbarism to which we are 
also condemned by the tales and reasoning that we are drowning 
in, which illustrate or take as a given the passivity of people, their 
demand for ready-made solutions, their tendency to follow the 
first demagogue to come along. Is it any surprise, since this is 
precisely what the hold of stupidity allows and propagates. We 
have a desperate need for other stories, not fairy tales in which 
everything is possible for the pure of heart, courageous souls, 
or the reuniting of goodwills, but stories recounting how situ-
ations can be transformed when thinking they can be, achieved 
together by those who undergo them. Not stories about morals 
but “technical” stories about this kind of achievement, about 
the kinds of traps that each had to escape, constraints the 
importance of which had to be recognized. In short, histories 
that bear on thinking together as a work to be done. And we need 
these histories to affirm their plurality, because it is not a matter 
of constructing a model but of a practical experiment. Because it 
is not a matter of converting us but of repopulating the devas-
tated desert of our imaginations.
The accusation of utopia rests not on the rarity of cases but 
on that of the narratives, or instead on their “exoticization.” 
Thus in order to affirm that there is nothing to be learned from 
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suffices to qualify the unity of societies in which such practices 
are cultivated as “organic” (closed, stable, based on adherence to 
self-evident common values, etc.). The case is closed then: to take 
an interest in such practices would be to pursue an illusory, or 
worse still, a regressive, ideal.
We know that within our so-called modern societies, however, 
modes of gathering that stimulate the capacity to do what people 
are reputedly incapable of doing exist. Without even mentioning 
scientific practices, when they are alive and demanding, let 
us take, for example, the manner in which, although nothing 
prepares them for it, citizens selected at random become capable 
of participating effectively in juries in court cases, their attentive 
presence preventing the usual connivance between profes-
sionals and their “we will all agree that…” subtexts. It is hardly 
surprising that professionals periodically dream about working 
without juries. They evoke the incompetence of mere citizens, 
but what really worries them is that the role such citizens take 
on brings uncertainty into the process. We should rather record 
that the role they have without deserving it because of their 
merits or competences has the power to stimulate capacities to 
think, object, and formulate questions that are precisely what is 
denied when it is said “people aren’t capable.” And the experience 
of citizen juries that meet with regard to technico-industrial 
innovations gives the same type of empowerment, when the 
procedure is not rigged, that is to say, organized around a ready-
made question, or run by communications professionals, whose 
techniques are addressed, as always, to groups that are sup-
posed to be incapable of functioning without any “framing.”
In these two cases, persons who are “anybodies” demonstrate 
that they are able to learn how to orient themselves in a situ-
ation that is complicated and conflictual because the protag-
onists in this situation are constrained by their presence to 
produce it in a mode that allows them to take a position, because 
the apparatus of the meeting has allowed this situation to be 
134 “dramatized,” unfolded in all its divergent, undecided and con-
flicting components. In the case of citizen juries the dramatization 
is all the more remarkable because it is not a matter of a reca-
pitulation of what has been produced in a legal inquiry: the jury 
carries out the inquiry itself, forcing a confrontation with experts 
who, in general, do not speak with each other, it unfolds ques-
tions that these experts usually forget, taking an interest in con-
sequences that have been ignored or disqualified or externalized, 
that is to say, reputedly concern other protagonists, who are not 
onstage.
It will not be surprising that in this world of ours the institution of 
citizen juries can only have an extremely limited scope, and that 
forms of public consultation, which are very fashionable, have in 
fact most often been reduced to cosmetic operations deprived of 
any consequence. Entrepreneurs demand that the accounts that 
they must give of their action – if they cannot be avoided – must 
be predetermined. We’ve seen all this. How could they accept an 
institution in which people produce open accounts and learn to 
interrogate the manner in which problems are formatted, that 
is to say too the distribution presiding over the formatting: what 
the State allows capitalism to do, and what capitalism makes the 
State do. But it is precisely because it is a matter of an institution 
in which this distribution is liable to lose any consensual evidence 
that citizen juries matter. Not only because this institution has the 
capacity of making perceptible the stupidity of those who present 
themselves before such juries as responsible, the arrogance, the 
naïvety, the blindness of certain experts, but above all because 
of what it is, or what it could be – productive of narratives that 
give those who hear them the taste for what has produced 
them. Yes, a situation can become interesting, worthy of making 
people think, able to stimulate a taste for thinking, if it has been 
produced by a concrete learning process, in which the difficulties, 
the hesitations, the choices and errors are as much a part of the 
narrative as the successes and the conclusions arrived at.
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Operators
 Let’s not fool ourselves: if we do not pay attention, the prospect 
opened up by the example of juries, whether in a court case or 
as a citizen jury, could bring us back to what it was a matter of 
avoiding: the contrast between blind and obtuse experts and 
professionals, and a group of goodwilled citizens who would 
provide the proof that when the occasion arises, “people” are 
able to think. To stop at such a contrast would lead to head-on 
opposition to our guardians and their allies, most notably those 
who will multiply all the examples that in their opinion testify to 
the voluntary servitude proving that people will follow the first 
demagogue to come along, etc.
Head-on opposition is a temptation to be avoided, because it 
empties out the world, only allowing two virulently opposed 
camps, which function in reference to one another, to subsist. 
In so doing, it feeds stupidity, because it accepts the question of 
knowing “whether or not the people are capable of…” This is the 
kind of abstract question that leads nowhere, except perhaps 
to school and its operations of verification: let’s see if they are 
capable.
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persons and groups, and always in circumstances that are not 
simply a context but which are operative. Thus, what interests 
me with the example of juries, whether in a court case or a cit-
izen jury, is not that they would manifest the equality of humans 
when it is a matter of thinking. It is the efficacy of an apparatus 
that brings about a “making equal.” Continuing with the contrast 
with school, it is significant that the efficacy of the apparatus of 
the jury depends upon the deliberate exclusion of everything 
that might repeat a situation of a school type, in which one is 
supposedly ignorant, necessarily needing to be taught something 
before being authorized to think, always dependent upon those 
who supposedly know more.
It is crucial to underline that there is nothing demagogical about 
not presupposing ignorance. Avoiding the repetition of a situ-
ation of the school type, that is to say also of avoiding reviving 
the “I don’t understand” that is produced at school, is part of 
the apparatus in a positive sense. It positively takes into account 
that having to undertake a course in the knowledge mobilized 
by genetic engineering before discussing GMO will never put 
this innovation in a position of being thought. The questions that 
matter always come afterwards, and this afterwards, when 
at last it comes, will not have been prepared for by the ped-
agogical exposition, but rather will have been captured. GMO 
will first have been presented as a consequence of the progress 
in knowledge, and the difference between GMO in research 
(carefully disinfected, because things have to be made simple) 
and GMO from Monsanto will only be evoked in the last instance, 
if at all.
Avoiding situations that produce inequality is not enough, just 
as most of the so-called egalitarian modes of functioning, those 
that make equality into an abstract injunction, claiming to make a 
clean slate of all the processes that have always already trans-
formed differences into inequalities, are not. Thus in meetings 
in which “everyone has a right to express themselves”: boredom, 
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of those with big mouths and other unrepentant windbags, ques-
tions that get bogged down incessantly in personality clashes 
or rivalries between people, the gnawing desire that someone 
“take things in hand,” the progressive rout, weary, fragile 
compromises…it is pointless elaborating this, as it is a shared 
experience.
If citizen juries are able to escape this poison, like juries in courts, 
it seems that it is to the extent that the apparatus gathers its 
participants around a common cause, that is to say, achieves 
the transformation of a problematic situation into a cause for 
collective thinking. But this cause that makes participants equal 
cannot be equality itself, or any other cause supposed to tran-
scend particularities and demand equal submission. Equality 
is a pharmakon too, one that can become a poison when it is 
associated not with a production but with an imperative, and an 
imperative that always sanctions its privileged spokespersons. 
A common cause, endowed with the power to put those it 
gathers together in a situation of equality, cannot have a spokes-
person. Rather, it is of the order of a question, the response to 
which depends on those it gathers together, which cannot be 
appropriated by any one amongst them. Or, more precisely, it is a 
question the answer to which will be messed up if one amongst those 
it gathers together appropriates it.
When the event of an achievement occurs, it is the “questioning”1 
situation that produces equality, that is to say, the capacity of 
“simple citizens” to participate in juries. It is this situation that 
transmutes what is presented as an expert response, with an 
authoritative status, into a contribution the importance of 
which must be evaluated as well as what it makes matter, what 
it leaves indeterminate. So, woe betide an authoritative expert, 
1 To be distinguished radically, of course, from the problem situations dear 
to the pedagogue, which are defined in terms of the potential learning of 
pupils, in terms of mental operations that they will have to put to work.
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expertise to be unimportant, something that must be accepted 
as the inevitable price of progress. It is because they are brought 
together by a questioning situation that citizen juries can be for-
midable machines for making experts stutter, or for evaluating 
the reliability of the expertise on which what is proposed to them 
rests.
Today, one could say that the intrusion of Gaia produces a ques-
tioning situation of this type, calling into question all our stories, 
our positions, those that reassure, those that promise, those that 
criticize. The power of the situation is nothing if it isn’t actualized 
in concrete apparatuses however, apparatuses that gather con-
cerned people around concrete situations. The only generality, 
here again, is of a pharmacological order. We have a need, a 
terrible need, to experiment with such apparatuses, to learn 
what they require, to recount their successes, failures and drift. 
And this culture of the apparatus can only be constructed in real 
time, with real questions, not in protected experimental places, 
because what has also to be learned is precisely what such 
places, because they are protected, take shortcuts on: how is one 
to hold up in a milieu that is at one and the same time poisoned 
by stupidity and turned into a hunting ground for the predators 
of free enterprise? And how is one to do so without closing up on 
oneself, with fabricating a nice little world that may well become 
a stakeholder, protecting its particular success in contempt for 
everyone else (just do what we do!)
That the milieu of a group experimenting with the possibility of 
a collective regime of thinking and action can at the same time 
be what poisons it, what threatens it and that to which links have 
to be created, indicates clearly that any shortcut in thinking here 
is lethal, and notably any search for a guarantee, but also every 
transformation of what is experimented with into a model. The 
questions that such a group raises, because they form part of 
this group’s milieu, are operative questions, even and especially if 
they pretend to be neutral, the questions that judges or voyeurs 
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always be linked to the invention of practical means for making a 
response.
Let us take a fairly crucial example, that of trust, as much the 
trust between members of a group as between this group and 
its milieus. Making of trust an operative question is to make two 
linked senses of this word diverge – let us call them the “having” 
and the “fabrication” of trust. When the trust that one had turns 
out to have been misplaced, one feels betrayed, duped, dis-
appointed, disgusted, indignant, but it is powerlessness that 
dominates, and it can be translated by recoiling, vindictiveness, 
ressentiment: “I won’t get fooled again!” This is in effect what 
often happens and it is what testifies to the unhealthy character 
of our milieus: not only can a group be betrayed by those it 
thought were its allies, but it can be denounced for betraying the 
trust of those who had celebrated it as exemplary. On the other 
hand, American activists practicing nonviolent direct action have 
given us the example of veritable, artful fabrications of trust. 
What is presupposed here is that betrayal is what everyone will 
be incited to do during an action. These activists in effect know 
that what they must prepare for is a test: not only will the police 
provoke them into violence but the consequences of the action 
– prosecution, prison, heavy fines – will be designed in such a 
way as to divide them, to provoke disagreement and mutual 
accusation. Typically among those who will be selected for 
prosecution many will feel that they have been put in a situation 
that they were not capable of dealing with, or that they have been 
taken hostage by a decision making process that exceeded them 
and the price of which they now have to pay, or that they have 
been left hanging at the moment they have to face consequences: 
shame, ressentiment, disappointment, guilt.
Fabricating trust, for these activists, corresponds to apparatuses 
that make for the envisaging of action on the basis of these tests 
and these foreseeable traps. And this, once again, implies resisting 
the fiction of equality, in this instance, everyone’s equal capacity 
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autonomy. It is, on the contrary, a matter of conferring on the 
tests to come the power to make the participants feel, think, and 
dare to speak in a mode that renders perceptible and legitimate 
the heterogeneity of everyone’s modes of commitment, and 
what they feel capable of. In short, an entire pragmatics, not of 
avowal but of imagination and of the creation of the means to 
make equality pass via differences that are not the object of any 
judgment, but which will be that which the vectors of betrayal will 
profit from if they are not taken into account.2
Nothing is guaranteed, as is always the case with the 
pharmacological art. The transformation that confers on the test 
the power to make think, which constitutes it as an integral part 
of the questioning situation, however, is able to “treat” what are 
foreseeable poisoning operations. Attention no longer bears on 
persons but on modes of collective functioning that in and of 
themselves render some vulnerable, their possible betrayal being 
subsequently taken as a reference so as to accentuate the mis-
trust, intensify suspicion, and thus to anticipate and provoke new 
betrayals.
Obviously the art of apparatuses doesn’t concern stakeholders. 
These play themselves off against each other in every possible 
way, but they cannot betray each other as they are united on the 
basis of the valorization of their respective interests and have 
no other cause to serve. Nor does it concern those united by the 
power of a mobilizing cause characterized as a response, a truth 
with the power to make people agree. Because such a cause com-
municates with an ideal of homogeneity, where all are mobilized 
equally by what gathers them together, by what is good in itself. 
The art of apparatuses is a pharmacological art because those 
whom it concerns are gathered together by what is, in the first 
place, a question that requires an apprenticeship. The fabrication 
2 Starhawk, Webs of Power: Notes from the Global Uprising (Gabriola Island, BC: 
New Society Publishers, 2002).
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possibility of betrayal is taken as a constitutive dimension of the 
situation, but also because it gives a positive signification to the 
heterogeneity of the gathering together, through its response. 
It constitutes this heterogeneity as something that must be 
recognized, indeed even as something that must be actively 
produced, a production that requires apprenticeship.
And so perhaps “everyone together,” but the ensemble will only 
be robust or pertinent if what composes the “everyone” is not 
subject to the “same,” a same that refers the responsibility of 
this ensemble to that which is struggled against. To be reliable, 
the ensemble must not presuppose a postulated equality, but 
must translate operations for the production of equality amongst 
its participants. This signifies that it must be of the order of 
an alloying of heterogeneous elements, not a fusion. What it 
is a matter of learning, in each case, is the manner of making 
divergences exist, of naming and taking them into account where 
otherwise the poison of unspoken, shameful differences would 
have acted, with its potential for the divisive maneuvers that will 
inevitably occur. And it is a matter of learning not only so as to 
resist these maneuvers, but because far from being assimilable 
to a defect, the production of equality between participants, 
which demands that their heterogeneity be activated, is also that 
thanks to which the different dimensions of the situation that 
unites them will be unfolded.
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Artifices
It should be unnecessary to emphasize that making divergences 
present and important has nothing to do with respect for 
differences of opinion, it must be said. It is the situation that, 
via the divergent knowledges it activates, gains the power to 
cause those who gather around it to think and hesitate together. 
I would go so far as to say that the achievement of an alloying, 
of a practice of the heterogeneous, doesn’t require a respect 
for differences but an honoring of divergences. “I respect your 
difference [of opinion]” is a rather empty thing to say, which 
smells of tolerance and commits whoever says it to nothing. On 
the other hand, what can enter into communication with the 
word “honor” is something that will be apprehended not as a 
particularity of the other, but as what the other makes matter, what 
makes him or her think and feel, and which I cannot dream of 
reducing to the “same” without being insulting – the dream is 
transformed into a nightmare. Because what is thereby grasped, 
as something that is irreducible to psychology or to a notion as 
general as culture, is that which, if it is destroyed, would make 
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rather it is that which makes an aspect of this world matter.
Naming Gaia, naming stupidity, and, now, honoring divergences 
in so far as they are related to the situation and not to persons, 
are propositions whose truth derives from their efficacy. An 
efficacy that one might say is against nature, if one holds to the 
usual opposition between the natural and the artificial. But with 
this qualification: that this opposition has no positive sense. The 
desperate search for that which, being “natural” would sup-
posedly have no need of any artifice, refers in fact, once more 
and as ever, to the hatred of the pharmakon, of that whose use 
implies an art.
The natural, in its sadly predictable sense, is what serves as 
an argument for those who feel themselves to be responsible. 
Thus many scientists will affirm that people must trust Science, 
because if they took a measure of everything that scientists don’t 
know, the completely natural reaction would be to relate what 
these scientists know to opinions like everyone else, opinions that 
can be ignored if they are disturbing, if they are an obstacle to a 
rational solution. Similarly those who mistrust user associations 
worry that these users obey a selfishness that is completely 
natural, and will, in a sadly predictable manner, call into question 
those who prevent them from fully enjoying what it is that they 
use, including mechanisms for the solidarity and protection of 
workers that it took so many struggles to create.
If the intrusion of Gaia signifies the necessity of learning to pay 
attention, of accepting inconvenient truths, we are in desperate 
need of artifices, because we desperately need to resist the 
sadly predictable. It is barbarism that is today sadly predictable. 
But the test here is once again to abandon with neither nostalgia 
nor disenchantment the epic style and its grand narrative of 
emancipation, in which Man learns to think by himself, without 
needing any artificial prostheses any longer. This grand narrative 
has poisoned us, not because it would have lured us with the 
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given a debased version of this emancipation, one marked by 
a scorn for those peoples and civilizations that our categories 
judged well before we undertook to bring them, with their 
consent or by force, our enlightenment. Do we not recognize 
ourselves in their rituals, their beliefs, their fetishes, these 
artificial prostheses that we have been able to free ourselves 
from?
That the definition given to emancipation has been marked by 
polemics is nothing to be surprised about, because in our regions 
it has been associated with struggle. But what has made us a 
danger to the planet, ready to recognize illusions everywhere, 
is the way that emancipation has come to coincide with the 
struggle against human illusions. What has turned sciences into 
servants of the public order is the way they have defined their 
achievements, which are primarily creations, the production 
of prostheses of a new kind, in terms of the denials that they 
inflict on opinion. Of course, some will propose that illusions be 
tolerated, but with the gentle scorn of those who think that they 
have no need of that. The path from scorn to stupidity is com-
pletely traced out.
How many times I have felt this scorn when I have described the 
artifices invented by the American activists. How many times I 
have heard the sniggers, assimilating their inventions to tricks 
well known to social psychologists, using catch-all categories, 
like the performative character of language or symbolic efficacy. 
These blunt demurrals, which are analogous to the commission’s 
verdict against Mesmer, attributing the action of his fluid to the 
imagination, are terribly effective. Let us not be mistaken: these 
really are naming operations, but the efficacy of these operations 
is the inverse of the efficacy that I am aiming at when I name. 
In their case, the operation can be phrased: “Move on, there 
is nothing to think about here.” This reminds us that like every 
efficacious operation, naming is both a remedy and a poison, but 
also signals that if we do not perceive the poison, if we confuse 
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is because we are intoxicated. How are we to think without 
becoming addicted to critical demystification? How are we to 
deprive ourselves of the gentle poison of the “we have not been 
fooled, we possess the categories that identify what it is that 
others put to work without knowing it.”
Those who have been poisoned are also those who scorn what 
I have called the art of the pharmakon, with the same protest 
as always: what is of the order of the truth requires no artifice 
to impose itself. Or with the same objection: if the efficacy of a 
proposition requires an art of cultivation, is not the door open to 
relativism? What a horrible possibility! Must one not postulate 
that certain propositions have the power of imposing themselves 
by themselves, if we want to avoid the conflict of opinions and 
the arbitrariness of relations of force becoming an unavoidable 
horizon? The objection is all the more curious for coming from 
scientists who nonetheless know very well that a scientific inter-
pretation can never impose itself without artifice, without exper-
imental fabrications, the invention of which impassions them 
much more than “the truth.”
And the height of scorn and derision is reached when an analogy 
between certain artifices and the techniques used in businesses 
can be denounced: “and why not bungee jumping whilst we’re 
at it, as it works with executives…” And yes, businesses seize 
hold of everything they can use, with perfect indifference to our 
sniggers. Sniggers that are emitted in a quasi-automatic manner 
by those who always again place themselves in the position of the 
brains of humanity.
Let’s not kid ourselves, what provokes the sniggering has a 
great deal to do with the idea that thought is what is merited, 
demanding renunciation and solitude. That is why a good number 
of these “brains” can, on the other hand, bow with respect before 
the passion of Antonin Artaud, who yelled and screamed that 
thought is not “in the head.” What matters to them is that yelling 
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imity as possible to madness. Artaud then, this consecrated cul-
tural hero, offers us the confirmation of what Man is capable of 
confronting, at the risk of losing himself in it, the abyss of chaos 
that must be kept at a distance in order to think. What provokes 
sniggering is the use of artifices that could be called democratic, 
those that it is so easy to dismiss as superstitions, or to role-
playing games or autosuggestion. What is more, they are artifices 
that demand a collective, experimental art, radically denuded of 
any tragic connotation. That the human adventure might pass via 
the pragmatic learning of techniques that our sniggerers have 
been so proud to do without seems quasi -indecent, a sort of 
deliberately infantilizing business.
It is often said that techniques are neutral, that everything 
depends on their utilization. Substitute for the term utilization 
the term use and the sense of neutrality changes. It is no longer 
what allows responsibility to be shifted onto the utilizer, but 
is what requires precautions, experience, and the mode of 
attention that every pharmakon demands. The hatred of artifices, 
always associated with the threat of relativism, is the hatred of 
the pharmakon. If everything depends on an artifice or an art, 
then one can make people think anything and everything.
It is automatically evident that one can associate artifices with 
the worst (grand Nazi rituals, etc.). But is that not precisely why 
practicing the art of the artifice matters, why we need to cultivate 
a capacity to discriminate between their uses, an experience of 
their potential? It has been necessary for me to understand the 
power of stupidity to understand why the danger could serve 
as an argument, to understand why those who feel themselves 
responsible demand that the only legitimate means for political 
action be those that are guaranteed to be without risk, like chil-
dren’s toys. And for as long as that is what they demand, as long 
as they are haunted by the threat of a fantasized populace that 
is always ready to follow the first deliberate agitator, the equality 
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position that they occupy as responsible.
In fact, there is often very little needed between recognizing 
and ignoring the importance of artifice. Thus Jacques Rancière 
has described superbly the importance of the old Athenian 
apparatus, which carried out the choice of magistrates through 
a lottery.1 To be sure, this only concerned those who could claim 
such functions (most notably not women, slaves, or foreigners), 
but the lottery matters for Rancière because it signifies that those 
whom a power is conferred on did not conquer it, did not have to 
beat others, and would not owe their position to a recognition of 
their merits. He isn’t what I have called a whoever, however, as he 
will have to think to ask questions, to participate in a deliberation. 
On the other hand, he is an “anyone.” Anyone can! And it is as 
such that he becomes a magistrate. For Rancière, this anyone 
designates politics as that which supposes and effectuates a 
disjunction with the natural order – it is natural that the best, 
or the most competent, or the most highly motivated, govern. 
But he does not linger on the efficacy of the lottery as artifice, an 
artifice that also characterizes citizen and criminal juries. Those 
who are selected by a lottery know that they are an anyone, and 
that is doubtless what protects them from the complicity that is 
so easily established between experts and guardians, those who 
feel themselves responsible. As anyones they do not owe their 
role to some merit that would distinguish them, and this role, as a 
result, obliges them, constrains them to look for what the situ-
ation demands, and not to think themselves capable of defining 
it. Certainly chance loses its conceptual imperiousness as a pure 
signifier of politics. But it engages a thinking of efficacy that it is a 
matter of learning to honor.
Chance is then all the more interesting as it situates very precisely 
the efficacy of artifice. It is not a matter of allowing chance to 
1 Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, trans. Steve Corcoran (London: 
Verso, 2013).
149decide, but of having recourse to a procedure that, between 
us and what we do, makes what is not ours exist, opening up a 
situation in relation to which we do not have to claim to be up 
to it. The manner in which the idea of appealing to chance can 
shock, when it is a serious matter, where the elected one should 
be selected, demonstrates just how far merit and motivation 
as reasons have created a void around themselves, to the point 
of dismissing as arbitrary everything that cannot present such 
reasons. But chance is also the simplest of artifices. One day, 
perhaps, we will experience a certain shame and great sadness 
at having dismissed the age-old traditions – from the auguries of 
antiquity to those of seers, Tarot readers or cowrie shell diviners 
– as superstition. Then we will know how to respect their efficacy, 
independently of any belief, the manner in which they transform 
the relationship of those who practice them to their knowledges, 
in which they render them capable of an attention to the world 
and its scarcely perceptible signs, which open these knowledges 
up to their own unknowns. On that day, we will also have learned 
just how arrogant and careless we have been in regarding 
ourselves as not needing such artifices.
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Honoring
Ticklish Gaia, such as I have named her here, cannot be 
associated with either prayer, which is addressed to divinities 
able to hear us, or with the submissiveness that this other blind 
divinity, honored under the name “the laws of the market,” 
demands. To honor Gaia is not to hear a message that comes 
from any kind of transcendence, nor is it to resign ourselves to a 
future under the sign of repentance, that is to say, the acceptance 
of a form of collective culpability – “we must accept that we must 
change our way of life.” We haven’t chosen this way of life, and 
all the knowledgeable sociological narratives that tell us about 
the modern individual tell us about a “remainder,” about what 
remains when what had the power to cause us to think, feel, 
and act together has been destroyed, when free enterprise has 
conquered the right not to pay attention, and has shunted the 
burden of risk management onto the State.
If it is a matter of honoring Gaia, one must not repeat in her 
regard what were perhaps the errors of Marx’s inheritors: fab-
ricating a point of view organized around a humanist version of 
salvation, in which the question posed communicated directly 
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overcoming what separates it from its truth. Perhaps it is a ques-
tion of salvation, but in the sense that this reference doesn’t 
guarantee anything, authorizes nothing, is not associated with 
any “and so,” and doesn’t communicate with any providential 
morality reducing the intrusion of Gaia to that which our history 
needed in order to be fully accomplished. Responding to Gaia’s 
intrusion by means of triumphalist slogans/order-words that put 
the ends of humanity on stage would always show that we have 
learned nothing, again and as always, accepting the grand epic 
narrative that makes us, always us, into the pathfinders. Didn’t 
we invent the fateful concept of humanity? It is, instead, a matter 
of detoxifying the narratives that have made us forget that the 
earth was not ours, in the service of our history, narratives that 
are everywhere, in the heads of all those who in one manner or 
another feel themselves responsible, the bearers of a compass, 
the representatives of a direction that must be maintained.
It is not enough to denounce the pastors, responsible for a herd 
that they must protect from seduction and illusion. If I have 
offered a eulogy to artifice, it is because it is necessary for us to 
reclaim, to reappropriate, to relearn that whose destruction has 
turned us into a quasi herd. And what I have called artifice trans-
lates this necessity. We who are the inheritors of a destruction, 
the children of those who, being expropriated of their commons, 
have been the prey not only of exploitation but also of the 
abstractions that made them into whoevers, we have to exper-
iment with what is likely to recreate – to take root again as one 
says of a plant – or to regenerate the capacity to think and act 
together.
I haven’t stopped emphasizing that such experimentation is 
political, because it is not a question of making things better, 
but of experimenting in a milieu that is known to be saturated 
with traps, infernal alternatives, and impossibilities concocted as 
much by the State as by capitalism. But political struggle, here, 
doesn’t happen through operations of representation but much 
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stitution of “resonance chambers” such that what happens to one 
group makes others think and act, but also such that where one 
group achieves something, what they learn, what they make exist, 
becomes so many resources and experimental possibilities for 
others. However precarious or small it might be each achievement 
matters. None will suffice to appease Gaia, but all will contribute 
to responding to the trials that are coming, in a mode that is not 
barbaric.
Of course, it is not a matter of substituting a culture of exper-
imental achievements for the necessities of open political 
struggle, which is all the more necessary for having to invest 
spaces that are reputedly beyond politics, in which experts 
are activated, calculating limits, attempting to articulate the 
measures to be taken, with the imperious necessity of durable 
growth. Even the apparently sensible notion of limit is bearer 
of the threat of the sad but determined “we must…” that 
announces barbarism. Limits are what are negotiated between 
our guardians, they are imposed on the herd, and leave in the 
shadows the fact that in our world, riven by radical inequalities, a 
veritable miracle would be needed for limits not to be a factor in 
even greater inequality. And that would be the case whatever the 
prodigious accomplishments of the technique that announces to 
us today that Man will become capable of manipulating matter 
atom by atom, of shattering his biological limitations, of beating 
old age and of living in intelligent houses that will satisfy his 
slightest desires.
Political struggle should happen everywhere that a future that 
none dare imagine is being fabricated, not limiting itself to the 
defense of acquired gains or the denunciation of scandals, but 
seizing hold of the very question of this fabrication. Who pays 
the technicians, how are scientists educated, what promises 
make the wheels of fascination turn round, to what dreams of 
the rich is one entrusting the issue of restarting the economy? 
Scientists and technologists themselves need such questions to 
154 be posed, and some – such as Jacques Testart – have the courage 
and lucidity to ask that they are, that political struggle move in 
on technoscientific innovation, where at the moment apolitical 
slogans of the kind “the planet is in danger, let us save research!” 
resonate. But it is precisely because political struggle must move 
in everywhere that it cannot be thought of just in terms of a 
victory or a conquest of power. The point here is not moral but 
pragmatic: no power, from wherever it comes, however legitimate 
it may be, can as such produce the responses Gaia’s intrusion 
obliges, at all levels.
The GMO event offers an example of a coupling of a new type 
between anticapitalist struggle (and Monsanto is a fairly precise 
figure for this capitalism that concocts a barbaric future) and the 
production of thought. Those who are responsible for us have 
got to promising second- (or third-) generation GMOs, with the 
slogan “if you want the marvelous others that will follow, you 
have first to accept this one.”  But by doing this they raise even 
more questions. They have not managed to isolate the antiGMO 
activists, to label them ecoterrorists, because knowledges have 
been produced that have publicly left the experts stammering, 
because the biotechnologies that produce patents can no longer 
rally their scientific colleagues quite so easily in a grand crusade 
against the rising tide of irrationality, because certain of these 
colleagues have been led to ask themselves questions at the 
same time as the public. To be sure it is rare for geneticists to 
betray genetics from the inside, like Christian Velot did, that is to 
say, to put their research grants, and so their careers, at risk, so 
that what their colleagues won’t talk about is made known. But 
the GMO event is one of those events (one thinks also of strug-
gles over the question of medication, or now over energy) that, 
if appropriately “activated,” can help scientists call their role 
into question –  as much the role that is assigned to them in the 
knowledge economy as that which has for much longer put them 
in the clutches of stupidity, making them the guardians of the 
moral order, of rationality against an opinion which, as Bachelard 
155put it, is always wrong. The outline of a possible new kind of 
researcher, inventing the means for independence in relation 
to their sources of finance, which enslave their practices, is the 
order of the day. This possibility is part of the stakes that couple 
political struggle and creation, because whatever happens we will 
need scientists and technicians.
What is missing in the GMO event? Firstly a political resonance 
chamber that is up to the job: even political allies, when their 
electoral credibility is what matters to them, are frightened 
of getting every dimension of the event communicated, and 
notably politicizing the question of progress that technoscientific 
rationality bears, or that of the knowledge economy, its patents 
and partnerships. “More research money is needed” is a theme 
that still works and is worth trying, as is “the French say no to 
GMO,” the spineless reprising of a refusal that is often reduced 
to a matter of opinion polls and the respect of public opinion 
(even if it is wrong). But perhaps what is also missing is its having 
been celebrated as an event, its having been named such, its 
having generated witnesses who learn to recount what they owe 
to it, what it has taught them, how it united them, how it forced 
them to learn from one another. We need, we desperately need, 
to fabricate such witnesses, such narratives, such celebrations. 
And above all we need what such witnesses, narratives, and 
celebrations can make happen: the experience that signals the 
achievement of new connections between politics and an exper-
imental, always experimental, production of a new capacity to act 
and to think. This experience is what I, after Spinoza and many 
others, will call joy.
Joy, Spinoza writes, is that which translates an increase in the 
power of acting, that is to say too, of thinking and imagining, and 
it has something to do with a knowledge, but with a knowledge 
that is not of a theoretical order, because it does not in the 
first place designate an object, but the very mode of existence 
of whoever becomes capable of it. Joy, one could say, is the 
signature of the event par excellence, the production or discovery 
156 of a new degree of freedom, conferring a supplementary 
dimension on life, thereby modifying the relations between 
dimensions that are already inhabited – the joy of the first step, 
even if it is uneasy. And joy also has an epidemic potential. That 
is what so many of the anonymous participants, like me, tasted in 
May 1968, before those who were to become our guardians, the 
spokespersons of abstract imperatives, dedicated themselves 
to have us forget the event. Joy is not transmitted from the 
knowledgeable to the ignorant, but in a mode that itself produces 
equality, the joy of thinking and imagining together, with others, 
thanks to others. Joy is what makes me bet on a future in which 
the response to Gaia would not be the sadness of degrowth but 
that which the conscientious objectors to economic growth have 
already invented, when they discover together the dimensions of 
life that have been anesthetized, massacred, and dishonored in 
the name of a progress that is reduced today to the imperative 
of economic growth. Perhaps, finally, joy is what can demoralize 
those who are responsible for us, bringing them to abandon their 
sadly heroic posture, and betray what has captured them.
No one is saying that everything will then turn out well, because 
Gaia offended is blind to our histories. Perhaps we won’t be 
able to avoid terrible ordeals. But it depends on us, and that is 
where our response to Gaia can be situated, in learning to exper-
iment with the apparatuses that make us capable of surviving 
these ordeals without sinking into barbarism, in creating what 
nourishes trust where panicked impotence threatens. This 
response, that she will not hear, confers on her intrusion the 
strength of an appeal to lives that are worth living.
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